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The object of science: matter in motion, bodies. Bodies cannot be separated from 
motion, their forms and kinds can only be apprehended in motion; nothing can be 
said about bodies divorced from motion, divorced from all relation to other 
bodies. 
Friedrich Engels, 1873. 
  
What characterises the dialectical world, in all its aspects, as we have described 
it is that it is constantly in motion. Constants become variables, causes become 
effects, and systems develop, destroying the conditions that gave rise to them. 
Even elements that appear to be stable are in a dynamic equilibrium of forces that 
can suddenly become unbalanced, as when a dull grey lump of metal of a critical 
size becomes a fireball brighter than a thousand suns. 
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 Abstract 
This thesis aims to assess how radical perspectives in biology might animate and inform 
political ecology. 
In the 1970s and 1980s there were several social movements of politically engaged scientists 
active in various parts of the world, represented most prominently by Science for the People in 
the US. These scientists critiqued the uses to which scientific knowledge was being put but 
also its content. Therefore their activism called into question the supposed neutrality of 
science. Among them were a small group of biologists who, following Richard Levins and 
Richard Lewontin, tried to develop an approach to biological knowledge informed by Marxist 
dialectics. 
The contribution of these biologists is addressed here in relation to two current theoretical 
debates around the relationship between society and nature and the role of the non-human in 
thinking about environmental issues. Firstly, new/vital materialist accounts of the more-than-
human world are often opposed to ecological Marxism which is seen as being founded on a 
problematic nature-society binary and as insufficiently attentive to the materiality and agency 
of non-humans. Secondly (and related to the first) there is also a heated debate among Marxists 
on the question of nature. For example, there have been arguments between metabolic rift 
theorists and advocates of a world-ecology approach with the latter accusing the former of soft 
dualism and the former responding by defending an account of society and nature as a 
differentiated unity. 
These controversies are playing out in the context of widespread discussions of the 
Anthropocene. The idea of an Anthropocene itself calls into question old certainties about 
society and nature, representing for some a recognition of the complex entanglements of 
human and non-human agencies, and for others an assertion of the overriding influence of 
humans on the biosphere. 
In this thesis I argue that the dialectical approach developed within biology addresses many of 
the concerns of the new materialists. Far from neglecting the role of non-human agency, 
dialectical biologists have actually renewed discussions of this topic within their discipline, in 
particular with the concept of niche construction where it is argued that organisms ought to be 
seen as subjects as well as objects of evolutionary processes. It also points the way forward for 
a more ecologically informed Marxism. 
This thesis is largely theoretical but it does draw on interviews with radical/Marxist biologists 










There is no doubt that human activity is influencing Earth system processes in multiple and 
interconnected ways. Carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere have recently exceeded 
the landmark figure of 400 parts per million meaning that the air we breathe contains around a 
third more carbon dioxide than our great grandparents breathed 100 years ago. Global 
temperatures are now more than 1 degree Celsius above pre-industrial levels and temperature 
rises are set to continue, raising the prospect of catastrophic and uncontrollable changes to 
Earth’s climate.  
Climate change is not the only environmental issue of global concern. Air pollution remains a 
major global health risk, and antimicrobial resistance, threats to the oceans and displacement 
of people have been identified by the UN as emerging issues (UNEP, 2017). Since its 
invention at the start of the 20th century, plastic has become so common in the oceans that it 
poses a serious problem for human health and for biodiversity, with one study finding plastic 
in the bodies of a quarter of marine fish sampled (Gruber, 2015). The effects of human activity 
can also be observed in the bodies of living things themselves: humans are adapting the very 
DNA of non-human species, creating new forms of life such as the trademarked oncomouse 
made famous by Donna Haraway. Animals and plants are forming new assemblages as they 
move location to escape the rising temperatures or migrate into cities and encounter other 
species with which they have not previously been in contact (Marris, 2011). But, although 
human activity is creating both novel species and novel ecosystems, the number of new species 
created is a fraction of the number being pushed towards extinction by anthropogenic changes 
to the climate, habitat destruction and the human induced spread of disease (Dawson, 2016).  
These multiple influences have ensured that the state of the biosphere has become one of the 
most pressing concerns of the 21st century and that it will likely increase in importance in 
terms of official policy and among activists. The effect human activity is having on the world 
is on such a scale that scientists are increasingly taking seriously the prospect that humanity 
has “entered a new geological epoch of its own making” (Castree, 2014, p436). Using the 
Greek word Anthropos (human), geologists propose to name this the “Anthropocene” to 
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signify an epoch when geological strata are dominated by artefacts of recent human origin. The 
Anthropocene idea has also been of public interest, taken up in the popular press (featuring on 
the front cover of The Economist in 2011 and highlighted by geographer Simon Lewis in the 
Guardian—Lewis, 2009) and has provided inspiration for works of art such as Jason DeCaire 
Taylor’s underwater sculpture “Anthropocene”.  
The Anthropocene also provides an impetus to many of the debates taking place in 
contemporary environmental geography. “Geographies of the Anthropocene” was the theme of 
the high profile RGS (with IBG) Annual International Conference in 2015. Chaired by Sarah 
Whatmore, the conference attracted an audience of mostly human geographers but also 
included a keynote talk by Will Steffen formerly of the International Geosphere-Biosphere 
Programme and one of the scientists most closely associated with the idea of an Anthropocene 
epoch. Of course, society-nature theory has been an element of the discipline of geography 
since before contemporary discussions of the Anthropocene. As Noel Castree has argued (see 
Castree, 2000; 2005; 2014) geography itself, with roots in both the natural sciences and the 
social sciences, has tended to act as a “bridging discipline” with a particular, perhaps unique, 
ability to address questions of society and nature. Geography “has been centrally concerned 
with how humans and their environments relate to each other. Many of the most important 
disputes within the discipline can be traced back to different understandings of this 
relationship” (Loftus and Royle, 2017). The Anthropocene has, however, provided a “shock” 
to existing ideas about how publics might view the human place in the biosphere, what is 
meant by “nature” and how easily (or not) nature can be manipulated by human action 
(Lorimer, 2015, p3; Bonneuil and Fressoz, 2017).  
In the context of increased discussions of, and public anxieties around, the role of human 
influence in the Earth system, this thesis will address how the perspectives of a group of 
Marxist thinkers from another discipline, biology, might animate and inform political ecology 
at this conjuncture. These biologists were actively involved in the radical political movements 
of the 1960s and 1970s around the uses of science and, crucially, they also saw Marxist ideas 
as relevant to debates within science. In particular the thesis focuses on a number of thinkers 
who have developed what they refer to as a dialectical biology (see especially Levins and 
Lewontin, 1985). In order to do this, it revisits a discussion of the concept of a “dialectics of 
nature” which, as will be demonstrated in chapter two, has proven controversial among 
Marxists in part due to the misguided approach to the application of dialectics to “nature” in 
the Soviet Union. However, the tragedy of Soviet biology doesn’t mean that “nature” should 
be outside the remit of Marxist philosophy. I argue that ecological Marxists have been 
integrating an understanding of biophysical approaches into their understanding since Marx 





Therefore, this thesis also speaks to debates about whether Marxism could (or should) be 
developed in a more ecological direction. The potential contribution of Marxist biologists has 
been relatively overlooked within geographical thinking, particularly among advocates of what 
are described here as new or vital materialisms (see chapter three) whose ideas have dominated 
geographical discussions of the Anthropocene. However, for reasons to be discussed, many of 
these thinkers have been extremely dismissive of dialectical thinking. However, it is argued 
here that dialectical biology, far from being irrelevant to current debates, offers a resource for a 
critical rethinking of capitalist socio-natural relations.  
 
1.1: Political ecologies 
This thesis is primarily theoretical. It is concerned with ideas from biology and how they might 
be useful in shaping the way we think about environmental issues. However, according to 
Andreas Malm, an activist and scholar, theory can only take us so far. Malm asks whether we 
should be more concerned with the urgent and militant political action needed to slam the 
brakes on climate change (Malm, 2015 and 2018, p16). But, answering himself, he also argues 
that, as the present moment forces us to rethink the assumptions we have made about society 
and nature, theory itself is up for “re-evaluation”: “action remains best served by conceptual 
maps that mark out the colliding forces with some accuracy” (Malm, 2018, p16). This thesis 
aims to contribute in a small way to developing such a conceptual map.  
Within geography, questions of socio-natural relations have often been raised under the banner 
of political ecology. Therefore, this subdiscipline of geography seems like a good place to 
start. Although political ecology itself is a broad and changing field, it is understood here as an 
attempt to politicise environmental processes by seeking to understand how power relations 
influence the relationship between human societies and the biophysical environment. Paul 
Robbins (2012) lists various definitions of political ecology, concluding that it is more aptly 
described as a “community of practice united around a certain kind of text” than as a “theory” 
(p20, emphasis in original; see also Walker, 1998, p132). Political ecology can be viewed as an 
alternative to apolitical ecologies such as the persistent assumption that the environment 
imposes “natural” limits on human populations. This position is itself implicitly political. 
However, it is often framed as an apolitical view and provides an apparently neutral, “natural” 
justification for concerns about population growth. By contrast, political ecologists recognise 
that when making any statement about the environment, politics is inescapable (Robbins, 2012, 
pp14-18). Early empirical work in political ecology often involved detailed studies of physical 
processes such as soil erosion and the ways in which these phenomena are driven by changes 
in human societies in particular, thereby relating processes at local scales with wider dynamics. 
It has traditionally been somewhat focused on rural or semi-rural human populations in the 
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developing world (Robbins uses an example from the east African savanna—Robbins, 2012, 
pp11-13) but it is by no means limited to these spaces and there is a vibrant sub-field of urban 
political ecology (Loftus, 2012; Heynen, 2014).  
In their own discussion of political ecology, Blaikie and Brookfield criticise both social 
scientists who have tended to treat the environment as a “passive background to human 
interaction” (1987, p.xviii) and natural scientists who, they argue, have underestimated the 
extent to which the processes they measure are socially constructed (p.xix). They therefore 
define political ecology as an attempt to combine “the concerns of ecology and a broadly 
defined political economy” together encompassing “the constantly shifting dialectic between 
society and land-based resources” (1987, p17). The sub-field is also often informed by Marxist 
political economy—indeed, the opening article of the first issue of the Journal of Political 
Ecology (Greenberg and Park, 1994, p1) refers to Marx on the first page as the thinker who 
perhaps came closest to developing a materialist understanding of how societies and nature 
mutually transform each other and who therefore became a major influence on thinking within 
political ecology.  
Although political ecologists take pride in their knowledge of the “concerns of ecology”, there 
has been some debate around the extent to which political ecology can (or should) call itself 
ecological. Peter Walker (2005) points out that, particularly from the 1990s onwards, the sub-
field has become more concerned with environmental knowledges, representations of the 
environment and the politics of environmental social movements than with biophysical 
processes. The perceived neglect of the ecological within political ecology has led Walker to 
argue that it risks being marginalised within academic geography and that it “has diminished 
its capacity to contribute to solutions to environmental problems” (Walker, 2005, p77). Walker 
informs readers that, within the natural sciences, “ecology” has a specific definition: “the study 
of the interrelationships between living organisms and their physical environment” (Walker, 
2005, p78). By contrast some political ecologists have used the word “ecology” in its popular 
sense, to signify a more general interest in the “natural” world or concern with broad 
environmental issues such as deforestation or land degradation. Likewise, Zimmerer alerts 
human geographers to a profound theoretical reorientation taking place among biologists and 
calls for them to take note of this shift. He points out that ecologists are moving away from the 
assumption that ecosystems tend towards stasis, arguing that many of these systems are 
characterised by flux and disequilibrium. Biologists have also started to address what 
Zimmerer refers to as the “subjectivity” of non-human organisms in terms of a discussion of 
their different behaviours and capacities to adapt to changing environments (Zimmerer, 1994). 
Interestingly, as we shall see in later chapters, similar conclusions have also been reached by 





1.2: Red-green politics redux 
Political ecologists often apply their theoretical perspectives to real world environmental 
problems. Take for example, the debates in the 1980s and 1990s over forest conservation in the 
United States and the fate of the northern spotted owl. This classic environmental problem 
demonstrates the need for an understanding that is both dialectical and materialist. Any activist 
seeking a way forward through the tangle of disagreements surrounding an issue like spotted 
owl conservation would need ideological clarity as well as tact, understanding and 
commitment. 
The northern spotted owl is one of three subspecies of spotted owl. Its range extends along the 
West coast of North America from Canada, through Washington State and Oregon as far as the 
north of California and it is closely associated with the coniferous forest of this part of the 
country. Ecologists researching the bird’s behaviour have reported that it prefers old growth 
forest which consists of a mix of older trees (often over 200 years old), as well as younger 
individuals and damaged or dead and rotting trees. The felled trees and undergrowth provide 
suitable nesting sites for owls and enable them to hunt prey species such as the flying squirrel. 
When the owls breed, their young disperse themselves widely, suggesting that they need large 
areas of forest in order to breed successfully (Ackers et al, 2015; Birdlife International, 2013; 
Royle, 2017a).  
The northern spotted owl population is decreasing with logging for commercial timber 
production being the major (though not the only) reason for the decline (Birdlife International, 
2013). Furthermore, the owl is often treated as an indicator species, providing a symptom of 
the state of the forest in general. Since the early 1980s, when the Reagan government proposed 
full conversion of the forest to managed timber plantations, the owl and the habitat it lives in 
have been the subject of a heated conflict between the forestry industry and wildlife 
conservation groups. Following public opposition to this plan, various proposals to protect 
areas of forest were put forward. The Northwest Forest Plan, approved in 1994, would set 
aside 5 million acres of forest. But it was predicted that this would lead to 28,000 job losses in 
the timber industry causing widespread anxiety among timber workers and their families. 
Some forestry workers protested by displaying bumper stickers with the slogan “I like spotted 
owls—fried” and dead owls were allegedly found nailed to road signs (Foster, 2002, p119). 
The plan also failed to satisfy environmentalists. The Native Forest Council continued to 
oppose all resource extraction of any kind on public land and organisations such as radical 
green group Earth First! took direct action to try to stop the felling of trees (Foster, 2002).  
Marxist Sociologist John Bellamy Foster, in a wide-ranging analysis of the economics and 
politics of the timber industry on the West coast, points out that jobs were being lost in any 
case as a result of various factors including mechanisation in the timber industry and reduced 
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demand for timber in housing. He argues that, in the absence of effective solidarity between 
workers and environmentalists, the forestry industry saw an opportunity to redirect the blame 
onto environmentalists. The industry supported the Wise Use Movement, which promoted 
logging and lobbied against environmental legislation, thereby attracting the support of some 
workers: “It is no secret that the Wise Use Movement is bankrolled by corporations… 
Nevertheless [it] has a grassroots basis” (Foster, 2002, p127). The movement seems to have 
been effective in convincing some that wildlife would continue to thrive if old growth forest 
was replaced by plantations—in spite of the statements to the contrary from ecological 
scientists. One timber worker in a public hearing in 1989 expresses this understanding, saying: 
“Unless a person has actually sat quietly at a logging site and watched and listened, they 
cannot appreciate the amount of wildlife that is around” (Proctor, 1996, pp270-271). So Wise 
Use propagated an ideal of a productive, managed, ordered environment in contrast to the 
messy forest full of rotting wood favoured by spotted owls.  
The case of the northern spotted owl cannot be understood without reference to the political 
forces involved; what happens to the trees in the forest and the owls that live there is 
inseparable from human action. This human agency operates at multiple scales, from the local 
disputes between workers, unions, environmental groups and logging companies to the level of 
national policy and global markets for timber. Of course, the forest is not a “wilderness”, it has 
been influenced by human action for some time. Even before the logging companies arrived, 
the forest was inhabited by people including First Nations communities, whose activities 
shaped it.  
The northern spotted owl case also involves issues of representation, and poses questions such 
as: how is the forest described by different actors in, for example, magazine articles, websites, 
government reports, contributions to public meetings? Who are these representations aimed at 
and what purpose do they serve? How do people who have never visited these forests or seen a 
northern spotted owl build up an idea of what the forest and its animal inhabitants are like? 
Therefore, the forest itself can be seen as a social artefact “constructed” by the various human-
driven processes involved: it is constructed in the sense of being physically manipulated by 
humans and in the sense of figuring in cultural representations and these types of construction 
mutually reinforce each other (Braun, 2002).  
But, at the same time as the forest is constructed by humans, the behaviour of the owls 
themselves also plays a role. Although many species of animal have adapted to the 
transformations humans have made to their environments, these birds have not coped well with 
changes to their habitat. Whether humans like it or not they seem to have a real preference for 
old growth forest and to actively choose it. Therefore, there are material attributes of the owls 





between the construction of the biosphere and the role of non-humans such as animals within 
it, frames many of the debates this thesis engages with. 
Hobson (2007) offers an intriguing response to this problem. She argues that non-humans 
should be seen as active subjects in socio-environmental processes, rather than as passive 
bystanders. When animals are objects rather than subjects, they can end up being viewed as 
“co-oppressors of the world’s marginalised and poor” (p253). Indeed, the Oregon forest 
workers who nailed owls to road signs certainly seem to have viewed the animals as complicit 
in their oppression. According to Hobson, rather than simply taking the side of the humans in 
this conflict, political ecologists ought to refuse to accept the terms of a debate that pits 
humans and animals against each other. Likewise, Foster also refuses to take sides, calling for 
a wider critique of the capitalist economic system that simultaneously exploits workers and 
degrades the biosphere (Foster, 2002, p131).  
The northern spotted owl example also raises the question of the kind of knowledges needed to 
make sense of these ecological debates. Although insights from the human sciences such as 
sociology and economics are needed in order to grasp what is happening in the forests, it 
cannot be understood purely with reference to human activity. Therefore, Richard York, who 
is based in Oregon and was influenced early in his career by debates over West coast forest 
conservation, explains why an integrated understanding of both human processes and the 
natural sciences is needed. He mentions the work of the dialectical biologists, with which this 
thesis engages, as an example of such an approach: 
It’s a social problem. The problem isn’t just about the owls…it’s human 
activity, it’s human economy, it’s human behaviour. If you want to solve 
environmental problems it’s a social change question… If you want to 
understand humans and the environment you really need a bigger picture 
understanding of ecological sciences and the social sciences. Most social 
scientists really don’t engage with the natural scientists very much and a lot 
of the natural scientists are often very naïve about social science and don’t 
understand the political processes. This is one of the reasons why I think 
the dialectical biologists have a more sophisticated view of politics and 
society (interview, 19 April 2017).  
The northern spotted owl provides a classic case of an environmental problem about which 
much has been written. As a “jobs versus the environment” issue it has become particularly 
polarised. But it is not the only case of an environmental problem that brings together a diverse 
set of human and non-human factors. Debates over whether to adopt land-sparing agricultural 
practices to provide “more space for wildlife” or over the currently high-profile issue of plastic 
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pollution in the oceans similarly bind together the actions of humans and those of non-human 
living things. These issues provoke us to consider our definitions of society and nature, how to 
conceptualise the relationship between the two (or whether to reject such terminology as in 
itself founded on a dualism) and who or what we consider as agents in such an analysis.  
This thesis therefore considers the contribution of Marxist biology to these questions. But 
issues of ecology and the environment were not always considered priorities for Marxists in 
the 20th century. In a striking commentary on his own intellectual heritage, Ted Benton, a 
sociologist and practicing field ecologist, explains how he didn’t always see the connection 
between his interest in wildlife and his political commitments: 
The link between Marxism and nature is something that would be hardly 
conceivable for people on the left in my youth… There has been a huge 
transformation in the way that we think about these things. I want to say 
a bit about that because I think it throws some light on where we are now.  
When I was a teenager in the 1950s in Doncaster in South Yorkshire I was 
living in a big working-class estate with a massive presence of heavy 
industry and mining. The working class had an immense power… I was 
drawn into that. But at the same time, like quite a few boys—specifically 
boys (the gender issue is quite significant)—of my age, we were 
essentially feral kids. We actually roamed the quarries and the river banks 
and the marshes and the very lightly grazed pastures and so on that were 
interspersed in the industrial landscape. We started collecting birds’ eggs 
and local flowers and butterflies and had tadpoles and watched them grow 
into frogs and so on.  
That to me was a very important part of my childhood. It gave a lot of 
meaning to me as a kid. But I never saw any connection whatsoever 
between the class politics that was very prominent at that time and these 
other interests.  
In the early 1970s when I was…lecturing in sociology at Essex University 
I gave quite a lot of lectures on Marx and Marxist philosophy and was 
involved to some extent in supporting student occupations and lecturers’ 
strikes and stuff like that… At the same time, I actually wrote articles on 
campus wildlife… One of my ex-students came up to me [at a reunion] 
and said: “We all thought this was great to have this lefty lecturer talking 





butterflies and we were totally disillusioned and horrified” (Benton, 
2016). 
Benton goes on to explain how he himself didn’t see the connections between his work in 
sociology and environmental issues until the emerging green movement started to raise the 
issue of the link between social relations and what was happening to the rest of nature. But 
these movements developed quite autonomously from the socialist left and often 
antagonistically towards it (Benton, 2016). As the northern spotted owl example demonstrates, 
environmental concerns have sometimes been pitted against workers’ demands for jobs and 
better living conditions. Likewise, in the 20th century, Marxist ideas weren’t necessarily 
appealing to environmental activists and there was some debate as to whether Marxism is 
relevant to environmental concerns (Harribey, 2008; Benton, 1981). 
In May 1917, the Polish born revolutionary Rosa Luxemburg, in a letter to her friend Sophie 
Liebknecht, describes her interest in wildlife and expresses the tension between this interest 
and the concern with relationships between humans that might seem more central to socialist 
enquiry. She even suggests that this fascination with animals might be considered “treason to 
socialism” if her comrades found out about it:  
You ask what I am reading. Natural science for the most part; I am 
studying the distribution of plants and animals. 
Yesterday I was reading about the reasons for the disappearance of song 
birds in Germany. The spread of scientific forestry, horticulture and 
agriculture, have cut them off from their nesting places and their food 
supply. More and more, with modern methods, we are doing away with 
hollow trees, waste lands, brushwood, fallen leaves. I felt sore at heart. I 
was not thinking so much about the loss of pleasure for human beings, but 
I was so much distressed at the idea of the stealthy and inexorable 
destruction of these defenceless little creatures, that the tears came into 
my eyes… 
I suppose I must be out of sorts to feel everything so deeply. Sometimes, 
however, it seems to me that I am not really a human being at all but like 
a bird or a beast in human form. I feel so much more at home even in a 
scrap of garden like the one here, and still more in the meadows when the 
grass is humming with bees than—at one of our party congresses. I can 
say that to you, for you will not promptly suspect me of treason to 
socialism! You know that I really hope to die at my post, in a street fight 
or in prison. 
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But my innermost personality belongs more to my tomtits than to the 
comrades. This is not because, like so many spiritually bankrupt 
politicians, I seek refuge and find repose in nature. Far from it, in nature 
at every turn I see so much cruelty that I suffer greatly (Luxemburg, 
1917).1  
Evidently from this letter, the removal of habitat for birds by clearing dead wood from forests 
in the cause of “scientific forestry” was a source of concern long before the northern spotted 
owl debates of the 1980s and 1990s. Luxemburg’s reference to dying in prison is also prescient 
given that she would be imprisoned and killed not long after these words were written. Of 
more direct relevance to this thesis, Luxemburg also captures something of the contradiction 
between approaches that try to grasp something about the intrinsic characteristics of non-
humans and those that treat non-humans in terms of their relationship with humans, for 
example as a source of pleasure.  
 
1.3: Marxism, materialism and biology 
In the years since the debates over northern spotted owl conservation, theoretical struggles 
over interpretations of nature-society theory within geography have continued. This thesis will 
address in particular the emergence of a strand of theory that might be referred to as new or 
vital materialism and which aims to address the apparent omissions in ecological Marxism. 
This “diverse and increasingly well known” body of literature has come to dominate 
discussions of society and nature (Braun, 2015, pp1-2). As will be explained further in chapter 
three, this work often involves an interest in the materiality of the non-human world, a 
rejection of dualist approaches to nature and society and a preference for referring to socio-
natural hybrids. New materialists have developed novel understandings of the agency of non-
humans and its adherents have referred to the vitality and inventiveness of natural processes 
(Braun, 2008). These thinkers have a particular interest in knowledges from the natural 
sciences and how these might provide a way of addressing the perceived lack of regard for 
non-human processes in political ecological accounts. For example, Bennett (2010) and Grosz 
(2011) both make use of a reading of Darwin’s work, while Barad draws on ideas from 
theoretical physics (Barad, 2007).  
Ecological Marxism, on the other hand, is centrally concerned with the influence of the 
development of capitalism on socio-natural systems. As will be argued in chapter two, the 
dialectical and materialist approach of Marx and Engels has been a continual point of reference 
for ecological Marxists. For example, a discussion of dialectics, understood as an emphasis on 
                                                          





the processes that constitute things rather than the things themselves, forms a chapter of David 
Harvey’s (1996) book Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference. However, some new 
materialist thinkers have been suspicious of Marxist approaches and of dialectics. Perhaps 
influenced by Bruno Latour’s contention that Marxism has done little to overcome dualist 
accounts of society and nature, retaining a “notion of society and nature as a pair” (quoted in 
Malm, 2018, p58), they have criticised such thinking on the grounds that, they say, it imposes 
a type of binary thinking whereby society and nature are two separate realms that come to 
relate to each other. Latourian thinkers have also argued that dialectics is unable to account for 
the agency or materiality of non-human forces (see Lorimer, 2013). Marxism is, therefore, 
seen as limited in its ability to address the questions raised by the Anthropocene where human 
influence seems to have become inextricably entangled with biospheric processes. However, 
some counter that this scepticism about dialectics is overblown and that dialectical and new 
materialist approaches actually share much in common (see Sheppard, 2008 for example).  
Alongside this muted standoff there have also been debates among Marxists around different 
understandings of nature and society. This is represented strikingly by the recent feud between 
metabolic rift theorists including Andreas Malm and John Bellamy Foster on the one side and 
world-ecologists such as Jason W Moore on the other (Foster, 2016b and 2016c; Moore, 
2017b) but there have been sharp differences for some time now, for example Foster is also 
critical of David Harvey and of Neil Smith’s earlier writings on the production of nature. 
These debates will be addressed further in chapter two. Here, suffice it to say that there are 
important debates about how Marxists might conceptualise capitalist societies’ treatment of 
nature including whether capitalism can be said to create a rift in the society-nature 
relationship, and around the possible contribution of non-humans to value. So, there are two 
debates at work, one between people who are sceptical that dialectical methods are a useful 
element of society-nature theory and another between Marxists, many of whom refer to their 
conceptions as dialectical but have differing interpretations of what that might mean. For the 
latter, elaborating a dialectics of nature has become a central question. These two debates are 
interlinked. For example, Malm has strongly criticised Moore because, as he sees it, Moore 
flies too close to the new materialist, hybridist, Latourian trend in contemporary theory (by 
contrast Malm refers to his own project as an effort to “capture a dialectics of society and 
nature”—Malm, 2018, p59, emphasis added).  
An analysis of the work of dialectical biologists speaks to both of these debates. It addresses 
some of the criticisms levelled against dialectics by highlighting a tradition of thought 
concerned with complexity, dynamism and agency, concerns that might generally be 
associated with new materialist thought. It also adds clarity to the debates among Marxists by 
demonstrating what a dialectical approach to the “natural” world might look like in practice.  
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But there are also issues at stake when social scientists look to biology for answers. As Bruce 
Braun points out, geographers, including many within the new materialist tradition, are 
engaging with biological knowledges. This is to be welcomed as “not only justifiable but also 
necessary” for those who reject dualistic views of society and nature (Braun, 2015, p3). J 
Anthony Stallins agrees that “maintaining an awareness of current biological and evolutionary 
thought should be considered essential for any discipline [ie geography] that studies the 
human-environment relationship” (Stallins, 2012, p438). Commenting on this interest in 
biology, sociologist Nikolas Rose has gone as far as to state that the social sciences are 
entering a “biological age” in which a new relationship between the human and biological 
sciences is required (Rose, 2013).2 In geography this interest in biology has started to manifest 
itself in the last few years. For example, Myra Hird, in collaboration with the influential 
biologist Lyn Margulies, has argued that theories of symbiosis have the potential to complicate 
accepted notions of the separation of nature and culture (Hird, 2010). Furthermore, in the last 
few years, animal geographers have also produced a wealth of critical engagements with the 
lives and histories of animals (Emel, Wilbert and Wolch, 2002, see also chapter three here).  
Benton also argues for a reengagement on the part of social scientists with biology. But he 
cautions that such an approach should avoid reductionism (Benton, 1991). If reductionism 
within the “natural” sciences tends towards seeing biology as essentially explainable with 
recourse to physics (see also chapter five), its logical correlate is that psychology, 
anthropology and, ultimately, the social sciences fit into this hierarchy and can be similarly 
reduced to biology. Meloni (2014) further criticises a tendency to treat biological knowledge 
as ontologically prior to the social; biology can be seen as a “solid foundation” on which 
human society is built. But such an approach would be unhelpful for developing a critical 
political ecology. We should avoid biologism, the inappropriate application of biological ideas 
to attempt to explain social phenomena.  
Meloni also questions the tendency of some social scientists to see biology as essential unified 
and therefore to neglect major disputes within the field. Likewise, for Braun, there is a 
persistent assumption in some of the literature that science “speaks in one voice” leading to a 
neglect of sharp theoretical differences among natural scientists (Braun, 2015). Nevertheless, 
Benton (1991) sees good reason for social scientists to engage critically with biology and, 
indeed, to take a position on debates within the discipline. In particular, he refers to the work 
of dialectical biologist Richard Lewontin as an example of non-reductionist biology that 
sociologists might learn from. If such an engagement recognises that biology itself is already a 
                                                          






site of contestation, it should, therefore, be possible to critique its ideas. Indeed, many 
biologists are themselves already involved in intense debates within their own discipline.  
 
1.4: Structure of the thesis 
The following chapter of this thesis will review the major trends within ecological Marxism 
including some of the aforementioned debates that have developed among Marxists. As a 
major theme throughout the thesis is the need for a dialectical approach, this chapter introduces 
the subject of dialectics and shows how some thinkers within geography have used dialectical 
methods in their work. The dialectical biologists make a clear argument that such a 
methodology can be useful in understanding the non-human world as well as human societies. 
But any attempt to argue this position must also acknowledge the troubled history of 
arguments for a “dialectics of nature”, an idea most associated with Marx’s collaborator 
Friedrich Engels. This chapter shows why some theorists have been sceptical about the notion 
of a dialectics of nature, in particular it addresses the contention of the Hungarian Marxist 
Georg Lukács, who at times argued that Engels was fundamentally wrong in his application of 
dialectical thinking to “nature”, but whose ideas have also been met with their own critique.  
As discussed above, the notion of an Anthropocene epoch provides context to the lively 
debates on society and nature currently taking place. Therefore, chapter three opens with a 
discussion of this popular concept, explaining some of the controversies around the diagnosis 
of the Anthropocene and the wider theoretical issues it raises. The chapter goes on to address a 
body of work, collectively referred to here as “new/vital materialisms”, which has emerged in 
recent years and which calls for a renewed engagement with the liveliness or vitality of non-
human matter. Arguably new materialists have been more prepared to engage with the 
Anthropocene than some Marxists who have been sceptical about the proposals for a new 
epoch. However, the chapter also assesses some of the criticisms that have in turn been raised 
against the new materialist project.  
After a brief chapter (four) explaining the methods used to gather and interpret interview data 
for this thesis, chapter five—the first of three more analytical chapters—addresses the 
contribution of the dialectical biologists. The chapter draws on interview-based research as 
well as a study of these scientists’ written work. As explained here, many of the biologists 
interviewed were part of the campaign group “Science for the People” and combined political 
activism with their research. They navigated the contradictions inherent in doing scientific 
work that was both politically engaged but still aimed at finding out truths about the world. 
This chapter shows how this small group of biologists have made use of dialectics, with a 
particular focus on the themes of dynamism and complexity evident in their work. The chapter 
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responds to some of the criticisms levelled at Marxism by the new materialists by pointing to a 
dialectical approach that is very much concerned with the materiality and agency of the non-
human.  
Chapter six extends what, for many, is the key contribution of dialectical biology, its notion of 
the organism as a subject as well as an object in evolution. From within their own discipline, 
the dialectical biologists have theorised the specific ways in which non-human organisms can 
be said to exhibit agency. In particular Levins and Lewontin and their various associates have 
argued that organisms actively construct their environments as well as being influenced by 
those environments (see Levins and Lewontin, 1985). This insight is explicitly influenced by 
Marxist philosophy, with its own concerns with the ways in which humans act to change the 
world around them and at the same time change their own nature. The chapter demonstrates 
how this idea has been taken up within biology, in particular how it has enlivened 
contemporary debates around the concept of the biological niche (Odling-Smee, Laland and 
Feldman, 2003). The dialectical biologists’ relevance for political ecology is both 
methodological and substantial. Therefore, this chapter turns to the question of what political 
ecology might look like if it incorporated the ideas developed within biology. It shows how 
dialectical biology offers a non-dualist perspective on ecology with particular attention to 
novel or human-created ecosystems. The aims here are therefore twofold: engagement by 
political ecologists with a set of overlooked ideas from the natural sciences as well as a 
contribution to more philosophical debates about what it means to adopt a dialectics of nature. 
Chapter seven demonstrates how one way in which this thinking might be taken forward in 
developing a more historical political ecology. This question has been raised by animal 
geographers in response to the human exceptionalism that, some argue, treats only humans as 
historical actors and denies the capacity of non-humans to participate in historical change—
exceptionalism that has been evident in some discussions of the Anthropocene (Wilcox and 
Rutherford, 2018). As well as ideas within contemporary biology from the previous chapters, 
this chapter also builds on a discussion of the ways in which animals are represented in natural 
history museums and in Darwin’s writings on the small agencies of earthworms which offers 
an alternative historical approach to animals. The chapter continues by addressing the 
contributions of dialectical biology to issues of human evolution and human “nature”. The 
final chapter concludes the thesis by summarising the key points made in the preceding 
chapters and offering an argument for a political ecology informed by dialectical biology. 
Much of the work informing this thesis has been published. The overall structure of the 
argument is based on an article, “Complexity, Dynamism, and Agency: How Can Dialectical 
Biology Inform Geography?” published in Antipode in May 2017 (Royle, 2017b). Here I 





why there is a debate between followers of these two approaches before going on to discuss 
the work of biologists Richard Levins, Richard Lewontin, Ivette Perfecto and John 
Vandermeer. This article demonstrated how these thinkers’ ideas counter some of the 
criticisms levelled against dialectical thought and the ways in which they might inform 
political ecology. I received very positive and encouraging feedback on this article from 
Richard Lewontin (by email).  
The review of ecological Marxism in chapter two is an expanded version of a short book 
chapter I was asked to write for a forthcoming Handbook of Marxism and Post-Marxism, 
published by Routledge and edited by Alex Callinicos, Lucia Pradella and Stathis Kouvelakis 
(Royle, forthcoming). This also builds on the argument in an article in International Socialism 
entitled “Dialectics, Nature and the Dialectics of Nature” (Royle, 2014a). This article debated 
the issue of a dialectics of nature and argued that to talk of a dialectics of nature requires a 
discussion of what we mean by “nature” as well as dialectics. In addition, part of chapter three 
is based on an article on the Anthropocene published in International Socialism (Royle, 
2016b). This introduced the idea of the Anthropocene to a general audience and explained 
some of the debates around the concept. The article was used on the reading list for an 
undergraduate and postgraduate course in environmental sociology at Virginia Commonwealth 
University in the US. Chapter seven is an extended version of another book chapter titled: 
“Shaking the Ground: Histories of Earthworms from Darwin to Niche Construction” in an 
edited collection, Historical Animal Geographies, published by Routledge in 2018 (Royle, 
2018).  
An entry I co-wrote with Alex Loftus for the Oxford Bibliographies series on Nature/Society 
Theory helped clarify my ideas on different approaches to the issue of “nature” and “society” 
within geography and provides some of the references for this thesis (Loftus and Royle, 
2017).3 I also published a short peer reviewed entry on the northern spotted owl for an 
encyclopaedia of animal geographies, Humans and Animals: A Geography of Coexistence 
which encouraged me to revisit this classic case study of a controversy around species 
conservation (Royle, 2017a). Books I have reviewed that are referred to in this thesis include 
Jamie Lorimer’s (2015) book Wildlife in the Anthropocene (reviewed in Human Geography, 
Royle, 2016a), John Parrington’s (2015) The Deeper Genome (reviewed in Monthly Review, 
Royle, 2016c), This Changes Everything by Naomi Klein (Klein, 2015, see Royle, 2015) and 
the 2014 Haymarket edition of Paul Burkett’s Marx and Nature (Royle, 2014b). 
                                                          
3 The Oxford Bibliographies are peer-reviewed bibliographies providing a list of references on a 
particular topic with annotations and introductory explanations of the sources. 
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I am also thankful to have been given the opportunity to present my research in sessions at the 
RGS (IBG) Annual Conference, The Association of American Geographers Annual 
Conference, Historical Materialism Conference, the London Conference in Critical Thought, 
the Political Ecologies of Conflict, Capitalism and Contestation (PE-3C) International 
Conference, a conference titled “Performing Dialectics” at Queen Mary, University of London 
in 2015 and the Oxford Real Farming Conference in 2017. I discussed my work at the King’s 
Climate Exchange and at various paper presentations and reading groups within the 
Department of Geography at King’s.  
 
1.5: A note on vocabulary 
Words such as “nature” and the “environment” used in this thesis have often been 
problematised in discussions of the biosphere. The language we use structures our 
understanding of the world and it is sometimes difficult to avoid using words that are laden 
with different meanings. Although many of us have an intuitive sense of what is meant by 
“nature”, Raymond Williams described it as “perhaps the most complex word in the English 
language” (Williams, 1976, p219). “Nature” tends to evoke a realm separate from human 
influence, which many of the authors discussed in this thesis would say simply does not exist. 
Therefore, where possible I have tried to avoid using the word except critically.   
Similarly, the “environment” also refers to something that “doesn’t exist”. On one level the 
word simply means “surroundings” and can be used to refer to the material and organic 
conditions that organisms live within and relate to, rather than as something that simply exists 
“out there”. However, it is possible to criticise even this relational view. Therefore, following 
the radical agricultural theorist Colin Tudge, I have preferentially used the word “biosphere” to 
refer to the part of the world inhabited by living things. “Environmentalism” also refers to 
various social movements and their associated ideas, so I have referred to environmentalism, 
environmental movements, environmental geography and environmental issues for want of 
better words to describe these.  
In biology, “ecology” is a branch of the discipline concerned with analysing the relationships 
between living things and with the non-living elements of the biosphere. As this suggests a 
relational perspective it avoids some of the more problematic connotations of “nature” as 
separate from society. Therefore, I have referred to ecological Marxism and where particular 
thinkers describe themselves as ecosocialists I have adopted this terminology.  
Finally, the term “environmental crisis” has been criticised by some. The identification of a 
crisis too easily allows for some to pose the kind of post-political solutions discussed here in 





posed by problems such as climate change to people’s lives and welfare (particularly in the 
Global South), I have tried to avoid calling this a “crisis”.  
 
  






Chapter 2: Ecological Marxism 
The previous chapter referred to Benton’s comments on how his interest in wildlife developed 
somewhat separately from his socialist politics. However, in the past few decades there has 
been a growing interest in questions of ecology and climatic instability among Marxists. For 
these thinkers, Marx’s method, his historical materialism and dialectics, is as important as his 
substantive conclusions in Capital (Holleman, 2015).  
This chapter starts by outlining Marx and Engels’ approach to questions of science and 
ecology and continues with a discussion of the work of those Marxists who continue this 
project today. These include the early attempts of James O’Connor, Benton and others to 
reconcile Marxian ideas with those of the environmental social movements of the 1960s, the 
“second stage” ecosocialism that developed in response to these attempts, the production of 
nature approach, associated primarily with Neil Smith, and the world-ecology of Jason Moore 
and colleagues.4 As this chapter will show, a (sometimes heated) dispute has arisen between 
followers of these different approaches as to the type of theory needed to make sense of socio-
natural relations. For example, Moore has been particularly critical of interpretations of a 
theory of metabolic rift associated with the second stage ecosocialists. The former have in turn 
criticised Moore’s approach which they see as a departure from Marx’s own method.  
One aspect of this debate that is not always raised is that several of its interlocutors have 
invoked the work of the dialectical biologists. The current schism between ecological Marxists 
is rooted in discussions of what constitutes a Marxist philosophy, but also more specifically in 
older debates about what a dialectical approach to nature consists of. Therefore, this chapter 
introduces the subject of dialectics with a particular focus on Engels’ unfinished project of 
developing a “dialectics of nature” and the subsequent debates this has provoked. For this the 
work of the dialectical biologists is informative as it offers one of the few attempts to actually 
elaborate a dialectical approach to nature and show what such an approach might look like in 
                                                          
4 No doubt the overview here will contain many omissions, notably this chapter focuses on the work of 





practice (as Jason Moore argues, it is often easier to invoke dialectics than to demonstrate it—
Moore, 2017b, p304).  
 
2.1: Marx and Engels on the question of nature 
In The German Ideology, Marx and Engels jointly state that: “The first premise of all human 
history is, of course, the existence of living human individuals. Thus, the first fact to be 
established is the physical organisation of these individuals and their consequent relation to the 
rest of nature” (Marx and Engels, 1968 [1845-6]). In the Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts (of 1844) Marx takes an even more apparently naturalistic stance, writing: 
“Nature is man’s inorganic body… Man lives from nature—ie nature is his body—and he must 
maintain a continuing dialogue with it if he is not to die. To say that man’s physical and mental 
life is linked to nature simply means that nature is linked to itself, for man is a part of nature” 
(Marx, 1959 [1844]).5 These references to “nature” in two key early statements of their 
theoretical approach show that Marx and Engels made relations with the rest of nature central 
to their understanding.6 The notion of nature as the “inorganic body” of a human suggests a 
holistic approach whereby humans are a part of nature and nature is a part of human life in the 
form of the human body. Marx and Engels evidently saw socio-natural relations as a starting 
point for building an analysis of capitalism rather than something added to the analysis after 
the fact. Indeed, Marx distinguished his thought from that of the political economists he 
critiqued in that he saw wealth as a product of the activities of labour and nature, whereas for 
the political economists, wealth or use value derives only from human activities, a viewpoint 
that itself reflects the alienation of humans from nature. Kohei Saito goes as far as to argue 
convincingly that “it is not possible to comprehend the full scope of [Marx’s] critique of 
political economy if one ignores its ecological dimension” (Saito, 2017, p14).  
Marx continues his discussion in the Manuscripts by elaborating how humans produce various 
material products through their labour. At this point he establishes a dialectic between human 
subjects and their object (Smith, 2008, pp32-35). The ability to produce consciously, a 
human’s “species being”, in Marx’s terminology, differentiates humans from animals: “The 
animal is immediately one with its life activity. It does not distinguish itself from it. It is its life 
activity. Man makes his life activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness” 
(Marx, 1959).  
                                                          
5 This statement is meant to refer to all humans, not just men. Indeed, Marx often used gender neutral 
German terms which were later translated into English as words like “man”.   
6 Marx’s views on nature are, of course, the subject of several book length studies that can elaborate 
them in much more depth than is possible here (see Foster, 2000, Burkett, 2014, Saito, 2017 for 
example).  
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In volume one of Capital Marx adds a further point that humans relate to nature by exercising 
labour power as they appropriate the “materials of nature”: 
Labour is, first of all, a process between man and nature, a process by 
which man, through his own actions, mediates, regulates and controls the 
metabolism between himself and nature… He sets in motion the natural 
forces which belong to his own body, his arms, legs, head and hands, in 
order to appropriate the materials of nature in a form adapted to his own 
needs. Through this movement he acts upon external nature and changes 
it, and in this way, he simultaneously changes his own nature (Marx, 1976 
[1867], p283, emphasis added).  
In the same chapter, Marx outlines an understanding of the labour process in general, in which 
both humans and nature participate, and again makes a distinction between humans and other 
animals on the basis of conscious planning by humans: 
A spider conducts operations which resemble those of a weaver, and a bee 
would put many a human architect to shame by the construction of its 
honeycomb cells. But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best 
of bees is that the architect builds the cell in his mind before he constructs 
it in wax (Marx, 1976, p284).  
Here humans “confront” nature as they work, and simultaneously change themselves, acting 
upon external nature rather than simply being part of nature (Marx, 1976, p283). So, taking the 
quotes together shows that Marx took the apparently contradictory position that humans are 
“part of nature” but are able actively to differentiate ourselves from the rest of nature. This is 
not the type of holistic approach that simply treats society and nature as indistinguishable; it is 
one whereby socio-natures are treated as a differentiated unity (see the discussion in 
Henderson, 2009, pp266-270). David Harvey similarly notes the “complexity” of Marx’s dual 
conception of the human-environment relation, pointing out that, for Marx, humans are 
described as part of nature and “at another level” as “an ensemble of social relations” (Harvey, 
1974, p266).  
Marx’s initial general statements on “the labour process independently of any specific social 
formation” (Marx, 1976, p283) lay the groundwork for thinking about how human beings 
relate to the rest of the biosphere. But, of course, Marx and Engels were concerned not just 
with human labour in general but with humans organised in different types of society. 
Ecological Marxism therefore develops a critique of the specific ways in which capitalism—
defined by exploitation of human labour power driven by competition between capitals in 





approaches that treat humans as atomised individuals, for Marxists, humans are social beings. 
The human relationship with the rest of the biosphere is intrinsically related to the way in 
which the production process is organised (see White, Gareau and Rudy, 2017, p26). This is 
why Harvey can say that: “All critical examinations of the [human] relation to nature are 
simultaneously critical examinations of society” (Harvey, 1996, p174).  
For Marx, the ability of humans to perform labour has historically become alienated with the 
development of societies divided by class, and further so with capitalism. When humans are 
compelled to produce what will make a profit for the capitalist and no longer own the products 
of their labour or control the labour process, this leads to a form of alienation from their 
species being: “estranged labour tears from [the human] his species-life”. Therefore, as Saito 
has argued, Marx’s understanding of nature must be understood with reference to his writings 
on alienation. Modern labourers “can no longer relate to nature as their own ‘inorganic 
body’… When the land becomes a commodity, the relationship between humans and land is 
radically modified and reorganised for the sake of producing capitalist wealth” (Saito, 2017, 
p41).  
Rather than being naturalised, capitalism is, for Marxists, understood as a transient 
phenomenon. As Saito (2017, pp59-60) explains, Marx differs from his predecessor Ludwig 
Feuerbach in that, for the latter, nature tends to be treated as ahistorical, whereas for Marx it is 
necessary to explain the specific origins of capitalist socio-natural relations (Holleman, 2017, 
p168). Rather than treating “man” and “nature” as abstract entities, they must be seen in their 
concrete specificity, to account for “the historical process of the formation of nature through 
the human activity of production” where history itself is understood as mediated by human 
labour (Saito, 2017, pp58-61). Nature, in this account, is itself historical because it cannot be 
understood as distinct from human activity.  
In this spirit, Marxists have thrown light on how human-environment relations have changed 
throughout history. Martin Empson’s book Land and Labour (2014) uses several examples to 
demonstrate the lasting effects past humans have had on the landscape and how, for example, a 
qualitative shift from feudal to capitalist production relations had a profound effect on the way 
agriculture is organised. Naomi Klein (2015) further demonstrates the destructive effect of 
specifically capitalist social relations, turning her attention to the contemporary fossil fuel 
industry. Klein shows how fossil fuel extractors are driven by competition to accumulate and 
must continuously expand their operations, prospecting for further sources of oil and gas and 
in many cases exploring ever more “extreme” fuel sources such as oil from tar sands (Klein, 
2015). Ecological Marxists have, of course, also envisioned a future society where a more 
rational approach to the biosphere will correspond with more democratic and egalitarian social 
relations. 
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Marx himself also pointed to qualitatively different ways of relating to the biosphere inherent 
to different ways of organising society. He criticised thinkers like the demographer and 
political economist Thomas Malthus, for whom the laws of capitalist production are treated as 
eternal “natural laws”. By contrast Marx posited that: “every particular historical mode of 
production has its own special laws of population, which are historically valid within that 
particular sphere” (Marx, 1976, p784). In other words, Marx saw the unemployment and 
poverty he observed as an outcome of capitalist accumulation (and the consequent creation of 
a relative surplus population—the unemployed) rather than as the inevitable or “natural” 
outcome of “overpopulation” (Harvey, 1974, p268). 
  
2.2: Ecological Marxism after Marx 
This chapter has so far given an overview of broad principles on which ecological Marxists 
might agree. Ecological Marxism is a historical and materialist approach that looks at how 
capitalist relations of exploitation and competition necessitate a particular—often damaging—
relationship with the biosphere. However, beyond these points of agreement, theorists differ on 
some fundamental issues including how to conceptualise “society” and “nature”. According to 
Noel Castree, Marxian theories of nature have “see-sawed between naturalistic and social 
constructionist positions” (Castree, 2000, p5; Royle, forthcoming). At one extreme are those 
approaches that emphasise social relations to such an extent that “nature” is seen as entirely 
socially constructed, even as having no external existence beyond human society. Castree 
gives the example of the Frankfurt School theorist Alfred Schmidt, whose 1962 classic The 
Concept of Nature in Marx puts much greater emphasis on the social side of the society-nature 
binary and argues that nature “can only be conceived through social categories” (Castree, 
2000, p15). At the other extreme are positions that stress the materiality of the non-human 
world, often aiming to bring nature back in. The first of these positions bears some 
resemblance to philosophical idealism, in other words with a set of approaches that take human 
culture, discourse and ideas as their starting point, whereas the second is associated with 
materialist philosophies which start by asserting the existence of the non-human world 
(Sheehan, 1993). To return to the case of the northern spotted owl with which this thesis 
began, the contradiction between naturalistic and social constructionist approaches has 
implications here as in this example some commentators emphasise the social constructedness 
of the owl’s habitat while others focus on the biological or “material” properties of the owls 
themselves.  
Philosopher Kate Soper (1995) similarly makes a distinction between what she refers to as 





The contrast, crudely, is between discourses which direct us to the 
“nature” that we are destroying, wasting and polluting, and discourses that 
are focused on the ideological functions of the appeal to “nature” and on 
the ways in which relations to the non-human world are always 
historically mediated, and indeed “constructed”, through specific 
conceptions of human identity and difference (Soper, 1995, pp3-4).  
Nature-endorsing approaches tend to treat nature as something that is not only real but 
possesses intrinsic qualities (or intrinsic worth) that is not bestowed on it by humans, whereas 
nature-sceptical approaches call into question an apparently self-evident nature (Demeritt, 
2002). The latter stress that humans do not have direct access to “nature”; our experience of 
nature is always mediated by the social and cultural world in which we live. Of course, Soper 
is making a very broad generalisation. There are approaches that fit uncomfortably into either 
category. However, the distinction remains a useful starting point to unravel why different 
thinkers can disagree so strongly on how to approach questions of nature. Soper also usefully 
sets out what is at stake politically in adopting one or the other approach. Nature-endorsing 
views have tended to be favoured by an environmental movement concerned with protecting a 
threatened natural world. Nature-sceptical views, on the other hand, have been useful to, for 
example, feminist movements as a means to critique assumptions about the “naturalness” of 
existing gender relations (Soper, 1995). Nature-sceptics have refused to recognise a trans-
historical “natural state of things” or to treat nature as a stable foundation on which society is 
built (Swyngedouw, 2015, p135). In the light of this distinction, what follows will discuss 
some of the contributions of ecological Marxists since Marx’s time.  
In some ways epitomising the debates about ecology among eco-socialists, Ted Benton, 
writing in 1981, identified deep-rooted “tensions and oppositions” within Marxism itself which 
had led to the socialist left taking an ambiguous or even hostile stance towards 
environmentalism.7 For Benton, the historical materialism expressed by Marx and Engels in 
their early writings was inherently ecological, the problems were to be found in Marx’s later 
economic work (Benton, 1981). As Benton points out, in Marx’s discussions of the labour 
process in Capital he emphasises those situations where humans consciously manipulate raw 
materials to produce new objects, making a table from wood perhaps. But, Benton contends, 
not all labour processes are like this; much of agriculture involves applying labour in order to 
optimise the conditions for a transformation to take place, in this case providing conditions for 
plants to grow, rather than working on a raw material in order to transform it. In this case 
                                                          
7 Benton is a founder member of the red-green study group which continues his aim of reconciling 
socialist and ecological thought. Founded in 1992, the group still meets regularly in London—
http://redgreenstudygroup.org.uk/ 
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human activity plays an eco-regulatory role. There are also variations in the extent to which 
raw materials can be freely and intentionally manipulated by humans and many also ultimately 
depend on appropriation from nature and will run out if not replenished. For Benton, these 
omissions leave Marxism inadequate in recognising limits to the development of human 
societies imposed by nature.  
Similarly, Michael Redclift reminds us that Marx saw value as deriving from human labour 
power. The activity undertaken by bees in producing honey, for example, does not produce 
value in Marx’s terms. Redclift argues that Marx therefore failed to consider “natural limits” to 
“the material productive forces of society” (1984, quoted in Foster and Clark, 2016b, p112). 
Marxism, according to Redclift, cannot account for situations of scarcity of natural resources 
since it does not treat such resources as productive of value. At around the same time James 
O’Connor put forward the idea that capitalism is characterised by two contradictions 
(O’Connor, 1988). The first is between the forces and relations of production while the second 
contradiction occurs when capitalism undermines its own conditions of existence by damaging 
the natural environment. O’Connor, like Benton, proposed that Marxism ought to be combined 
with ideas from environmentalism; he counterposed his ecological Marxism to what he called 
“traditional Marxism” (O’Connor, 1988).  
 
2.2.1: Metabolic rift theories 
Moving in a somewhat different direction from these earlier perspectives, at the end of the 
20th century two major contributions to ecological Marxism were published: Marx’s Ecology 
by John Bellamy Foster (2000) and Paul Burkett’s Marx and Nature: A Red and Green 
Perspective (2014 [1999]). Referring to their predecessors as “first stage” ecosocialist thinkers, 
Foster and Burkett see themselves as representing a second stage.8 Rather than integrating 
Marxism with ecology, these two thinkers have argued that there is already an ecological core 
to be found within Marx’s writings (Foster and Burkett, 2016).9 Foster’s work in particular has 
been credited with rescuing Marx’s ecological thought from obscurity so there is now greater 
knowledge of and interest in Marxism (and anti-capitalism) within the environmental 
movement (see Holleman, 2017).  
Foster traces the materialist influences on Marx’s philosophy, including that of Greek 
philosophers Democritus and Epicurus. He has noted in particular Marx’s reference in Capital 
                                                          
8 As well as Burkett, several other authors cited in this thesis have worked with Foster: Ian Angus, Brett 
Clark, Hannah Holleman, Kohei Saito and Richard York are all associated with the Monthly Review 
journal (which Foster edits) and its publishing house. All share his views on the importance of the 
concept of a metabolic rift. 





to humans as controlling the “metabolism” between themselves and nature (Marx, 1967, p283) 
and sees this notion of metabolism as central to the latter’s conception of the labour process 
(Foster, 1999; Foster, 2000, p157). Humans, like all species, satisfy their needs by 
appropriating from nature and must maintain a constant relationship with the natural world in 
order to survive. However, Foster, in agreement with Saito’s work on alienation discussed in 
the previous section, argues that when humans are alienated from their own ability to labour, 
this leaves them no longer able to regulate their relationship with nature. This creates a “rift” in 
the metabolic process. Foster (1999) shows how this concept of a metabolic rift was elaborated 
by Marx in relation to a discussion of agriculture and soil science. Marx described how 
agricultural practices were removing nutrients from the soil and failing to replace them, a 
process inseparable from the removal of workers from the countryside as they became wage 
labourers in the cities (Holleman, 2017, pp168-172). Marx referred to “an irreparable rift in the 
interdependent process of the social metabolism” (Marx, 1981, p949; see also Foster, 1999, 
p379 and the discussion of metabolism in Swyngedouw, 2006, pp107-110). The metabolic rift 
has also been referred to as a “rift in the metabolism between man and nature” (Holleman, 
2017, p169), although, as explained later in this chapter, these references to relations between 
humans and nature have been criticised as dualist distortions of the original formulation.  
Burkett, like Foster, returns to Marx’s own writings in Capital. He argues that, far from 
advocating a Promethean domination of nature, Marx was fully aware of the role of natural 
processes in contributing towards wealth or use value (Burkett, 2014). He also took account of 
the constraints imposed by natural processes on production and the ways in which natural 
resources can be depleted. Responding to Benton’s comments about eco-regulation, Burkett 
shows how Marx does, in fact, distinguish between eco-regulatory and other forms of 
production at various points in his writings. The reason he does not start his discussion in 
Capital with this form of labour is because, as mentioned above, his analysis starts with a 
trans-historical concept of human labour, whereas eco-regulation is specific to labour in 
societies that practise agriculture (Burkett, 2014, pp42-45).  
Perhaps more centrally, Burkett has defended the relevance of value theory to an ecological 
Marxism. According to Marx, commodities possess three forms of value: use value, exchange 
value and a third form known simply as value (Marx, 1976, chapter 1; Harvey, 1982, pp5-13). 
Use value can be thought of as a “social combination of labour and nature to satisfy human 
needs”, exchange value is effectively the price a commodity can be exchanged for on the 
market, whereas value is the abstract labour time embodied in commodities (Burkett, 2014, 
pp79-80). Bees produce a use value when they make honey (as this can satisfy a human want 
or need); but Marx maintained that in a capitalist society only human labour produces value. 
The value of this human labour power is separate from (and usually lower than) the value of 
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the goods or services produced, allowing the capitalist to take the difference as surplus value. 
Without this exploitation of labour, capitalism cannot exist (see Kallis and Swyngedouw, 
2017, for a further discussion of this). Burkett points out that it is capitalism, therefore, that 
treats nature as a free gift. Although we might (for moral reasons) wish that capitalism would 
“value” nature, it is structurally unable to do so. In a capitalist system there is a tendency for 
use value to be subordinated to value as it drives to increase profits, although the production of 
a use value remains a “necessary moment of value production” (Burkett, 2014, p83).  
More recently, Matt Huber has made use of Marx’s value theory to critique projects aimed at 
allocating monetary value to “ecosystem services”, for example where firms buy up plots of 
forest and market them as a profitable investment opportunity. According to Huber, these 
environmental valuation schemes are destined for failure when it comes to solving 
environmental problems. Capitalism is ill-equipped to value services such as the carbon 
sequestration performed by a forest as it has no way of valuing processes outside of labour and 
production (Huber, 2017; see also Labban, 2014).  
 
2.2.2: The production of nature 
Somewhat independently of Foster and Burkett, a group of scholars—many within 
geography—have sought to conceptualise what they refer to as the production of nature. In this 
vein, David Harvey states that “there is nothing unnatural about New York City” (1996, p186), 
a claim intended to challenge the assumption that nature only exists in rural or wilderness 
areas. It also draws attention to the active role humans play in constructing what become our 
own environments. Little, if any, of the world is untouched by humans; as Marx and Engels 
put it: “the nature that preceded human history…is nature which today no longer exists 
anywhere (except perhaps on a few Australian coral islands of recent origin)” (Marx and 
Engels, 1968). As Henderson (2009, p269) shows, Harvey’s approach is in line with Marx’s 
own view. For Marx, human labour (including that taking place in cities) necessarily 
transforms the natural world, so people in urban areas are relating to nature when they live 
their everyday lives (see also Loftus, 2012).  
Harvey refers to William Cronon’s critique of “wilderness” environmentalism (Cronon, 1995). 
For Cronon, treating nature as synonymous with untouched wilderness spaces erases from 
history the humans who have long inhabited such places. At the same time, cities are treated as 
unnatural and as beyond the remit of environmental social movements (Cronon, 1995). For 
thinkers like Harvey much more attention should be paid to created ecosystems such as cities: 
Who is constructing these places? Towards what purpose? In whose interests? As explained in 





writers in geography who are less sympathetic to Harvey’s dialectics. For example, Whatmore 
and Thorne have interrogated persistent assumptions around the association of “nature” with 
such spaces (Whatmore and Thorne, 1998; see also Lorimer, 2015). 
Neil Smith makes the point even more forcefully when he proposes that humans “produce” 
nature (Smith, 2008; Loftus, 2017). Drawing on Henri Lefebvre’s concept of the production of 
space, Smith argues that we cannot understand the social production of space without also 
understanding nature as socially produced (Smith, 2008, p94). But, as Smith states himself, 
this very idea goes against all our assumptions about nature: “the epitome of that which neither 
is nor can be socially produced” (Smith, 2007, p22). Smith’s point is not that humans literally 
“produce” or build mountains. However, many aspects of nature cannot be understood as 
external to capitalist production: if they are not already circulating as commodities, they have 
the potential to be commodified and are therefore subject to capitalist logics: “in the form of a 
price tag, every use-value is delivered an invitation to the labour process, and capital—by its 
nature the quintessential socialite—is driven to make good on every invitation” (Smith, 2008, 
p79). In this process, produced nature assumes some of the characteristics of capital itself.10 
What is more, humans are constantly producing new entities—from acidified oceans to 
genetically modified organisms. It is not possible to prise apart what is “natural” and what is 
human-produced about these “socio-natural” admixtures (Smith, 2007).  
Marx never referred to nature as “produced” (Smith says that the latter’s writings on nature 
were incomplete and “fragmented”, 2008, p52). However, for Smith, a production of nature 
thesis aligns with the “direction and intent” of Marx’s thinking. Specifically, it involves a 
strong rejection of dualism (Castree, 2000). Rather than starting from the position that nature 
and society are two separate spheres that latterly come to relate to each other, Smith, drawing 
on Marx’s conception of a differentiated unity, says that Marx: “begins with the relation with 
nature as a unity and derives as a simultaneously historical and logical result whatever 
separation between them exists. In this way the social priority of nature is not something that 
must be infused from without, but something that already exists in the social relation with 
nature” (Smith, 2008, p48). To refer again to the sketch of Marx’s ecology at the start of this 
chapter, this seems to be in line with Marx’s view of human labour as the means by which 
humans have historically come to differentiate themselves from other species.  
Smith, like Harvey, shows how the notion of nature as a realm free of human influence is an 
ideological commitment that developed with class society but that is maintained in today’s 
capitalism by various cultural practices including political, legal and literary discourse as well 
                                                          
10 Ecologist Ian Rappel also describes a reorganisation of nature involving the creation of a “capitalist 
ecology” with its own distinctive characteristics such as a tendency towards growing crops in 
monocultures (Rappel, 2015).  
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as scientific practices (Smith, 2008, pp10-30). But the ideology of external nature is also 
endorsed by some within the environmental movement. Environmentalists might exhort us to 
“save” nature, return to nature or scale back “our” impact upon it. The dominant ideology 
therefore assumes that humanity collectively impacts on nature rather than existing as a part of 
nature. Such an approach is politically problematic in that it sidesteps any discussion of the 
historically specific ways in which nature is produced that its critics say is needed (Loftus, 
2012, p.xxii). (As will be demonstrated in chapter five, the dialectical biology of Richard 
Levins and Richard Lewontin has led them to a strikingly similar criticism of calls to “save the 
environment”). 
The view that nature is external to human society goes hand in hand with the view that it is 
universal. It is assumed that nature is not influenced by a changing human society, and 
therefore does not go through changes of its own. As discussed above in relation to Marx, part 
of Smith’s project is, then, to historicise nature (Loftus, 2017). The dual ideology of nature as 
external and universal ensures that nature is treated as a static or stable ground on which 
society is built. These two conceptions of nature together mean that humanity can be subsumed 
within nature and existing societal relations can be justified by appeal to supposed “natural” 
laws (Braun, 2006, p196). Henderson (2009) adds that capitalism is able to treat nature as both 
universal and external due to processes of alienation. Humans produce nature by applying 
labour to the natural world but this produced nature then becomes external to them. 
Smith further argues that capitalism’s production of nature has intensified in the past few 
decades as a new range of ecological commodities have been developed. For example, 
legislation in the US means that people can be given monetary compensation for preserving 
wetlands and there is now a market in “wetland credits”. This represents a shift from the way 
nature had previously been commodified, for example when wood is removed from a forest to 
be made into a table, to one where a wetland becomes a commodity precisely because it 
remains embedded in its (socially produced) natural environment (Smith, 2007). Smith draws 
here on Marx’s distinction between the formal and real subsumption of labour (Marx, 1976, 
pp429-432) to propose a distinction between the formal and real subsumption of nature. In 
conditions of formal subsumption, workers enter into a relationship with capital but retain 
some autonomy over the labour process. But the advent of real subsumption in modern 
industry leads to a more intensive relationship whereby the ways in which workers work are 
themselves transformed. With the former, absolute surplus value is being extracted, in the 
latter there is also an increase in relative surplus value (pp429-432). This distinction can also 
be made about nature’s production. As well as extracting materials and turning them into 
commodities, nature is now, according to Smith, being transformed in order to make it more 





The production of nature approach contrasts with that of O’Connor who defines the conditions 
for capitalist production as external to capitalism and argues that these are not themselves 
“produced”. It also tends to lead Smith away from discussions of external limits to society 
imposed by nature (2008, p84). Alex Loftus therefore argues that the production of nature 
“goes against the grain of almost all Marxist conceptualisations of the environment” (2017, 
p2). However, Smith’s use of Marx’s value theory and his emphasis on the alienation of labour 
in capitalist societies are shared with the likes of Foster and Burkett although, as will be 
explained, Foster has been somewhat critical of the production of nature thesis (Foster, 2016b).  
In Uneven Development, Smith describes his method as dialectical. Referring to accounts that 
simplistically treat nature and society as “interacting”, he says that, even where it is accepted 
that nature and society interact in complex ways, “interaction is no substitute for the dialectic” 
(Smith, 2008, p68). However, as Castree points out, dialectics is a complex and at times 
controversial topic among Marxists (Castree, 1996, p342).11 Therefore, the next sections of this 
chapter will turn to an outline of what Marxists mean by dialectics. The chapter will address 
Engels’ unfinished study of the dialectics of nature and show how this was taken up 
uncritically in the Soviet Union. However, this chapter will also attempt to recover what is 
useful in a dialectical methodology by showing how dialectics has been developed within 
geography. Rather than being “some dispensable component of classical Marxism” (Castree, 
1996, p345), dialectics is one of the distinctive contributions of Marxist philosophy (Ollman, 
2014)—the “algebra of revolution” (see Haug, 2005). It will be argued here that, despite some 
of the misuses of dialectics in the 20th century, it is nevertheless fundamental to a critical 
approach to ecology in the Anthropocene.  
 
2.3: Dialectics 
The methodology established and adopted by Marx and Engels is often described as both 
dialectical and materialist.12 However, dialectics and materialism are sometimes seen as 
incompatible (see Edgley, 1992). Materialism has mechanistic connotations whereas dialectics 
is more closely associated with idealist philosophies, which assert the primacy of ideas, surely 
the polar opposite of materialism (Bhaskar, 1992).  
According to Helena Sheehan (1993), the dominant ideas in Marx and Engels’ day, among 
both philosophers and natural sciences, were materialist. However, while engaging with 
existing materialist ideas, the two thinkers rejected what they saw as the worst forms of 
                                                          
11 Variations of the dialectical method are numerous, it is more accurate to refer to dialectics rather than 
“the dialectic” (Castree, 1996). 
12 It is also referred to as “dialectical materialism” but neither Marx nor Engels used the term themselves 
(Graham, 1973). 
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materialism, specifically mechanistic and reductionist materialisms (Kircz, 1998). The 
mechanist approach (Engels often refers to it as “metaphysical”) separates the world out into 
static objects, while reductionism asserts that processes in human society are reducible to those 
within biology (and ultimately to physics). However, in Engels’ materialist view, human 
society has properties that are emergent from those of nature rather than reducible to it (Rees, 
1998, p77). As will be explained in chapter five here, contemporary dialectical biologists have 
continued Engels’ project of criticising reductionist materialisms.  
For Marx, the dialectical method is predicated on the assumption that all social systems are 
dynamic: “Change, development, instability…are the very conditions for which a dialectical 
approach is designed to account” (Rees, 1998, p6; see also Molyneux, 2012). It is opposed to 
those forms of thought that naturalise the existing “state of things”. In the afterword to the 
second German edition of Capital, one of the few accounts of his methods, Marx (1976, p103) 
emphasises this aspect of the dialectical method, remarking that it involves: 
Recognition of the existing state of things, at the same time also, the 
recognition of the negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up; 
because it regards every historically developed social form as in fluid 
movement, and therefore takes into account its transient nature not less 
than its momentary existence; because it lets nothing impose upon it, it is 
in its essence critical and revolutionary (Marx, 1887, p15).  
If dialectics is “critical and revolutionary” many argue that it does not make sense to consider 
it as a theory separate from practice. As Loftus puts it: “Understanding the politicised 
environment must be a process of simultaneously intervening in and engaging with this 
environment” (Loftus, 2009, p162). Hannah Holleman, who refers to dialectics as one element 
of an ecological Marxism (Holleman, 2015) also emphasises that a Marxist method involves 
recognising the contingent nature of what might otherwise be seen as static processes: 
“Historical materialism emphasises the necessity of not taking anything about the 
contemporary world for granted as a given, universal, trans-historical reality” (communication 
by email, 3 January 2018). 
Dialectical forms of thought have a long history. The word “dialectic” comes from ancient 
Greek philosophy. Plato established the dialectic as a formal method of argument between two 
people intended to lead to a consensus regarding the truth (the two initial propositions are the 
thesis and antithesis; the final conclusion is a synthesis of the two). Importantly, though, 
Marxist thinkers often use the term dialectics to refer to processes in reality rather than to the 
relationship between different ideas in a discussion (Haug, 2005). However, some 





a thesis and antithesis. For example, Derek Gregory defines dialectics as “the perpetual 
resolution of binary opposites” (Gregory, 2009, p157). 
Marx developed his own dialectical method with reference to the 18th century German idealist 
philosopher GWF Hegel. Hegel established many of the ideas that we now might describe as 
dialectical. He saw the world as an interrelated and internally contradictory totality and 
emphasised that this totality is in a constant process of change. Hegel also referred to a subject-
object dialectic—a relation between humans and the world they encounter (Rees, 1998, pp37-
45). However, for Hegel this subject-object dialectic was conceived in classical idealist terms 
whereby material reality was merely the reflection of an ideal “essence”. He also seems to 
have believed that society would progress forwards as new ideas replaced old ones. Although 
Marx initially rejected these views, he would later come to embrace a “critical reworking” of 
Hegel’s idealism, turning his dialectics into a materialist method (Castree, 1996, p344). Rather 
than taking ideas as their starting point, Marx and Engels, as noted previously with reference to 
their writings on nature, start their analysis by considering real humans and their material 
needs (Loftus, 2012, pp.xi-xii). This is why Marx is often referred to as taking an idealist 
dialectics that was standing on its head and turning it “right side up again” (Mandel, 1976, 
pp18-19).  
Marx and Engels therefore combined two philosophical approaches: dialectics and 
materialism. However, as Lefebvre argued, they did this in a way that didn’t merely smash 
together two distinct theoretical approaches but transformed both (Lefebvre, 2009 [1940]). For 
Lefebvre, Marx’s dialectics transcended Hegel’s while preserving its core concepts, “what is 
essential in its mode of operation”. Lefebvre argues that:  
Perhaps we must accept the “rich content” of life in all its immensity: nature, 
spontaneity, action, widely differing cultures, fresh problems…the form to 
which thought raises the content must be seen as fluid and capable of 
improvement. Thought must accept the contradictions and conflicts in the 
content (p47).  
Lefebvre here shows that, as well seeing the world as constantly changing, ideas must 
themselves also be vulnerable to being changed, negated or transcended (see also Dixon, 
Woodward and Jones, 2008).13   
                                                          
13 In the final chapter of Dialectical Materialism (1940) Lefebvre turns to what he describes as “the 
production of man”. Here he seems to agree that “man is part of nature”. However, Lefebvre maintains 
that aspects of social life do become separated from the natural world (at least in human thought); the act 
of describing and categorising objects immobilises them, making them social objects despite their natural 
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As well as emphasising dynamism, dialectics also implies a particular type of change, 
revolutionary rather than evolutionary. Quantitative change can lead to a qualitative shift and 
novel forms can develop from existing systems (Edgley, 1992).14 Furthermore, it invokes an 
understanding of contradiction. Systems and structures are internally heterogeneous and the 
constant interaction of contradictory forces and the creation of further contradictions fuels the 
change and renewal of social systems (Sayers, 1980). David Harvey has paid particular 
attention to Marx’s use of contradiction. In Seventeen Contradictions and the End of 
Capitalism, Harvey (2014) argues that capital is inherently contradictory, indeed that it cannot 
exist without its internal contradictions. He says that these contradictions tend not to be 
resolved but to be “merely moved around”. For example, 18th century British capitalism’s use 
of charcoal resulted in a shortage of available land to grow food which pushed capitalists to 
search for other sources of fuel such as coal, but that this would eventually lead to further 
contradictions: urban pollution and climate change (Harvey, 2014, p4). Note here that Harvey 
is not using contradiction in the sense that one statement might contradict (ie cancel out) 
another; capital’s contradictions result from opposing tendencies present within the same 
process.  
From a different perspective, David Barnett, in a discussion of post-Brechtian theatre, takes 
issue with the concern with trying to resolve contradictions in some interpretations of 
dialectics. Barnett, discussing the negative dialectics of Theodor Adorno, refers instead to an 
approach in which the thesis and antithesis are not resolved but held in tension: “the dialectic 
becomes an unwieldy beast alive with contradiction and not harmony” (Barnett, 2013). As 
Barnett points out, following Adorno, an emphasis on resolving contradictions is itself an 
artefact of bourgeois thought. To suggest that disparate elements of a system, the thesis and 
antithesis, could be reconciled in the same way that the capitalist commodity form makes 
everything commensurable is to accept some of the suppositions of the capitalist worldview. 
As Haug explains, Brecht developed an understanding of dialectics in sharp distinction to the 
Stalinist interpretation: “which stirs everything up in order to calm it down, which transforms 
the things in flux into something fixed, ‘elevates’ matter into an idea, is just the bag of magic 
tricks for such shit-awful times” (quoted in Haug, 2015, p257). Brecht’s approach, 
emphasising unresolved contradictions, was an outlook that, far from implying the inevitable 
resolution of society’s contradictions with the emergence of socialism, offered no such 
guarantees. Interestingly for the discussion of scientific knowledge in this thesis, Brecht 
                                                          
origins. Lefebvre’s dualism here has been described as a major omission from an otherwise useful body 
of work (Loftus, 2012, p110). 
14 Sheehan (1993) has suggested that those who attempted to formulate a version of Marxism with 
dialectics removed (notably several “revisionist” intellectuals of the German Social Democratic Party 





argued that dialectics “is necessary because of the unbridgeable difference between thought 
and reality”. Whereas most ways of trying to observe or represent reality are founded on 
resolution and conclusion, in reality, Brecht says, processes are not resolved so a more agile 
method is needed to try to at least account for this (Haug, 2005, pp256-257).  
Dialectics is, in summary, a relational form of thought that emphasises dynamism, totality and 
irresolvable contradiction (see Harvey, 1996, chapter 2; Holleman, 2015). As Castree (1996) 
points out, this way of thinking has been particularly interesting to geographers. In what follows, 
this chapter addresses this specifically geographic dialectics before going on to address debates 
over the dialectics of nature.  
 
2.3.1: Ollman and Harvey’s approach 
In 2008 a special issue on dialectics of Environment and Planning: A featured various 
contributions from geographers. As its editors noted, even sceptical authors have admitted that 
a method that “tracks change not in circles but in spirals” has an enduring appeal within the 
discipline (Dixon. Woodward and Jones, 2008, p2549). David Harvey, Erik Swyngedouw and 
Andy Merrifield have all developed dialectical approaches to questions of space, place, nature 
and society with Harvey’s work on this subject becoming particularly influential in geography. 
Therefore, Sheppard (2008) is able to discern a distinctive “geographic dialectics”. Harvey, 
Swyngedouw and Merrifield are influenced by Lefebvre and by political theorist Bertell 
Ollman, for whom dialectics “explains nothing, proves nothing, predicts nothing and causes 
nothing to happen” (Ollman, 2003, p12; Castree, 1996, p344). Dialectics, for Ollman, is “a 
way of thinking about the relations and processes in the world, and a method for studying 
them” (2014, p573); it is an attempt to grasp the constantly changing nature of the world, to 
understand reality as it is—in a constant state of flux—as well as a critique of attempts to 
separate the world into static and independent bodies.  
Ollman views reality as consisting of multiple processes that undergo continual change and are 
constantly relating to each other. His interpretation of dialectics therefore defies the common 
sense view that the world consists of separate things that are more or less discrete.15 This is 
described as a philosophy of internal relations. While philosophies of external relations rest on 
the assumption “that reality consists of things…with boundaries that are distinct and relatively 
stable, which can undergo changes and get into relations” (Ollman, 2014, p574), for Ollman 
reality is instead seen as fundamentally constituted by relations; a thing would not be what it is 
                                                          
15 Although dialectics originated with Plato, this version is perhaps more reminiscent of the philosopher 
Heraclitus, who emphasised the constantly changing nature of the observed world, rather than the back 
and forth exchange of arguments associated with Plato (Haug, 2005). 
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without the relations in which it exists (see also, Castree 2005, pp232-233). Importantly, this 
approach is simultaneously an ontology and an epistemology, a statement about the nature of 
reality as well as a method for understanding and representing that reality. For Ollman, 
ontology and epistemology are themselves internally related; ways of understanding the world 
must also relate to the way the world is (Ollman, 2014, p574).  
Ollman’s dialectics allows the thinker to grasp something about a world that is constantly in 
motion (Ollman, 2003), it places the emphasis on processes and flows rather than form and 
fixity, allowing for an understanding of the processes driving change, how those processes 
sometimes crystallise into things that might appear solid and fixed, as well as what forces pull 
them apart (Harvey, 1996, p81; Braun, 2006, p209). This is not incompatible with the 
emphasis on contradiction discussed above with reference to Harvey’s work. If what appears 
to be a thing is constituted out of diverse processes it is possible that some of those processes 
will act in opposition to each other producing internal tensions (Harvey, 1996, p54). Such an 
approach inevitably sees dynamism as an inherent property of things rather than seeing things 
as becoming endowed with dynamism as a result of the influence of outside forces: “space and 
time are neither absolute nor external to processes but are contingent and contained within 
them” (Harvey, 1996, p53). As a methodology, dialectics therefore treats dynamism as central 
to analysis rather than peripheral to it. 
Critics might argue here that it is impossible for a thinker to grasp the whole of reality at once; 
that it is therefore necessary to understand the world as composed of bounded entities to 
prevent “the study of anything spilling over into everything” (Ollman, 2014, p574). In answer 
to this, Ollman shows how Marx employed a process of abstraction, bringing one aspect of a 
complex system into view momentarily in order to focus on it from a particular vantage point. 
But this does not imply treating that particular aspect as operating distinctly from other 
elements of a totality (Ollman, 2003, 2014).  
One of the best-known endorsements for such an approach within geography comes from 
David Harvey in a chapter of Justice, Nature, and the Geography of Difference (1996, chapter 
2) where he lists eleven attributes of dialectical thought. Harvey first elaborates this way of 
thinking in a critique of Peter Haggett’s attempt to incorporate elements of a systems theory 
approach from the natural sciences into human and physical geography (Harvey, 1995). 
Systems theory is more concerned with wider processes and relationships between things than 
explicitly reductionist programmes. But it is nevertheless still preoccupied with concrete things 
that exist prior to the processes that constitute them, “we get to understand processes by 
looking either at the attributes of what appear to us in the first instance to be self-evident things 
or at the relations between them” (Harvey, 1996, p49). Dialectics, by contrast, is a relational 





which things exist. Harvey also usefully counterposes dialectics to Cartesian thought (here he 
actually draws on the work of Levins and Lewontin and their 1985 book The Dialectical 
Biologist). Whereas a Cartesian thinker might assume that reality can be understood by 
breaking it down into its constituent elements and studying each in isolation, Harvey rejects 
the distinction between parts and wholes on which Cartesianism relies, stating that parts and 
wholes are “mutually constitutive of each other” (Harvey, 1996, p53).  
Elsewhere Harvey demonstrates how Marx builds an understanding of the workings of 
capitalism by examining value, use value and exchange value but by treating each as related to 
the others rather than assuming that each of these elements of the commodity form can be 
understood in isolation. As he argues, this dialectical procedure allows Marx to analyse a 
system that is both complex and inherently contradictory (Harvey, 1982, p2; see also Castree, 
1996). Using Ollman’s terminology, Harvey compares the method of considering each relation 
in turn as being like looking at the system under observation through a series of separate 
“windows”. Through one window we might see part of the thing we want to understand, 
looking at it through a second window will reveal further aspects of it that were formerly 
hidden from view. This gives more of an insight when we return to the first window. This 
method allows Marx to proceed from abstract concepts such as the three forms of value to 
build up a progressively more concrete picture of what he wants to understand (Harvey, 1982, 
p2). As Harvey explains, this is why Marx takes the reader through a lengthy explanation of 
the exchange of commodities before the answer to the questions of what value is or where 
profits come from can come into view. Harvey has also sometimes employed the concept of 
“moments” to refer to the physical things that express general processes (Castree, 2005, p233). 
In this way individual aspects of a social structure can be analysed while still seeing them as 
embedded within that structure (see also Hartsock, 2006).  
In geography, extending the dialectical method has led to a rethinking of issues of spatiality. 
Merrifield (1993) points out that the relationship between “space” and “place” is often left 
unexplained leading geographers unintentionally to make the Cartesian assumption that space 
can be divided up and treated as the sum of a number of places. Drawing on Lefebvre’s work 
on the production of space, Merrifield suggests that a place can itself be seen as constituted—
produced—out of various broader political and economic practices (Merrifield, 2002). As 
these processes “stretch beyond specific localities” (Braun, 1998) this way of thinking sees 
place as important but avoids drawing a binary distinction between the global and local. 
Furthermore, as places are made up of social forces they don’t merely act as passive 
backgrounds against which social processes play out but themselves reflect those social forces. 
Soja (1980) similarly refers to a socio-spatial dialectic in which societies and spaces are seen 
as mutually constitutive. Swyndedouw brings Harvey’s work into conversation with 
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Haraway’s notion of the cyborg as well as Smith’s production of nature to demonstrate how 
the things that make up cities are produced in historical and geographically specific ways. 
Using the example of water provision, he also insists that cities are socio-natural hybrids, 
irreducible to either the social or the natural (Swyngedouw, 1996).   
Likewise, Harvey’s dialectical thinking can apply equally to “society” and “nature”. He states 
that: “there is as much evidence for the argument in the natural and social world as there is 
evidence for any alternative proposition” (Harvey, 1996, p58; see also Braun, 2006) and uses 
examples from biology and physics to illustrate his points. Likewise, for Ollman, if things are 
seen as constituted by processes, it makes little sense to attempt to separate those things that 
are “social” from those that are “natural”. However, as the following section will show, 
attempts to develop a materialist dialectics of nature, which have their origins in Engels’ 
writings, have been met with controversy and even been rejected entirely by some Marxists.  
 
2.4: Engels and the natural sciences 
In a letter to Marx in 1873, Engels described the natural sciences as the study of “matter in 
motion” (quoted in Sheehan, 1993, p24). Over the next ten years he embarked on a study into 
how the method used by Marx to analyse the circulation of value in Capital might also be 
applied to nature. For Engels it was entirely possible for scientists to adopt a particular 
philosophical worldview such as a dialectical outlook in order to make sense of their 
observations. Using arguments that would be familiar to the radical scientists of the 20th 
century (see chapter five), he pointed out that scientists who claimed to be carrying out purely 
empirical work without explicit philosophical influence were misled. These scientists would 
still have an implicit philosophical basis for their ideas whether or not they admit it—and often 
“the most mediocre vulgar philosophy” (Engels, 1939 [1883], p105). Engels never completed 
his Dialectics of Nature, putting it aside after Marx’s death to prepare volumes two and three 
of Capital for publication. However, the collection of manuscript pages was translated and 
published in the Soviet Union in 1927 (in Russian and German) and in English in 1939 
(Engels, 1939; see also Sheehan, 1993).  
The biologist JBS Haldane, in a preface to the English edition of Dialectics of Nature, 
described Engels as “probably the most widely educated man of his day” (foreword to Engels, 
1939 [1883]). Both Marx and Engels read the work of, and communicated regularly with, 
natural scientists such as the chemist Carl Schorlemmer (Angus, 2017) and the zoologist and 
evolutionary biologist E Ray Lankester (Gould, 2006). Marx also had some knowledge of 
anatomy, mathematics and geology as well as the soil science that was influential to his 





own method as a “science” including in volume three of Capital where he states that: “all 
science would be superfluous if the outward appearance and the essence of things directly 
coincided” (Marx, 1981 [1894], p570).  
Engels’ insight that the natural sciences are about matter in motion must therefore be 
understood in the context of real developments in the sciences when he was writing and of 
which he would have been aware. Science had previously been based on models—such as 
Isaac Newton’s laws of mechanics—of processes that can be explained using reversible 
equations. However, when Engels was writing, science had started to emphasise irreversible 
processes where systems do not just change in a reversible way but develop through time, 
undergoing historical transformation. Time and matter are no longer seen as distinct as in 
Cartesian thought; rather, change is seen as intrinsic to processes in nature (Callinicos, 2006, 
pp210-211). In particular, when Engels was writing, Charles Darwin was demonstrating how 
species undergo irreversible qualitative change over time.  
This thesis will return to the relationship between Marxism and Darwinism later; but it is 
important to note that historical change was emphasised in other scientific disciplines in the 
19th century, not just biology. In physics, Joule had demonstrated that heat can be transferred 
into mechanical energy and vice versa. In geology, Lyell had discovered the continual creation 
and destruction of strata within Earth’s crust (Engels, 1939 [1883]). For Engels: 
Modern materialism embraces the more recent discoveries of natural 
science, according to which nature also has its history in time, the celestial 
bodies, like the organic species that…people them, being born and 
perishing. And even if nature, as a whole, must still be said to move in 
recurrent cycles, these cycles assume infinitely larger dimensions. In both 
aspects, modern materialism is essentially dialectic (Engels, 1970 [1880]).   
Sheehan (1993) argues that Engels used evidence from the natural sciences to develop his 
theory of dialectics and shows how he was able to engage in some debates among scientists by 
considering questions in the light of a dialectical worldview. Although many of his 
assumptions have been disproved, some of Engels’ contributions to contemporaneous debates 
in science have since been proved correct (Graham, 1973). Notably, in his unfinished work 
“The Part Played by Labour in the Transition from Ape to Man” (often published as part of 
Dialectics of Nature), Engels supposed that early humans’ erect posture freed up their hands 
and allowed them to develop tool use and that the use of tools in turn allowed for the 
development of larger brains. So, for Engels, humans’ ability to carry out labour, in other 
words to manipulate the environment, played a role in the evolution of humans as a species. 
Engels’ suppositions contrasted with the views of most evolutionists, including Darwin, who 
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thought that large brain size evolved first and that the ability to use tools followed this (see 
Blackledge, 2002, pp11-12). But these ideas are similar to modern theories of gene-culture 
coevolution (Foster, 2000, p203) and to the understandings of human evolution rooted in niche 
construction discussed in chapter six of this thesis.  
 
2.4.1: The three laws of dialectics 
However, despite some of Engels’ informative insights, the section of Dialectics of Nature that 
is perhaps the best remembered concerns his proposal that three “laws” of dialectics can be 
deduced by studying society or nature. The laws, developed from a study of Hegel’s 
philosophy, are:  
1. The law of the interpenetration of opposites. 
2. The law of the transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa. 
3. The law of the negation of the negation. 
The first of these supposes that objects and systems have internal opposing qualities. This is 
analogous to the way in which a magnet has a north and south pole. Opposites conflict with 
each other but are also mutually constitutive—there can be no south pole on a magnet without 
a north pole (Gollobin, 1986). In a common example of the second law, heating a pan of water 
will result in quantitative change as the temperature of the water increases; however, at a 
certain point this will tip over into qualitative change as the water turns to steam, which 
displays entirely different properties (Engels, 1939). The second and third laws are themselves 
supposed to develop from an acceptance of the first; quantity and quality are two opposing 
attributes of things that interpenetrate and interchange with each other.  
These laws are, for many, obscure and antiquated. The very idea that processes in the natural 
world, which seems to follow its own rules or none at all, can be usefully abstracted to just 
three laws is difficult to countenance. And there have been some awkward attempts to graft the 
laws onto observations about the natural world. For example, it has sometimes been proposed 
that an oak tree “contradicts” the acorn from which it grows, and that this “contradiction” is 
resolved by the production of a further acorn (see Callinicos, 2006 for a critique). Therefore, 
Dialectics of Nature is often criticised as an attempt to find convenient evidence in the natural 
world for such laws. Sartre dismissively argued that: “the only dialectic one will find in nature 
is a dialectic that one has put there oneself” (Sartre, 2004 [1960], p31).  
Even more problematically, contradiction between two opposite forces where one “negates” 
the other has been proposed as a driving force of change in society. The law of the negation of 





“negated” earlier forms of society but in this process produced a class capable of negating 
capitalism in its turn—the proletariat. Perhaps unsurprisingly given the implication that 
capitalism will “necessarily give rise to socialism” this use of dialectics has been criticised as 
deterministic (see Rees, 1998, p81).16 Contrast this with Ollman’s more open-ended approach 
described in the previous section.  
The controversy surrounding the dialectics of nature isn’t helped by the fact that Engels didn’t 
live to complete or defend his study of nature. Marxists have therefore tended either to accept 
its assertions uncritically or to dismiss them entirely as an ill-informed diversion from Marxist 
thought. As will be discussed in the following section, the idea of a dialectics of nature is now 
associated for many with the crude attempts to develop a “proletarian science” in the Soviet 
Union and with apologetics for this on the part of some Communist intellectuals in the West. 
Chapter five will contrast the approach put forward by Marxist scientists of the 1970s and 
1980s, one that actively embraces the contradictions inherent in scientific activity and 
therefore avoids some of the problems of proletarian science. However, the Soviet approach is 
discussed here as a negative example of one of the pitfalls that Marxist science might fall into.  
 
2.5: A Proletarian science?  
After Marx and Engels, the next major attempt to combine Marxism and the natural sciences 
came about with the Russian Revolution of 1917, which provoked a flowering of scientific 
ideas, as well as the better-known experiments in avant-garde art, film and literature 
(Parrington, 2017). Prominent scientists at the time included Vladimir Vernadsky, who 
popularised the term biosphere, Alexander Oparin, whose ideas on the origins of life were 
ground-breaking, and Nikolai Vavilov, who greatly expanded knowledge of global plant 
biodiversity (Graham, 1973). John Bellamy Foster argues that there is still much of use in the 
insights of scientists from this period and in particular that Vernadsky’s ideas should be 
revisited by environmental theorists. Vernadsky understood the biosphere as encompassing 
complex interconnections operating on a global scale where there is no sharp distinction drawn 
between the organic and inorganic elements of the system. He referred to humanity as a 
                                                          
16 Another potential criticism of Engels is that the ideas of the 19th century may have been surpassed by 
developments within the natural sciences themselves. If science in the 19th century was dominated by 
materialist ideas, a paradigm shift in physics in the 20th century seemed to erode the foundations of 
materialism. Quantum physics suggested that the world could no longer be divided into discrete atoms 
that behave in a predictable way. Sheehan (1993) argues that new discoveries in physics around the turn 
of the century led the way to a return to idealist views. For thinkers such as Ernst Mach, a physicist 
whose ideas were influential among some Russian Marxists, science could no longer make ontological 
claims about an actually existing world. Instead, ideas about the world were reduced to a series of 
sensations and the role of science was merely to order and categorise the experience of the senses 
(Sheehan, 1993). 
46 Chapter 2: Ecological Marxism 
 
“global force” long before contemporary discussions of the Anthropocene (Foster, 2016a). 
Oparin similarly emphasised the active role of organisms in transforming their surroundings. 
He supposed that organic life emerged from inorganic matter under particular conditions in the 
early Earth (these ideas, the “primordial soup” hypothesis, are now widely accepted). When 
life did arise, living things substantially altered the planet’s atmosphere by adding oxygen 
which then obliterated the oxygen-free conditions that had enabled life to evolve in the first 
place (Foster, 2016a). According to historian Loren Graham, Oparin’s insights were related to 
his developing interest in Marxism. He understood the origin of life in materialist terms and as 
arising from the “movement” of matter (Graham, 1973, chapter 7).  
 
2.5.1: The scientific left in Britain 
At around the same time a scientific left, many of them sympathetic to Marxist ideas, 
developed in Britain, with many making major contributions to scientific knowledge.17 
Prominent left-wing scientists of the time included Haldane, pioneering X-ray crystallographer 
JD Bernal, developmental biologist and early advocate of epigenetics Conrad Waddington and 
physicist PMS Blackett (Sheehan, 1993, p303). Haldane, along with Ronald Fisher and Sewall 
Wright, was instrumental in establishing the modern synthesis of Darwinian natural selection 
and genetics on which the foundations of biological theory are built. The synthesis combined 
evolutionary biology after Darwin with the mathematical rules for how characteristics are 
passed down from parent to offspring initially investigated by Gregor Mendel, thereby 
integrating and building on two previously separate strands of biological theory (Dronamraju, 
2017).18 
Haldane contributed a science column to the Communist Party’s Daily Worker and joined the 
party officially in 1942. It was Haldane who suggested that Lawrence and Wishart (the CP 
publishing house) publish Engels’ Dialectics of Nature in English. In the introduction to the 
text he described how useful he found Engels’ work; had it been published earlier it would 
have saved him a lot of “muddled thinking” (Haldane, introduction to Engels, 1939).19 
However, as Gary Werskey (1988) argues, Haldane never shook off his commitment to the 
Communist Party’s interpretation of Marxist politics; a vision of socialism brought about by 
                                                          
17 As Sheehan explains, in the 1930s a Labour government fell, former Labour members turned to 
Communism and fascism was on the rise across Europe: “The middle ground was slipping away by the 
hour” (Sheehan, 1993, p306). The threat from the right, the economic crisis and the looming world war 
all played a role in radicalising British intellectuals of the time. 
18 John Bellamy Foster has also borrowed the term “modern synthesis” to represent the synthesis of 
classical Marxism and ecological science represented by second stage ecosocialism—Foster, 2016b, p5. 






great leaders rather than workers’ self-activity. For Werskey, this treats scientists as separate 
from and sitting above the rest of society. It suggests that a more just world can be brought 
about by increasing investment in science and implementing socialist planning to make better 
use of scientific findings. Hilary and Steven Rose, commenting on the differences between the 
1930s radical scientists and the later generation (of which they were a part), point out, 
therefore, that many of the 1930s generation assumed that science could be harnessed “to the 
service of society” with the Soviet Union providing the model, while the content of science 
itself went relatively unquestioned (Rose and Rose, 1972).  
However, not all of the 1930s radical scientists neglected to address the content of science. As 
evolutionary biologist Rob Wallace (2016a) explains, the ideas of Christopher Caudwell, also 
a member of the Communist Party, prefigured many of those of the dialectical biologists of the 
1970s. Notably, he criticised what he referred to as “the bourgeois separation of organism and 
environment” long before Levins and Lewontin would publish their own strikingly similar 
thoughts on the relationship between organism and environment which will be further 
discussed in chapter six here (Sheehan, 1993, pp350-383).20  
In 1931 a delegation of Soviet scientists, led by Nikolai Bukharin, visited Britain to take part 
in a session of the International Congress of the History of Science and Technology. The 
Soviet papers highlighted the ideological assumptions of science, drawing a sharp distinction 
between science in the Soviet Union and the “bourgeois science” of the West. In one of the 
presentations, Russian physicist Boris Hessen explained Newton’s achievements with 
reference to the social and political context in which they arose: the early capitalism of 17th 
century Britain (Rose and Rose, 1972, p108). Loren Graham therefore credits Hessen as one of 
the founders of this approach to the history of science (Graham, 1985). While it is widely 
accepted today that scientific knowledge must be understood in context, in 1931, the Soviet 
speeches had a profound effect on those who heard them. Sheehan describes how it shocked 
many in the audience into silence, referring to the dismissive statement of a reviewer in the 
leading journal Nature: the “laws of nature are the same for all of us” (Sheehan, 1993, p307). 
The Soviet Embassy in London was rapidly transformed into a publishing house, publishing 
the Soviet papers under the title Science at the Crossroads.  
 
2.5.2: Lysenko 
But science in the Soviet Union was, by this time, already taking a tragic turn. Scientists who 
had found some support for their work in the early years of the revolution were increasingly 
                                                          
20 Caudwell, a polymath who wrote fiction and poetry as well as commenting on physics, maths, biology 
and psychology died in the Spanish Civil War aged just 29 (Wallace, 2016). 
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threatened by Stalin’s counter-revolution. At around the time of Science at the Crossroads, the 
Ukrainian agronomist Trofim Denisovich Lysenko was beginning his experiments into the 
treatment of crop seeds. Lysenko proposed that vernalisation (pre-treating seeds at low 
temperatures before sowing) would increase their yield; carrying out experiments that were 
certainly interesting to a society desperately looking for practical ways to feed the population 
(Levins and Lewontin, 1985, p174). Lysenko went on to argue that, when different crops were 
manipulated by being planted in different conditions, they acquired characteristics that could 
be passed on to the next generation (Rose and Rose, 1972, p113). Part of the theoretical basis 
for Lysenkoism was the rejection of a separation between organism and environment; in 
contrast to Darwinian evolution, Lysenko did not see the inheritance of genes as a distinct 
process from the influence of an external environment. This led to the belief that organisms 
could freely assimilate certain aspects of their environment and reject others. New species 
were also thought, by Lysenko and his followers, to evolve when an individual organism 
encounters a particular environment. This removed the (Malthusian influenced) emphasis on 
competition between individuals in a population in Darwin’s conception of natural selection 
(Levins and Lewontin, 1985, p167).  
Lysenko would later reject the existence of genes entirely. The idea that information is passed 
from parent to offspring was seen as a metaphysical deviation and incompatible with the 
emphasis on materiality that Lysenko’s supporters saw as key to their Marxism. The notion of 
an unchanging genetic particle was particularly problematic as it went against the Lysenkoists’ 
stress on the mutability of living things and was seen as denying the reality of a dynamic 
natural world (Levins and Lewontin, 1985, p169).21 Sheehan shows how genetics was classed 
as “idealist”, a “bourgeois” mystical science that contrasted strongly with the “dialectical 
materialist” worldview, and places this in the context of a long debate between idealist and 
materialist Marxist philosophers of science (Sheehan, 1993, chapter 3 and pp200-201).  
Lysenko’s ideas were quickly seized upon by the Soviet leadership (Sheehan, 1993, pp202-
203; Lecourt, 1977, pp18-19). By 1940, Lysenko, with the personal support of Stalin, was 
made director of the Institute of Genetics. But the teaching and practice of genetics was 
banned. The regime destroyed textbooks and many leading geneticists including Vavilov and 
Hessen found themselves replaced by more compliant scientists and imprisoned (Soyfer, 
2011). The approach developed by Lysenko and his supporters clearly contrasts with that of 
Marx and Engels, who drew on the ideas of mainstream thinkers in the sciences even where 
they differed politically (Gould, 2006). However, Engels’ unfinished manuscript on the 
dialectics of nature undoubtedly influenced Soviet policy on biology and agriculture. In 
                                                          
21 The double helix structure of DNA had yet to be discovered at this point but many biologists accepted 





particular, the three “laws” of dialectics seem to prefigure the dogmatic approach of attempting 
to develop a proletarian science. But was Engels himself at fault? Barot (2010) reminds readers 
that Dialectics of Nature was an unfinished work. He cautions against either following its 
principles uncritically or dismissing it entirely. Sheehan (1993) similarly argues that critics 
need to be more discerning about what Engels’ contribution to scientific debates is, viewing 
his work more as a pointer towards areas of further study than a sacred text. However, Barot 
also adds that the proposed series of laws in Dialectics of Nature represents “a dangerous turn 
that paves the way for its later dogmatic transformation” (Barot, 2010, p144).  
Furthermore, some commentators have argued that Engels’ views on nature represent a 
fundamental departure from Marx’s own perspective and justify his dismissal from the Marxist 
tradition entirely (see Rees, 1994). For example, George Lichtheim (1964) proposed that Marx 
and Engels had completely different viewpoints and that Engels contaminated Marx’s 
philosophy with positivist ideology, calling this “a travesty”. As discussed above, Marxism is 
often seen as a critical science, concerned with changing the world, rather than the type of 
science that merely observes and interprets the world as it exists (Edgley, 1983, p291). 
Some suggest that Marx either disagreed with Engels but didn’t have time to provide a proper 
critique of his friend’s work or was unaware of the details of what Engels was writing. 
However, this seems unlikely as the two regularly visited and wrote to each other to discuss 
their respective work—Engels first proposed writing a dialectics of nature in a letter to Marx. 
It is more probable that Marx and Engels established a division of labour between them 
whereby Engels would deal with questions of nature, leaving Marx to focus on economics, 
although the latter also read and commented on drafts of Engels’ works on science (Angus, 
2017, p24; for a systematic critique of the various proposals that Marx and Engels disagreed 
see Sheehan, 1993). As Weston (2012) explains, Marx also sometimes chose to illustrate 
aspects of his method using examples from the natural sciences. In Capital he uses the 
example of elliptical motion of bodies in space to explain how a single thing can have two 
properties that contradict each other and that these contradictions are not resolved: “it is a 
contradiction to depict one body as constantly falling towards another, and as, at the same 
time, constantly flying away from it. The ellipse is a form of motion which, while allowing this 
contradiction to go on, at the same time reconciles it” (Marx, 1976, p70). For Weston, this 
further supports the argument that Marx essentially agreed with Engels.  
However, Hungarian philosopher Georg Lukács, provided what, for some, is a devastating 
argument against applications of dialectics to anything other than social relations (Vogel, 
1996, chapter 1). Lukács’ thought was influential to what became known as Western Marxism 
(as opposed to the Soviet or Eastern tradition) and to recovering the Hegelian influence on 
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Marxism and its emphasis on praxis (Loftus, 2012, p50). Nevertheless, his ideas raise 
problems for the idea of a dialectics of nature. 
 
2.5.3: Lukács and the dialectics of nature 
Lukács rarely referred to questions of nature or the environment, showing an “almost exclusive 
concern with the dialectic in society” (Rees, 1998, p252). Furthermore, in an infamous 
footnote to the 1923 book History and Class Consciousness he argued that Engels was 
mistaken to propose a dialectics of nature: 
The misunderstandings that arise from Engels’ account of dialectics can in 
the main be put down to the fact that Engels—following Hegel’s mistaken 
lead—extended the method to apply also to nature. However, the crucial 
determinants of dialectics—the interaction of subject and object, the unity of 
theory and practice, the historical changes in the reality underlying the 
categories...are absent from our knowledge of nature (Lukács, 1971, p24). 
For Lukács, there is a dialectical relationship between reality and ideas; dialectics describes 
only a subject-object relation (Smith, 2009, p358). Dialectics is therefore intended as an 
epistemology—referring to the way people interpret the world around them—rather than a 
method derived from a study of the workings of nature (Vogel, 1996, p16). Furthermore, in 
Lukács’ work there is a clear relationship between commodification and agency. For Marx, 
capitalism tends to turn objects into commodities by treating them as having value only in that 
they can be exchanged.22 As discussed in relation to value theory and ecology, the relevant 
property of a commodity from the point of view of the capitalist is its exchange value rather 
than its use value. For Lukács, human labour power is also given a price when humans are 
compelled to work for a wage—the working class effectively become commodities themselves 
(Lukács, 1971 [1923]). But, as human labour power is the ultimate source of the exchange 
value inherent to all commodities, labour power is the “absolute” or apical commodity (see 
Callinicos, 2006, p248). Labouring humans are jointly the subject and object of history—
objectified and turned into commodities but at the same time also able to act in the world as 
subjects. This role within the system also provides the working class with the means to 
understand the capitalist system: 
The worker can only become conscious of his existence in society when he 
becomes aware of himself as a commodity...his consciousness is the self-
consciousness of the commodity; or in other words it is the self-knowledge, 
                                                          





the self-revelation of the capitalist society founded upon the production and 
exchange of commodities (Lukács, 1971, p168). 
The working class, therefore, uniquely have the potential to comprehend the system they find 
themselves implicated in, to understand it from the standpoint of the proletariat (although of 
course this potential for class consciousness is not always realised). But furthermore, for 
Lukács the key to understanding a system is to play an active role within it. Workers will only 
understand the capitalist world by acting and trying to change it. If we accept Marx’s view that 
non-humans do not contribute to exchange value by their activities as do humans—as 
discussed earlier with the example of bees producing honey—it follows that non-humans don’t 
take on the same role within the system as subject and object of history. So, Marxism as a way 
of understanding the world is inseparable from it as a way of intervening. Lukács refers to this 
method as dialectics: “materialist dialectic is a revolutionary dialectic” (Lukács, 1971, p2) 
echoing Marx’s own point (previously quoted) about dialectics being inherently critical.  
In some ways Lukács’ work also addresses the status of Marxism as a science itself. While he 
maintains that Marxism aims to get at the “essence of things”, he differentiates Marxism from 
the type of science carried out by a neutral, distanced observer analysing a phenomenon which 
they do not attempt to influence. Social scientists often face problems of subjectivity—how 
can we come to valid conclusions about a human society of which we are part while avoiding 
bias? However, in Lukács’ work the problem is turned on its head. It is precisely because 
humans are part of society that they can attempt to understand it. As Slavoj Žižek puts it, 
Lukács articulated the notion of “partiality as not only not an obstacle to but a positive 
condition of Truth” (quoted in Callinicos, 2006, p248).23  
By contrast, in a later passage of History and Class Consciousness the dialectics of nature is 
referred to as something that “can never become anything more exalted than a dialectics of 
movement witnessed by the detached observer” (Lukács, 1971, p207). Such movements 
cannot be truly dialectical for Lukács as, for him, dialectics is about “transforming, rather than 
merely observing, reality” (Loftus, 2012, p61; see also Loftus, 2013) and nature is assumed to 
merely be observed. Kircz (1998) makes a similar point, arguing that there is something un-
dialectical in Engels’ formulation—or at least something that could, in the wrong hands, be 
interpreted in an un-dialectical way. Engels seems to have attempted to distil the experience of 
the natural world into a set of laws which can then be applied back to the material world. This 
in itself creates a dualism between the observed world and the observing scientist, creating an 
                                                          
23 Lukács was intensely critical of positivist interpretations of Marxism. At the time when he wrote 
History and Class Consciousness such versions of Marxism were primarily associated with the policies 
of the Second International and particularly with Bernstein and the German SPD (Lukács, 1971, p5).  
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external relationship between observer and observed as it suggests that one can influence the 
other in a deterministic way. Neil Smith also criticises the dialectics of nature briefly in 
Uneven Development. Smith argues that Engels treated nature as external and therefore 
removed the necessary element of a subject-object dialectic (Smith, 2008, pp34-35).  
However, other have been critical of Lukács’ treatment of dialectics as (exclusively) a social 
theory. Antonio Gramsci questioned whether it is itself dualist to propose that there are 
methods proper to accounting for human history that are not also relevant to nature: 
It would appear that Lukács maintains that one can speak of the dialectic only 
for the history of men and not for nature… If his assertion presupposes a 
dualism between nature and man he is wrong because he is falling into a 
conception of nature proper to...idealism which does not in reality succeed in 
unifying and relating man and nature to each other except verbally. But if 
human history should be conceived also as the history of nature (also by 
means of the history of science) how can the dialectic be separated from 
nature? (Gramsci, 1971, p448).  
Gramsci cautioned against seeing dialectics in nature, ie nature as witnessed by a detached 
observer, although he seems to have been broadly sympathetic to a dialectical understanding of 
nature. For Gramsci it is possible to understand nature dialectically as long as it is possible to 
understand human history in such a way; natural history is inseparable from human history 
(Wainwright, 2013). It is possible to adopt a dialectical approach to nature that avoids the trap 
of seeing nature as external while also avoiding the idealism of seeing dialectical relations only 
in relations between humans. Strangely, if Gramsci is right, Smith falls into the same trap of 
seeing nature as external and universal that he himself criticises. What is needed, rather than 
accepting that nature is external and therefore non-dialectical, is to develop an approach to the 
dialectics of nature that also recognises the ways in which natures are produced.    
Some theorists have attempted to avoid dualism by arguing that human action has some unique 
qualities not found in the rest of nature while also maintaining that society and nature are 
inseparable, a position that stands to reason as, of course humans are part of nature and 
evolved from non-human ancestors. John Rees argues that nature can be understood as 
following dialectical laws if it is also accepted that nature and society, though interpenetrating, 
are ultimately qualitatively different (Rees, 1998, p75; see also Smith, 2009) echoing 
Lefebvre’s statement that “the sciences of nature and the social sciences are specifically 
creative” (Lefebvre, 2009 [1940], p107). For others the dialectical approach is notable for its 
emphasis on emergence; reality is stratified with different processes or laws that operate at 





also some novel phenomena—consciousness, perhaps—that are specific to human society (see 
Callinicos, 2006 for a Marxist account influenced by critical realism).  
Lukács himself adopted something like this approach in later works. In Lukács’ Defence of 
History and Class Consciousness (published in English in 2000), he does accept the existence 
of a dialectic of nature, remarking that “self-evidently society arose from nature” and that the 
dialectic must therefore be “already effective as a principal of development of nature before 
society” (Lukács, 2000 [1925-6], p102). Lukács also refers at times to nature as socially 
mediated, although elsewhere and in contradiction to this he continues to deny that dialectical 
methods can be applied to the study of the natural world and reasserts nature’s “ontological 
objectivity”. Alex Loftus, drawing on Steven Vogel’s reading of Lukács (Vogel, 1996, chapter 
1), therefore argues that Lukács’ whole approach is limited by its idealist conception of human 
labour and his lack of attention to the role of practical activity in producing natures (Loftus, 
2012, p66).  
Providing a route out of the impasse represented by Lukács’ intervention that is particularly 
relevant to this thesis, Paul Burkett, in a paper originally written following the publication of 
Tailism and the Dialectic, has taken issue with some of Lukács’ assumptions about the natural 
sciences (Burkett, 2013 [2001]). When Lukács asserts that: “the dialectics of nature can never 
become anything more exalted than a dialectics of movement witnessed by the detached 
observer” (Lukács, 1971, p207) he shows a lack of understanding of the actual practice of 
science. Lukács implies that natural scientists remain “detached” from their object of study, 
something Burkett describes as an idealistic conception of the scientific method. Instead 
Burkett argues that Lukács should have developed an “immanent critique of natural science” 
(Burkett, 2013, p6) and adopted a goal of creating a more historical materialist approach to the 
natural sciences, a baton he argues was taken up by Levins and Lewontin. These biologists 
have denied that natural sciences are disinterested and that social sciences are uniquely 
subjective, pointing out some of the similarities between the two (Levins and Lewontin, 1998).  
Burkett’s second contention to Lukács’ approach is that the role of subject as well as object 
may not be exclusively human. Lukács did not address the question of subjectivity among non-
humans and seems to assume “that extra-human nature has no subjectivity”. Burkett hints that 
this is “a highly problematic claim given recent research on animals” (Burkett, 2013, p7). 
However, what this research on animals might consist of is left unexplored. This is an area 
where the notions of non-human agency being discussed within the social sciences with the 
emergence of new/vital materialisms (see chapter three) but also a renewed engagement with 
the ideas on non-human agency of the dialectical biologists should prove fruitful.  
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2.6: The return of the dialectics of nature debate 
Attempts to apply dialectics to issues of science and nature had disastrous consequences in the 
Soviet Union that anyone discussing dialectical biology today ought to acknowledge. 
According to Hilary Rose, the whole Lysenko episode shut the door on Marxist discussions of 
science for decades, leading to the idea that there is only one science—bourgeois science 
(Rose, 2004 [1983]). So, with the dialectics of nature so tarnished by its application in the 
Soviet Union, is there any reason to resurrect it? It is the contention of this thesis that dialectics 
remains central to the Marxist critique of capitalism and that, as Gramsci suggested, it makes 
little sense to separate human history from natural history. Therefore, dialectics still has 
something to say about socio-natural processes, but not as a set of rules to be applied to nature 
from the outside. Fortunately, there are interpretations of dialectics that treat it neither as a 
motor force of history nor as a dogmatic list of laws. In particular, it is argued here, the 
dialectics of Ollman, Harvey and their associates, that has become influential in geography, 
offers such a flexible methodology.  
Interestingly, Harvey’s approach accords with some of Engels’ statements about dialectical 
philosophy. While we can only speculate as to what Engels meant to say in Dialectics of 
Nature, in another text, Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy, 
Engels expresses a strikingly similar stance to Ollman, stating that:  
The world is not to be comprehended as a complex of ready-made things, 
but as a complex of processes, in which the things apparently stable no 
less than their mind-images in our heads, the concepts go through an 
uninterrupted change of coming into being and passing away (Engels, 
1947, [1888], p52, italics in original).  
Engels also emphasises dynamism and totality. He adds that the major contribution of Hegel’s 
dialectical philosophy is that it: “reveals the transitory character of everything and in 
everything; nothing can endure before it except the uninterrupted process of becoming and of 
passing away” (Engels, 1947, p15). Elsewhere in the same text he comments on the 
achievements of 19th century biology while criticising its tendency towards “observing natural 
objects and natural processes in their isolation” (Engels, 1947, p27). Engels also rejects 
“dogmatic” interpretations of Hegelian dialectics, arguing that Hegel’s major contribution is 
his dialectical method rather than the content of his proposals (perhaps including the infamous 
three laws): “The whole dogmatic content of the Hegelian system is declared to be absolute 
truth, in contradiction to his dialectical method, which dissolves all dogmatism. Thus, the 
revolutionary side becomes smothered beneath the overgrowth of the conservative side” 





In geography, dialectics is associated with urban theorists such as Soja and Merrifield and the 
potential contribution of a dialectics of nature is comparatively under-explored. However, as 
mentioned previously, Harvey uses examples from the natural sciences in order to illustrate his 
methodology. What does this mean for the question of the dialectics of nature? This final 
section will argue that the dialectics of nature debate is far from over. Indeed, it is at the heart 
of the ongoing schism among ecological Marxists about the kind of theory needed to make 
sense of socio-natures in the Anthropocene. This chapter has taken a detour through Engels’ 
attempt to elucidate a dialectics of nature in the late 19th century and the experiments in 
proletarian science in the 20th. However, some understanding of this history is necessary to 
make sense of ecological Marxism in the 21st century.  
As the start of this chapter showed, Marx’s understanding of how different ways of organising 
human labour necessitate different relationships with the rest of the biosphere is foundational 
to ecological Marxism. Here it was also argued that ecological thought since Marx has tended 
to “see-saw” between naturalist and social constructionist positions, which are more or less 
aligned to materialist and idealist thought (Castree, 2000). As Marx and Engels were 
themselves influenced by both idealist and materialist ideas, perhaps it should not surprise us 
that their followers remain divided along such lines. Although we should be cautious about 
mapping contemporary debates too closely to these foundational differences between 
philosophical worldviews, some seem to find the idealism/materialism distinction relevant. For 
example, Foster seeks to defend a non-mechanical materialist Marxism and accuses his 
opponents of idealism.24  
Castree argues that both naturalism and social constructionism fall prey to a dualism that 
presents a limit to our capacity to understand environmental questions. Both assume that 
nature and society are two distinct realms that come to relate to each other although they differ 
in which is seen as the explanatory pole (Castree, 2000). Therefore, what is needed is an 
approach that avoids either of these extremes and instead draws on Marx’s materialist outlook 
to show how any differentiation of humanity from the rest of the biosphere has arisen 
historically.   
More recently, Shannon Brincat and Damian Gerber (2015) have advocated dialectics as just 
such a method. For them, a dialectical view is not just desirable but necessary in an era of 
biospheric instability: “it is only in moving toward a dialectical account of the totality…that 
we can begin to grapple with the accelerating ecological crises of the present” (2015, p873). 
Brincat and Gerber stress the dynamism of socio-natural systems and the opposition to dualism 
                                                          
24 Foster and colleagues have consistently counterposed “materialist” science with spiritual or 
pseudoscientific accounts such as intelligent design. See Clark, Foster and York, 2007. 
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inherent in dialectical thought. Dialectics allows them to treat “society in nature” as a totality 
or dynamic whole and to avoid treating nature as external to human history; capitalism and its 
“crises” are for them inherently ecological. Such a method, will, according to these thinkers, 
enable us to critique specifically capitalist socio-natural relations rather than naturalising those 
relations and to seek out the potential for change within the conditions of the present. 
Importantly, Brincat and Gerber (2015, pp872-875) see themselves as addressing an omission 
in Marxist theory in the 20th century. Marxism has lacked an appreciation of (what they call) 
the “affinity” between humanity and nature; so, nature needs to be reintegrated into dialectics 
in order to recover a more ecologically informed Marxism (Brincat and Gerber interestingly 
refer to their project as one of developing a “dialectical naturalism” to mean something like 
this, see p887, but naturalism can also have connotations of reducing socio-natural phenomena 
to supposed “natural laws” so the word is avoided here). 
Similarly, Loftus (2012) takes “inspiration from Marx’s dialectical approach to understanding 
the world” for his project of rethinking environmental politics. As he argues, an approach 
drawing critically on Marxist dialectics can provide a framework “that is flexible enough to 
capture the interaction of what are normally conceived as separate elements: the natural and 
the social, the historical and the geographical” (Loftus, 2012, p.xvii). Following Smith’s 
example, Loftus demonstrates that, rather than being premised on a dialectical interaction 
between two separate elements—such as nature and society—a dialectical approach calls into 
question the historical processes through which these elements came to be seen as separate. 
Paul Robbins also refers to dialectics as a key methodological influence within political 
ecology by including a section on “human—non-human dialectics” in his critical introduction 
(Robbins, 2012). Robbins’ interpretation of dialectics is similar to Ollman’s, it is a 
methodology that treats things as constituted by relations and as therefore existing “in a state 
of ongoing becoming…never the same thing at any time” (Robbins, 2012, p94).25 
Continuing this project of revisiting a dialectics of nature, in a series of recent interventions, 
John Bellamy Foster has argued that only what he calls a “materialist dialectical” 
understanding of society and nature is adequate to grasp the implications of the Anthropocene. 
Foster understands dialectics as a theory of dynamics, complexity and transformation. He 
argues that ecological analysis must be rooted in “the recovery on a higher level, of the 
dialectics of nature—to be seen as connected to the dialectics of society”. This “is a vital task 
for Marxian ecological theorists today, who are seeking to explore the ecological 
                                                          
25 This sentiment is arguably also evident in Robbins’ classic political ecology text Lawn People 





contradictions of the Anthropocene, and to pave a way to a truly revolutionary praxis” (Foster, 
2016, p23).  
However, Jason Moore has raised some criticisms of the metabolic rift theory associated with 
Foster and others. Foster’s project of “connecting” a dialectics of nature to a dialectics of 
society is, according to Moore, a dualist approach. As Moore sees it, Foster has developed his 
analysis of capitalist political economy distinctly from his understanding of nature rather than 
addressing how capitalism and its crises develop through its production of nature (Moore, 
2017b).  
In the book Capitalism in the Web of Life (2015) and several related articles, Moore has made 
an ambitious attempt to rethink ecological Marxism and to develop a world-ecology. As 
Moore’s work is particularly influential, and particularly controversial, it is discussed in some 
detail here. Firstly, Moore proposes that ecological Marxism will be ineffectual if it rests on a 
dualism. Dualism as an ideology makes natures more commensurable to capitalist 
appropriation by enabling elements of the natural world to be quantified and rationalised. It 
can therefore only further capitalist interests: “The view of Nature as external is a fundamental 
condition of capital accumulation” (Moore, 2015, p2). According to Moore, the philosophical 
separation of humanity and nature in Western thought both underlies and bases itself in other 
dualisms including orientalism, binary understandings of gender roles and the oppression of 
indigenous people (often rendered as part of “nature” and cast out of the fold of “humanity”—
Moore, 2017b, p289). This points to another of Moore’s contentions: that ideology matters 
(2015, chapter 8). He argues that practices of measuring and categorising non-human natures 
cannot be seen as distinct from the commodification and appropriation of those natures. Moore 
claims that some “left ecologists” have adopted a “vulgar materialism” that does not account 
for the role of ideology in shaping socio-natural relations (interview, 3 November 2016).   
Rather than acting on nature, capitalism ought, according to Moore, to be seen as developing 
“through nature” in a continual process of mutual coproduction of humans and environments. 
Environmental history cannot be understood, therefore, by appealing to a combination of 
nature and society. Instead, transformations of social relations are also simultaneously 
transformations of space and nature (Moore, 2017b, p307).26  
Secondly, Moore combines a version of Marxist value theory with a geographical approach to 
world history spanning the last few centuries. In terms of value theory, he maintains the 
classical Marxist position that it is the labour power of exploited workers that produces value 
                                                          
26 Moore proposes new methods and new language, such as the notion of the oikeois in order to escape 
these persistent dualisms. The oikeois is described here as the “relation” from which other relations, 
including species-environment relations, emerge. The term originates with the Greek for “favourable 
place” that specifies a relationship between a species and its environment (Moore, 2015, p35). 
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in capitalism. However, he argues that unpaid work, including the “work” provided by non-
human natures, is “appropriated”. The process of appropriation contributes to the formation of 
capitalist value as it makes labour power cheaper (Moore, 2015, pp143-148). For example, it 
might become cheaper to employ workers if they are able to harvest firewood for fuel 
themselves at no monetary cost; in Moore’s terms, accumulation relies on the appropriation of 
“unpaid work/energy” (p146). In this Moore owes some of his ideas to the social reproduction 
theories developed by Marxist feminists who draw attention to the role of unpaid human 
labour (for example by women in the home) in reducing costs for capitalists (Moore, 2015, 
p52). It is important to note here that Moore does not argue that nature is exploited; he makes a 
distinction between the “exploitation” of labour power and the “appropriation” of work beyond 
the capital-labour relation. Yet the two might be described here as two moments within the 
same process. Conversely, Richard Walker (2017) admires Moore’s work but argues that non-
human natures are indeed exploited and that Marx was simply wrong to apply these terms only 
to human labour. On the other hand, Jean Parker (2017) criticises Moore for his inconsistency, 
arguing that although he states that only human labour power produces value, he tends to slip 
into referring to the “work” of non-humans as productive of value (see also Nayeri, 2016).  
Moore argues that capitalism has, over centuries, reconfigured non-human nature. It is 
therefore more properly a way of organising nature rather than an economic system. This 
reorganisation, for Moore, does not in itself produce value but produces the relations that make 
the production of value possible. So, his interest is in uncovering the origin of the law of value 
rather than taking value relations as a given. Moore evocatively describes how capitalism has 
tended to open new frontiers of appropriation. From the 15th century onwards it scoured the 
globe in the search for fresh supplies of commodities such as iron, silver, timber and sugar 
(Moore, 2015 and 2017a). However, when the geographical limits of the globe were reached, 
exhausting the ability to appropriate new natures, capitalism escaped a crisis by cheapening 
inputs; creating cheap labour, cheap energy, cheap food and cheap raw materials. But capital is 
now struggling to restore these four cheaps and will imminently reach a crisis, perhaps even a 
terminal crisis, as it is difficult to see where the next expansion of ecological surplus will come 
from. For Moore, these periodic changes within capitalism as it seeks out new frontiers 
represent qualitative transformations or “shifts” in socio-natural relations rather than the break 
or rift that Foster might refer to (Moore, 2017b, p302).  
Moore frequently refers to dialectics. He often quotes the (Western) Marxist philosopher Karel 
Kosík in saying that “dialectics does not consider fixed artefacts” (1976, quoted in Moore, 
2017b, p285). For Moore (2015), such a methodology is necessary for his project. He also 
mentions the dialectical biologists Richard Levins and Richard Lewontin in his book (Moore, 





an interview he described them as an early influence and “quite central” to his work and 
advocated that their 1985 book The Dialectical Biologist should be read as “a kind of methods 
text” (interview, 3 November 2016).  
Moore refers approvingly to philosophies of internal relations and to Ollman and Harvey as 
influences. As well as dialectics taking “relationality to be its operative premise” and 
recognising historical movement he adds that a dialectical approach is based on asymmetry. 
So, it seems that, even for Moore, dialectics does invoke a relation between two moments, 
even if such moments are only temporarily held to be stable:  
For dialectics you have to have a relation between two moments that are 
asymmetrical—[such as] capital and labour or empire and colony—and 
there has to be a historical movement such that the original terms of the 
relation, so capital-labour at the beginning…are eventually transcended. 
Not necessarily towards the expropriators being expropriated—that’s one 
possibility—but it could be another asymmetrical relation. So, you have 
to have the history, you have to have the asymmetry. And the history and 
the asymmetry mean you have to allow for the possibility of the 
interchangeability of subject-object relations. So, I mean those for me are 
the cores. Whatever basic units we begin with, whatever premises we 
begin with, we have to hold them stable up to a point, as Marx does of 
course for capital in the various moments of capital and the various other 
categories he uses. You have to treat them as historically stabilised but 
also as fluid in a particular trajectory (interview, 3 November 2016). 
For Moore, however, even advocates of a sophisticated Marxist interpretation such as the 
metabolic rift theory adopt a “soft dualism” (2017b, p299) when they invoke a relationship 
between humanity and nature and talk of a rift in this relationship that must be healed. Such 
approaches are, for Moore, insufficiently dialectical if they are inattentive to the processes 
through which socio-natural relations develop: “Nature and society can only be a dialectic—as 
opposed to a relation—through a specification of their laws of motion” (Moore, 2017b, p295). 
However, he does not wish to dispense with metabolic rift thinking entirely. He notes that the 
original formulation of the metabolic rift approach (in Foster, 1999 and Foster, 2000) was 
rooted in an understanding of the processes of alienation of human beings from the conditions 
of their existence under capitalism. In other words, Foster initially recognised that human 
history could not be understood as distinct from natural history. However, the language of a 
“rift” has apparently been adopted by those who would more crudely emphasise a separation 
between society and nature or refer to society’s impacts on nature. Therefore, Moore claims he 
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wants to “affirm” the “dialectical core” of the original metabolic rift approach (Moore, 2017b, 
p287).  
White, Gareau and Rudy (2016) also criticise Foster and other metabolic rift theorists, 
accusing them of assuming that nature exists in a state of balance or equilibrium when it is not 
disturbed by humans (2016, p27). These authors argue that rift theorists have failed to register 
work in non-equilibrium ecology that stresses the dynamism of biological systems. However, 
this particular critique is somewhat unfair. For example, Brett Clark and Richard York (2005a 
and 2005b) are two theorists in the metabolic rift tradition who have made use of dialectical 
biology to question the very assumption of a stable nature that human action simply impacts 
upon. However, it is true that they do at times refer to relationships between society and nature 
rather than adopting the language of hybrids or socio-natures that others might use (see chapter 
six).  
Moore’s ideas have in turn been criticised by other Marxists. Part of the controversy relates to 
their political implications. Andreas Malm, who is sympathetic to the metabolic rift theory, 
takes issue with Moore’s “cheerful” assessment that capitalism will soon grind to a halt as its 
own contradictions become unmanageable, he points out that capitalism tends to find a way 
out of its problems by offloading them onto the working class rather than dissolving itself 
when it encounters a crisis (Malm, 2018, pp192-194). So, in the context of an ongoing debate 
about environmental “catastrophism”, it is argued that Moore does not take the scale of today’s 
environmental problems seriously enough. On the other side of the debate, overemphasising 
environmental destruction can make problems seem insurmountable and lead to pessimism and 
inertia among activists. For this reason, Harvey has in the past referred to Foster as dealing in 
“apocalyptic proclamations” and “doomsday scenarios” (1996, p195).  
Malm also strongly criticises theories of the social construction of nature as, in effect, denying 
any real existence for biophysical processes. He posits a distinction between those who accept 
the reality of biophysical processes beyond human discourse, who acknowledge that “the 
actually existing forest contains a rich wildlife” and those who say it does not, dismissing the 
latter’s views as unhelpful in developing the theory needed to understand and respond to 
environmental problems (Malm, 2018, p27). Malm argues that theories of the construction of 
nature can be shown to be false “so easily as to court ridicule” (p36). As he sees it, there are 
many aspects of the natural world that predate human action. Coal, for instance, was laid down 
hundreds of millions of years ago. Therefore, it is simply incorrect to say that humans 
“produced” or “constructed” the coal seams, it is only relatively recently that they were 





Foster has defended his own interpretation of the metabolic rift from accusations of dualism. 
Countering the argument that he separates economics from ecology in his work, he maintains 
that “a dialectical systems view…understands the ecological problem as simultaneously 
economic and ecological” (Foster, 2016c). Foster sees the dominance of social constructionist 
Marxisms as originating with the split between idealist and materialist Marxisms discussed 
above. As he notes, Lukács was influential in Western Marxism, which is characterised above 
all else by its rejection of a dialectics of nature, effectively placing all discussions of “nature” 
outside the realm of Marxist enquiry (Foster, 2016b, pp3, 20; Foster and Clark, 2016a). Foster 
argues that Lukács’ (initial) repudiation of the dialectics of nature lent the concept a 
problematic status in Marxist philosophy which it still retains: “It would be difficult to 
exaggerate the importance of this stricture for Western Marxism” (Foster, 2013). Foster argues 
that the influence of Western Marxism can still be seen today in what he terms “social 
constructionist” accounts of society and nature which he also conflates with philosophical 
idealism. These theories, he argues, are predicated on the idea that there is no nature outside of 
society.  
Social constructionist ideas are dangerous, according to Foster, in that they downplay any 
analysis of the ways in which human societies emit waste into the biosphere (including the 
greenhouse gases that cause climate change, surely the pre-eminent environmental issue of our 
time). Whether Marxists treat nature as external or not, capitalism seems intent on literally and 
figuratively externalising its various waste problems. Therefore, while Foster accepts that 
socio-natural relations are in some sense internal, he also says that in a dialectical approach 
there needs to be a conception of the external relationship between society and nature (see also 
Holleman, 2015). This enables us to recognise the appearance of rifts in the metabolic process 
arising with capitalism which result from real processes of capitalist alienation of workers 
(Foster, 2016c). Similarly, for Malm, an issue like air pollution can only sensibly be seen as a 
problem of an external element (humanity) polluting the ecosystem rather than the problem 
being derived internally (Malm, 2018, p178).  
Foster also sees Smith’s notion of the production of nature as exemplary of an idealist 
approach. He has argued that Smith comes close to denying that nature has any existence 
outside of society and is too quick to dismiss any discussion of the properties of the biosphere 
outside of human influence as “dualism”. Foster argues that for Smith “nature was seen as 
subsumed within society” (Foster, 2016b, p4). This is seen as a form of social determinism 
which is just as problematic as the reverse procedure, subsuming society into nature 
(environmental determinism). Similarly, Holleman argues that neither society nor nature can 
be reduced to the other: “Social history is not reduced to natural history nor is the rest of nature 
subsumed by society, social forces, and social meaning. [Dialectics] emphasises the need to 
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analyse the relationship between structure and process and change over time (communication 
by email, 3 January 2018). What is needed is an approach that holds both society and nature in 
tension and uncovers the dynamic interactions between them.  
Foster concludes that there is a need to revisit the approach to science and nature developed 
within the Soviet Union, from the Eastern branch of Marxism where the dialectics of nature 
was not only remembered but enthusiastically adopted. Foster is critical of Soviet policy under 
Stalin and of Lysenko’s rejection of genetics. But he argues that some of the ideas of those 
Soviet scientists influenced by dialectics remains useful. As mentioned previously he is 
particularly interested in Vernadsky and the concept of the biosphere (Foster, 2016a).    
However, Castree would surely disagree with Foster’s premise that the production of nature 
thesis is social constructionist. He has argued that instead it: “circumvents the absolutisms of 
either natural limits conservatism or social constructionist utopianism” (Castree, 2000, p28). 
For Castree, one of the advantages of the production of nature framework is that, rather than 
denying the existence of carbon dioxide, it allows for an understanding of the complex ways in 
which different environments are capitalised in historically and geographically specific ways. 
Furthermore, Foster’s dismissal of notions of the subsumption of nature appears to involve a 
misunderstanding. As discussed above, Smith uses the term “subsumption” to refer to a 
specific process, drawing on an analogy with Marx’s use of the same term in Capital. Here 
subsumption does not simply mean that one thing wholly disappears within or becomes 
contained within something else as Foster seems to imply. Instead nature is being transformed 
as it is subsumed. And surely, for Smith, it is capitalism that subsumes nature; the term 
subsumption refers to a real process, not a methodological preference on the part of Smith. 
Tellingly, Foster’s colleague Burkett also uses the term, referring to both labour and nature as 
subsumed under capital (Burkett, 2014, pp67 and 161).  
Foster does indeed tend to overlook Smith’s work (along with much of environmental 
geography), conflating it with some quite different theoretical approaches, and seeing all as 
stemming from the same idealist distortion of Marxism. Therefore, Moore can complain with 
some justification that for Foster “all deviations from his interpretation of Marx are idealist 
and constructionist” (Moore, 2017b, 291).  
As well as what he sees as the lack of a dialectical understanding evident in metabolic rift 
theories, Moore also sees another, related, problem with this work. He remarks that “socio-
metabolic dualism has underemphasised the active role of extra-human natures in historical 
change” (2017b, p299). According to Moore, metabolic rift theories accord special status to 





They treat humans as having the ability to “disrupt” the biosphere or create a rift in the 
metabolism of humanity and nature, while non-humans are not endowed with the same agency.  
The production of nature has similarly been criticised for its lack of attention to the materiality 
of non-human nature. For its critics, the production of nature is “hubristic” and “insensitive to 
non-human agency” (see Loftus, 2017, p4). Recall that, for Smith, elements of the “natural” 
world are irrevocably drawn into the networks of human society; as they do so the properties 
of these things tend to become homogenised as they are turned into commodities with an 
exchange value (Swyngedouw, 2015, p137; Castree, 2003). Even an animal that seems free 
will be unable to exist outside of the bounds of human society—a shark’s meat and fins 
already have a price on the market as commodities that may or may not be realised. This 
perspective puts humans at the centre of the production of nature and emphasises the profound 
effect human activity has had in transforming the biosphere. However, Smith is quite aware of 
this. He argues that: “There can be no apology for the anthropomorphism of this perspective: 
with the development of capitalism, human society has put itself at the centre of nature, and we 
shall be able to deal with the problems this has created only if we first recognise the reality” 
(Smith, 2008, p8). Castree (2000, p30) further notes that Smith’s anthropomorphism is subtly 
different from anthropocentrism—which makes human activity its sole or pre-eminent 
concern—and argues that Smith was right to be “anthropomorphic” in his approach. 
However, even critics sympathetic to Marxism have argued that a focus on human labour and 
its specific role in generating surplus value risks overlooking the “materiality of nature” 
(Castree, 1995, p13). Donna Haraway, for example, might add that the “encounter value” 
arising from interactions between humans and other species should be acknowledged in the 
Marxist framework alongside use value, exchange value and value (Haraway, 2008, chapter 2).  
Also drawing attention to the material attributes of non-humans, in an analysis of the 
exploitation of the north Pacific fur seal in the late 19th century, Castree (1997) points out that 
the biological attributes of the seals (migration routes that crossed borders, suitability of the fur 
for making clothing and the large numbers of animals) offered an opportunity for hunting. 
However, the seals themselves also seemed to resist exploitation. Difficulties in identifying 
pregnant female seals meant they were often killed. This shocked commentators and 
influenced moves towards regulation of the industry. So, in this case, the material aspects of 
specific natural entities obstructed their complete transformation into commodities. Although 
nature can be said to be produced, with aspects of it being drawn into (in this case) industrial 
capitalism, nature doesn’t wholly disappear into capitalism (Castree, 1997, see also 
Henderson, 2009). As the following chapter will show, there is a growing interest among 
geographers in non-human agency and in the attributes of liveliness or vitality that might 
contribute to the monetary value placed on animals as they circulate as commodities (see 
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Collard and Dempsey, 2013). These criticisms have been particularly evident among those 
influenced by new or vital materialism. Chapter three will review recent work on the 
Anthropocene and show how, paradoxically as the Anthropocene seems to represent the 
triumph of human power, attempts to bring nature back in to discussions of socio-natures have 
become common in discussions of the proposed new epoch.  
 
2.7: Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that ecological Marxists from a range of perspectives have 
called for a return of dialectical methods in making sense of socio-natural relations. Evidently, 
within the recent debates around approaches to ecological questions, divergent interpretations 
of what dialectics means play a central role. Employing a dialectical methodology involves 
more than merely an assertion that attention should be paid to the relations between things. 
Instead, dialectics is a coherent and distinctive philosophical worldview. It is a methodology 
with historical origins in Marx’s materialist transformation of Hegelian philosophy and 
understanding the origins of these ideas can aid us in understanding how dialectics might be 
understood today. However, as this chapter has also suggested, dialectics has sometimes been 
seen as obscurantist. This is not helped by references to “laws” such as “the law of the 
negation of the negation” with its determinist connotations and by examples of acorns 
“negating” oaks. Furthermore, Engels’ unfinished book Dialectics of Nature has also become 
associated with the tragic proletarian science project in the Soviet Union. Although Lysenko’s 
rise to power was a consequence of the political decisions of the regime as well as its 
dialectical materialist philosophy, some have argued that Engels’ formulations paved the way 
for the misuse of the dialectics of nature. 
It might be argued that it is therefore unnecessary to invoke dialectics in discussions of 
ecology. Why not just do without such a philosophy? However, as Engels pointed out, 
everyone has a philosophy, those who don’t admit to it nevertheless have a philosophical basis 
for their views, often one that accepts the premises of the capitalist system. Therefore, there is 
a need to counter this implicit worldview with an alternative that explicitly emphasises 
dynamism, totality and contradiction. For Marx, the dialectical method was indispensable to 
understanding the relations that lie behind the appearance of the capitalist world he observed. 
And this applies equally to those trying to understand capitalism’s ecological relations as well 
as its political economy. Dialectics, rather than being superfluous, is central to a Marxist 
understanding.  
The discussion of dialectics in this chapter has shown that it is an inherently politically 
engaged methodology, incomprehensible without also realising that dialectics is about 





ontology that seeks to understand a totality but employs a method (abstraction) for dealing 
with particular aspects of that totality in turn. Dialectics has at its core the idea that socio-
natural relations can be changed. Furthermore, not all dialectical approaches rely on a rigid set 
of laws. The perspective developed by Ollman and popularised within geography by David 
Harvey and others offers an approach whereby, in essence, things are constituted by processes. 
This is distinguishable from mainstream or “bourgeois” philosophies but also avoids much of 
the dogmatism of earlier formulations of a dialectics of nature.  
What role might dialectics play in ecological Marxism? As discussed in this chapter, it is by 
now more widely accepted that there is a need for a more ecological Marxism that engages not 
just with relations between people but simultaneously uncovers the consequent relations with 
the rest of nature. But there are several issues that have been and continue to be debated by 
Marxists. On the meta-theoretical level there is the question of whether Marx and Engels 
themselves were sufficiently ecological in their outlook or whether their work requires 
supplementing with ideas from environmentalist movements and thinkers. There are debates 
about the different types of human labour and about the forms of activity that do or do not 
contribute to what Marx referred to as value. And there are profound disagreements about how 
to conceptualise socio-natures; whether to adopt a radically monist approach or whether to 
conceptualise society and nature as existing in a relationship within which a rift has developed. 
These debates have their roots in the fundamental antagonism between social constructionist 
and naturalist perspectives that goes to the heart of any Marxist ecological theory.  
In contemporary ecological Marxism, Jason Moore has usefully developed an understanding of 
the origins of capitalist value relations. Rather than naturalising capitalism, he has shown how 
the system, from its 16th century beginnings, has reorganised nature. His work is a corrective 
to accounts that treat society simply as an impact upon nature and he has shown how the 
ideology of an external nature has helped to facilitate its appropriation. Moore stresses the way 
that human activity transforms the biosphere. Rather than capitalism simply extracting 
materials from the “natural” world, historical change is seen as co-produced “by humans and 
the rest of nature” (Moore, 2015, p22). So, his ideas contrast with those of metabolic rift 
theorists, who tend to emphasise extraction from nature, especially the removal of nutrients 
from soil and its consequences for fertility. However, his critics are right to point out that 
Moore is shockingly optimistic about the prospects for the future, suggesting that ecosocialists 
should be more “hopeful” as they can expect capitalism to soon exhaust itself.  
By contrast, the work of John Bellamy Foster, Paul Burkett and their followers emphasises 
how capitalism, for Marx, simultaneously degrades “the original sources of all wealth—
the soil and the worker” (quoted in Foster, 1999, p379). Their work seems to be much closer to 
Marx’s understanding of a socio-natural totality as a differentiated unity than that of Moore 
66 Chapter 2: Ecological Marxism 
 
(who frames his intervention as an extension of classical Marxism). Here Nayeri raises the 
interesting point that Moore’s work, as it treats capitalism as a way of organising nature, 
focuses on an aspect of capitalism that it shares with other modes of production whereas the 
point of Marx’s work was to do the opposite, to address what is distinctive about capitalism 
(Nayeri, 2016).  
Their approach allows the metabolic rift theorists to argue that humans are part of nature but 
also, by their conscious actions, simultaneously able to change nature as they change 
themselves. This corresponds to the emphasis Marx placed on the specificity of human labour 
in the references to nature in Capital, for example where he distinguishes between the ability 
to construct an environment of bees and architects. Smith is similarly anthropomorphic in his 
approach and, like Burkett, makes use of Marx’s value theory. Although metabolic rift theories 
have developed separately from critical environmental geography, Burkett’s and Foster’s 
positions are similar to Smith’s (and Marx’s) conception of a historically developing 
differentiated unity. Therefore, it is unfortunate that Foster has so readily dismissed Smith’s 
important work as “idealist” and accused him of wanting nature subsumed into society. A 
more positive reading of Smith’s work might involve combining his broad approach with more 
concrete historical or empirical work on how specific natures become commodified and/or 
how they resist commodification as Castree (1997) does with the example of the fur seals.  
As this chapter has shown, Lukács’ contention raises a genuine challenge to the dialectics of 
nature. If dialectical principles are relevant to our understanding of nature, they must be 
applied in a way that does not treat “nature” as external to human society. Lukács rightly 
points out that movement observed by a detached observer is no substitute for a dialectical 
method that is inherently critical. Thankfully, however, decades of work in ecological 
Marxism (of which only an overview has been possible here) have pointed to a way out of 
such a dualist approach. Furthermore, as will be demonstrated in later chapters, theorists from 
a range of perspectives have questioned whether “agency” or subjectivity is purely a human 
attribute as Lukács seems to imply. As Marxists have sought theoretical tools to make sense of 
what is now increasingly referred to as the Anthropocene, the old debate about the dialectics of 









Chapter 3: The Anthropocene and the new 
materialisms 
The introduction to this thesis referred to the profound influence of human activity on Earth 
system processes. As this chapter explains, this human influence is increasingly understood as 
representing a shift of global scale and significance, leading to calls to rename the current 
geological epoch the “Anthropocene”.27 As will be explained, the Anthropocene raises 
questions about the relationship between humans and (the rest of) nature, the way this 
relationship has shifted throughout history, the role scientists might play in progressive 
politics, human “nature” and the roles of human and non-human agency in the biosphere. As 
ecologist Erle Ellis has argued, what is needed now is to make sense of the historical processes 
through which humans have become a geological force (Ellis, 2015).  
As the previous chapter demonstrated, ecological Marxism has engaged with many of these 
questions since Marx and Engels’ own writings. Marxism is concerned with understanding 
human societies and their consequent relation with nature and with uncovering shifts in that 
relationship throughout history rather than naturalising the current state of things. Some 
Marxist thinkers, including Foster, have consequently embraced discussions of the 
Anthropocene (see Foster, 2016a). However, others have been more sceptical, at least about 
the implications of certain narratives of the Anthropocene (Malm and Hornborg, 2014). The 
idea of an epoch of humanity’s own making has been criticised for the abstract and paradoxical 
approach some of its advocates take towards the issue of human agency and in some cases for 
reliance on an idea of a fixed (and essentially destructive) human nature. But the new epoch 
has been of particular interest to theorists influenced by new or vital materialisms. For Jamie 
Lorimer, whose multinatural approach will be discussed later in this chapter, the Anthropocene 
is capable of delivering a “necessary shock to environmental thought” by finally eradicating 
the ideal of a nature distinct from human history (Lorimer, 2015, p3). For Lorimer, the 
                                                          
27 Geologists divide up historical time into eons, eras, periods, epochs and ages. The present eon is the 
Phanerozoic, the era is the Cenozoic and the period, the quaternary. The quaternary is conventionally 
divided further into two epochs: Pleistocene and Holocene.  
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Anthropocene is still useful as a concept, despite the problems with some interpretations. 
Although, as discussed in the previous chapter, Marxist thinkers have long challenged the view 
of an external nature, thinkers such as Lorimer sometimes frame their work in opposition to 
Marxist dialectics.  
The term Anthropocene in its modern iteration was first proposed in the year 2000 by the 
Nobel Prize winning atmospheric scientist Paul Crutzen and by freshwater biologist Eugene 
Stoermer (Crutzen and Stoermer, 2000).28 In 2004 Will Steffen and colleagues at the 
International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme added to the evidence for the Anthropocene 
with their report, Global Change and the Earth System. The IGBP developed Earth system 
science as an approach that itself treats the planet as a single complex system with multiple 
interacting elements in which living things, including humans, play an active role:  
Crucial to the emergence of this perspective has been the dawning 
awareness of two aspects of Earth System functioning. First that the earth 
itself is a single system within which the biosphere is an active, essential 
component. Secondly, that human activities are now so pervasive and 
profound in their consequences that they affect the earth at a global scale in 
complex, interactive and apparently accelerating ways (Steffen et al, 2004, 
p1).  
By 2009 a working group of the International Commission on Stratigraphy (the body 
responsible for designating geological time periods) was set up in order to assess whether the 
Anthropocene can be formally added to the geological timescale. For this to happen, there 
would need to be a clear marker for the start of the epoch such as a measurable change in lake 
sediments or the composition of Arctic ice. For the working group, there is substantial 
evidence for the fact of the Anthropocene. According to the website of the Anthropocene 
Working Group: “it is widely agreed that the Earth is currently in this state” (Anthropocene 
Working Group, 2018). 
For Crutzen and Stoermer, the designation of the Anthropocene means that humans are likely 
to “remain a major geological force for many millennia, maybe millions of years, to come” 
(Crutzen and Stoermer, 2000, p18). They note that human influence is present in all planetary 
processes, whether biological, atmospheric or geological. It is evident at a molecular level in 
the increased levels of carbon dioxide in the very air we breathe (Marris, 2011). Human 
                                                          
28 As mentioned in the previous chapter, similar ideas were developed by scientists in the Soviet Union. 
Aleksei Pavlov and Vladimir Vernadsky both developed an understanding of the role of human agency 
in environmental transformation similar to theories of the Anthropocene today. The Holocene epoch was 
described in other early geology manuals as the “anthropozoic” and the “age of mind and era of man” 





agency has, in other words qualitatively transformed the biosphere, switching from extensively 
pushing out to appropriate more of nature to having an intensive influence on Earth system 
processes (see Castree, 2000, p25 for this distinction).  
The term Anthropocene, derived from the Greek “Anthropos” (meaning human being) and 
“kainos” (recent) suggests that most of the artefacts hypothetical future geologists might find 
by examining sedimentary rock layers or ice cores would be of recent human origin (Bonneuil 
and Fressoz, 2017, pp3-4). Such artefacts might include the bones of domesticated chickens. 
Chickens have grown in number since the mid-20th century, becoming the world’s most 
populous bird with around 60 billion animals killed each year. The fossilised chicken bones 
would also be distinguishable from those of their wild ancestors, for example by being bigger 
in order to support the weight of an animal bred to produce more meat (Carrington, 2016). 
Ellis has coined the term “human climate” to describe the ongoing directed effect human 
activity is having (as opposed to human weather which refers to short-term human-
environment interactions). He refers to “anthropogenic biomes”, large areas of Earth’s surface 
with characteristics consistent with human influence in the same way that biomes are 
traditionally designated to reflect different climatic conditions (interview, 23 August 2016; 
Ellis, 2015; 2016).  
Since it was first coined, the term Anthropocene has spread far beyond the small group of 
natural scientists tasked with its official designation. As Castree notes, social scientists are 
taking a belated but increasing interest in the idea and are continuing to debate its 
consequences (Castree, 2014). Lövbrand and others (2015) have effectively argued that the 
Anthropocene is too important to be left to the natural scientists. More engagement by social 
scientists might extend what they see as a “restricted” narrative offered by the physical 
sciences and incorporate a greater understanding of the cultural and political dimensions of 
global change. In what follows, this chapter reviews some of the most popular proposals for an 
Anthropocene start date. The chapter goes on to discuss some of the more problematic 
narratives attached to the proposals for a new epoch. It explains why, consequently, some 
theorists such as Andreas Malm have been sceptical about the Anthropocene before showing 
how others from the new/vital materialist tradition have found the idea of an Anthropocene 
epoch useful, despite the evident problems with some interpretations.  
 
3.1: When did the Anthropocene begin? 
For the Anthropocene to be designated a new epoch, it would need to represent a shift in 
environmental conditions on a global scale. “What matters when dividing geological-scale 
time is global-scale changes to Earth’s status, driven by causes as varied as meteor strikes, the 
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movement of continents and sustained volcanic eruptions” (Lewis and Maslin, 
2015). Boundaries between geological time units have often involved rapid changes in the type 
of living species on Earth as well as signatures in the rock strata. For example, the start of the 
Cenozoic era was marked by a dramatic loss of species including extinction for all the non-
avian dinosaurs (the K-T extinction). As well as changes in the fossil record, geologists prefer 
to establish an internationally agreed upon reference point known as a Global Boundary 
Stratotype Section and Point or “golden spike” that acts as a marker of the boundary between 
one geological time period and another. A peak in the levels of the element iridium found in 
the rocks at El Kef, Tunisia, consistent with the idea that a meteor hit Earth at this time, 
provides a geological marker for the start of the Cenozoic. The golden spike need not represent 
the most important thing that happened at the boundary between time periods, it simply serves 
as a marker that geologists can agree on (Lewis and Maslin, 2015). 
With these criteria in mind, various proposals for an Anthropocene start date have been put 
forward, including the origin of agriculture, the “discovery” of the new world, the Industrial 
Revolution or even as recent as the middle of the 20th century (Lewis and Maslin, 2015). All 
of these proposals for a start date represent significant events in human history with associated 
qualitative shifts in socio-natural relations. For many the start date has been a key question. 
Assessing what point in history human activities became so pervasive is clearly important for 
those concerned to understand the reasons for this shift. 
One proposal is that the Anthropocene actually began around 11,700 years ago after the end of 
the last ice age, which by convention we currently think of as the start of the Holocene (so 
Holocene could be renamed “Anthropocene” or geologists could keep the existing terminology 
and make no distinction between human influence in the Holocene and more recent influence). 
Other proposals for an “early Anthropocene” push the start date back even further in time, to 
when humans caused the extinction of many large mammals or even to the first surviving 
evidence of any human activity. An early start date would reflect the fact that the human 
species has always, by necessity, lived in a complex and developing relationship with the 
biosphere; which Foster might describe as a metabolic relationship. Humans have been 
domesticating animals and crop plants for thousands of years and have therefore influenced the 
evolution of other species. Agriculture, and emissions from livestock and forest clearing, have 
had an effect on the planet’s temperature from early in the Holocene and may have prevented 
the global cooling that would otherwise have occurred (Zalasiewicz, Williams, Steffen and 
Crutzen, 2010).  
A contrasting proposal from Mark Maslin and Simon Lewis that teases out the role of 
colonialism in large-scale biospheric transformations, is that the Anthropocene started with the 





crops such as maize and potatoes to Europe, Asia and Africa and transported wheat and 
sugarcane to the Americas causing significant and irreversible changes to ecosystems. These 
changes occurred all over the world and can be detected by identifying the appearance of new 
types of fossilised pollen. Of course, the “discovery” and conquest of the Americas brought 
slavery, famine and disease to many of the people living there. The human population declined 
from an estimated 54 million to 6 million by 1650 (Harman, 1999, p171). With fewer people to 
farm the land, forests started to return and levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere dipped. 
The reduction in carbon dioxide level (it reached its lowest in 1610; a nadir known as the Orbis 
Spike) could further serve as a geological marker for this event as it can be detected in 
Antarctic ice (Lewis and Maslin, 2015). The Orbis Spike hypothesis therefore integrates an 
understanding of imperial conquest into theories of when humanity became a significant global 
force. 
While Lewis and Maslin’s Orbis Spike proposal incorporates changes to ecosystems and 
human populations, Crutzen and Stoermer themselves focused more narrowly on energy use 
and greenhouse gas emissions. They initially suggested that the Anthropocene may have begun 
towards the end of the 18th century when James Watt developed the steam engine (Watt 
patented the condensing chamber that allowed large engines to be built by 1769). It was 
around this time that, according to Crutzen and his colleagues, atmospheric greenhouse gas 
concentrations started to rise (Crutzen and Stoermer, 2000). So, whereas for most of the 
Holocene levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere had fluctuated—going up or down by up 
to 5 parts per million (ppm), since the Industrial Revolution carbon dioxide levels have been 
rising by 2ppm per year (Malm, 2016). Crutzen and Stoermer also propose a “great 
acceleration” around the middle of the 20th century—a “remarkable explosion” in which the 
levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere have begun to shoot up even more rapidly (Steffen, 
Crutzen and McNeill, 2007). 
Finally, some have proposed that, rather than the middle of the 20th century representing an 
acceleration within the Anthropocene, the epoch actually started in 1945 (Zalasiewicz et al, 
2015). The first nuclear weapons test (and of course the first usage of nuclear weapons in war) 
took place in this year and testing continued throughout the 1950s and 1960s. This proposal 
has the advantage of providing a basis for a golden spike as there is a clear peak in the levels 
of carbon isotopes from nuclear weapons in tree rings around this time and it is unambiguous 
that this was caused by human activity (Lewis and Maslin, 2015).29 As with the iridium 
deposits that mark the start of the Cenozoic, this does not mean that nuclear weapons testing 
was the most significant thing that happened in the mid-20th century. To be considered the 
                                                          
29 1945 is, of course, extremely recent for geologists accustomed to dealing with time periods of 
hundreds of thousands of years and to referring to 1950 as “the present”. 
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start date of the Anthropocene it would merely have to represent a time in which a profound 
shift in human societies and a related impact on planetary processes occurred. For Will Steffen 
and others this is indeed plausible: 
The second half of the twentieth century is unique in the entire history of 
human existence on Earth. Many human activities reached take-off points 
sometime in the twentieth century and have accelerated sharply towards 
the end of the century. The last 50 years have without doubt seen the most 
rapid transformation of the human relationship with the natural world in 
the history of the species (Steffen et al, 2004, p258). 
A recent paper by the Anthropocene Working Group favoured a mid-20th century start date: “a 
pronounced, relatively sharp threshold in human modification of the global environment” 
(Zalasiewicz et al, 2015). In summer 2016 the group’s 35 members voted overwhelmingly that 
the Anthropocene is stratigraphically real and should be formalised. Furthermore, there were 
28.3 votes for a start date around 1950,30 far more than for any other start date proposal such as 
the Orbis Spike and earlier potential start dates. Plutonium fallout was the most popular choice 
of primary signal. There will need to be further votes on these proposals by the group’s parent 
bodies and they are still in the process of locating a suitable golden spike (Anthropocene 
Working Group, 2016). However, although the group do recognise that humans have left an 
impact on the stratigraphic record since before the start of the Holocene, the majority now 
agree that this influence intensified around the mid-20th century to such an extent that this 
point can be seen as the end of the Holocene.  
Members of the Anthropocene Working Group have pointed out that the period since the 
Second World War has involved rapid population growth, urbanisation, the intensification of 
agriculture and the widespread adoption of consumer goods such as televisions, cars and 
fridges. A marked increase in the adoption of disposable packaging at this time is just one 
example of the environmental consequences of the shift. This is often illustrated with various 
graphs that appear to show a notable upturn in the middle of the 20th century. As Bonneuil and 
Fressoz (2017, pp53-54) point out, however, we ought to be cautious in interpreting these 
graphs. An exponential curve, by definition, becomes increasingly steep and can sometimes 
appear to the eye to turn upwards sharply in the middle even when the rate of growth is 
actually constant.  
However, even if the graphs alone are ambiguous, some have suggested that there was indeed 
a qualitative global shift in socio-natural relations around the middle of the century. Drawing 
                                                          





on theories of monopoly finance capital, ecosocialist Ian Angus highlights the dominant 
economic position of the United States following the Second World War and the growing role 
of large monopolies (as opposed to smaller capitals) in the global economy, demonstrating the 
consequences of this for the biosphere (Angus, 2016, pp137-145). Therefore, Angus favours 
the idea of a “great acceleration” in capitalist influence on the biosphere in the mid-20th 
century which broadly aligns with his economic perspective. Angus would remind us that 
capitalism itself is a dynamic system that has gone through major changes in its short history. 
As well as developing an understanding of the workings of capitalism in the abstract, theorists 
ought also to analyse the specific ways in which the system has developed and changed. 
Bonneuil and Fressoz (2017, pp144-147) also point to the role of the Second World War and 
the associated increase in industrial production (especially in the US) and rapidly increasing 
levels of energy consumption. 
Discussions among geologists about when the Anthropocene began may seem like academic 
diversions. However, differing views on this question have real consequences for how we 
interpret the causes of environmental problems. Advocates of the various early Anthropocene 
hypothesis have been criticised for “normalising” global environmental change (Lewis and 
Maslin, 2015). By arguing that the biospheric instability of today has its roots in the emergence 
of human civilisation, they tend to downplay the dangerous effects of climate change and the 
speed with which it has come about. This interpretation arguably loses the power to shock that 
is one of the intriguing things about the Anthropocene diagnosis in the first place. Angus even 
supposes that these views are being promoted by lobbyists associated with the eco-modernist 
Breakthrough Institute. Although some environmental thinkers are associated with the 
Breakthrough Institute—Paul Robbins is a Senior Fellow—Angus argues that the Institute 
have opposed measures that would reduce carbon dioxide emissions and have offered 
technological, pro-capitalist measures such as nuclear power as the only potential solutions to 
climate change. He therefore refers to them as having an “anti-environmental agenda” (Angus, 
2015b). 
By contrast, a mid-20th century Anthropocene start date clearly invokes an accelerating 
influence of human activities on Earth system processes. Rather than an extension of the 
Holocene, it marks a departure from this epoch. The Holocene, characterised by a temperate 
and relatively stable climate, is associated with relatively conducive conditions for human 
survival (Swyngedouw, 2015, p131). It is the time period in which agriculture was established 
and that allowed for complex, urbanised human societies to develop. Although Holocene 
conditions always involved climatic instability, particularly for those most vulnerable to 
droughts or extreme weather, for thinkers such as Angus the Anthropocene represents a new 
epoch of unpredictable and dangerous climatic conditions (Angus, 2016).  
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3.2: The Anthropocene paradox 
The implications of the Anthropocene for environmental theory are profound. However, it has 
been interpreted in divergent ways by different commentators. As explained in chapter two, 
environmental thought has sometimes treated human activity as external to nature. These ideas 
have also prevailed in discussions of the Anthropocene with some using language that implies 
that humanity, as a whole, impacts upon nature (with the implication that humanity should 
therefore collectively lessen its impact—Lorimer, 2015, p5). For example, Will Steffen and his 
co-authors refer to “great forces” of nature which are now supposedly being “overwhelmed”: 
“human activities have become so pervasive and profound that they rival the great forces of 
Nature” (Steffen, Crutzen and McNeill, 2007). Crutzen (2002, p23) is clear in highlighting a 
rapidly increasing human population as a source of impact upon the planet: “The rapid 
expansion of mankind in numbers and per capita exploitation of Earth’s resources has 
continued apace”.  
These same authors even state that “Earth has now left its natural geological epoch” which 
tends to imply that the planet was in a pristine state before the onset of the Anthropocene. As 
these ideas of humanity destroying or overwhelming nature have been dominant for centuries 
it is hardly surprising that human agency has been pitted against the “forces of nature” in some 
discussions of the Anthropocene (Moore, 2017b, pp288). Of course, Anthropocene scientists 
are aware of the extensive human manipulation of the biosphere before the middle of the 20th 
century. Few would state explicitly that the natural world remained untroubled by human 
influence up until recently. The scientists also rightly point to what seems to be a qualitative 
shift in socio-natural relations taking place in the mid-20th century. However, statements about 
leaving a “natural epoch” remain problematic. The implication of an undifferentiated humanity 
acting on an external nature diverges from the understanding of social relations and the role of 
capitalism in producing nature discussed in the previous chapter. Furthermore, the notion of 
leaving the natural epoch suggests that the Anthropocene emerged from nowhere and does 
little to historicise this apparent epochal shift, explaining how or why the shift took place at the 
particular time it did. To understand the shift there is a need to understand the processes 
leading into it. 
Mainstream Anthropocene narratives have also been associated with problematic assumptions 
about human nature. They have sometimes involved the assumption that there is something 
inherently destructive about humans and that the emergence of the Anthropocene was 
therefore inevitable. If environmental damage is caused by something essential to “human 
nature”, it follows that all humans are implicated in this to some extent; and, as there is little 
that can be done to change what is essential to human nature, drastic measures (such as 





Anthropocene narrative, humanity’s ability to use fire has led us to manipulate the planet like 
no other species. Some have even proposed to label the human species “the fire-ape”, Homo 
pyrophilis (Mark Lynas quoted in Malm and Hornborg, 2014, p63). For these thinkers, the use 
of fire led in a linear progression to a situation where humans would at some point learn how 
to extract fossil fuels and would inevitably end up burning those too. This kicked off a chain of 
events that led to a rapid expansion in fossil fuel use and the skyrocketing carbon emissions 
observable today. According to one scientific paper: “The mastery of fire by our ancestors 
provided humankind with a powerful monopolistic tool unavailable to other species that put us 
firmly on the long path towards the Anthropocene” (Steffen, Crutzen, and McNeill, 2007; see 
Malm, 2015, for a critique of this thinking). Simon Lewis has even argued that the designation 
of the current epoch as the Anthropocene represents a shift in the way humanity sees itself. 
Copernicus demonstrated that humans are no longer at the centre of the universe and Darwin’s 
theory of evolution displaced humanity from the top of the tree of life. But now: “the future 
direction of the only place in the universe where we know life exists is in our hands. Suddenly, 
after almost 500 years, humanity is centre stage again” (Lewis, 2009). 
However, this is a long way from the sophisticated approach to human nature to be found in 
the work of Marx and Engels. The subject of human “nature” will be discussed further in 
chapter seven of this thesis with reference to the findings of the dialectical biologists. But, to 
put it briefly, although Marx does not deny the existence of a human nature, that nature is seen 
as developing historically as a result of the ways in which humans manipulate their 
surroundings which, in turn influences their own development as a species. As human nature is 
not fixed, it implies that environmental problems arise as a consequence of the ways in which 
humans are organised in a capitalist society rather than as a result of some essential property of 
humans.  
Ellis points out that Homo sapiens is not the first species to have altered its external 
environment—the atmosphere was changed dramatically by the addition of oxygen following 
the evolution of green plants, for example. But the speed and scale of change resulting from 
the action of a single species, humans, is “unprecedented”: 
My biggest question as an ecologist is “why do you have a single species 
changing the earth so much?” There is actually no precedent for that. It’s 
a remarkable thing. There are some examples…of where organisms, 
groups, taxa have had that kind of role. Photosynthesis has changed the 
earth powerfully, more powerfully than we are, but it wasn’t one species 
and it took hundreds of millions of years. It’s a whole other thing, it’s a 
strange thing that one species would do this. And it’s obviously not related 
to our biology directly. People didn’t have the capacity to interact with 
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each other at large scales that could actually influence the world in general 
until relatively recently. So, what is interesting to me is why did humans 
get this capacity to do this? And I see that as the cause of the Anthropocene 
(interview, 23 August 2016).  
As Kay Anderson has pointed out, the standard Anthropocene narrative described here 
involves a paradox (Anderson, 2014). Humans seem to have more agency than ever before. 
For the first time in history humanity is seen as capable of pushing the whole planet into a new 
epoch; we are in the driving seat in a way we have never been before even though it seems we 
are intent on crashing the train. This type of thinking has also been described as a form of 
human exceptionalism—“the positing of a separation between active human subjects and 
passive non-human objects” (Anderson, 2014, p5) in that humans are seen as unique in their 
ability to manipulate the environment.  
However, it is also assumed that humans have very little agency actually to change the 
situation, faced as we are with the prospect of unleashing global forces that we have little 
power over. At the same time as humans are supposedly overwhelming the forces of nature, 
humanity itself is also a force of nature; the Anthropocene is therefore seen as simultaneously 
both a natural and an unnatural phenomenon (Lövbrand et al, 2015. Moore, 2017a). As with 
many of the interpretations of the Anthropocene discussed here, this paradoxical approach 
builds on existing ideas. Even before the widespread contemporary discussions of the 
Anthropocene, Neil Smith recognised this paradox in his description of “nature-washing”, 
noting how it is widely acknowledged that climate change is anthropogenic, but that the 
resulting biospheric instability is nevertheless seen as being caused by the “power” of “nature” 
(quoted in Swyngedouw, 2015, p139).  
Furthermore, and related to the previous point, Erik Swyngedouw refers to the post-political 
nature of discussions around climate change (Swyngedouw, 2015; 2018), an analysis that has 
also been applied to the Anthropocene specifically (see Lövbrand et al, 2015). As 
Swyngedouw (2018) points out, there is a consensus among almost all scientists and much of 
the public about the causes of anthropogenic climate change and the magnitude of the 
situation. Climate change has become a matter of public debate and discussion. But, precisely 
because climate change is viewed as a problem for the whole of humanity, this has resulted in 
a process of de-politicisation where no particular political programme is advocated. 
Ideological contestation around different possible socio-ecological futures has been displaced 
by forms of technocratic governance that naturalise those solutions compatible with a liberal 
worldview such as market-based measures and changes to individual behaviour (Swyngedouw, 
2015, p136). It seems that, in the face of an overwhelming threat, the proximate causes of 





solutions are put forward: “the space for political contestation, debate and reorientation 
is…restricted” to very narrow considerations such as the right type of technology to adopt and 
when (Lövbrand et al, 2015, p214). With the dominance of post-political narratives there is no 
corresponding political subject (such as the proletariat for Marxists) as this tends to be 
replaced by broad appeals to “the people”, or perhaps the “Anthropos” (Swyngedouw, 2015, 
p140).  
Related to the post-political narrative is the idea that the Anthropocene is “good” or “great” 
and is something to be embraced. Ellis’ comments on the causes of the Anthropocene have 
been discussed above. He has also become associated with the good Anthropocene idea, 
stating that humans have become such an overwhelming causal agent that: “In moving toward 
a better Anthropocene, the environment will be what we make it” (quoted in Collard, Dempsey 
and Sundberg, 2015, p324). For Ellis this comes to be tied to the idea that humans have 
uniquely developed the capacity to “wake up” to the negative effects “we” are having. Humans 
merely need to put the newfound knowledge of the Anthropocene to good use:  
The boom in Anthropocene discussions might itself indicate that societies 
are waking up to the realities of becoming a global force in the Earth 
system…we might guide this new “great force of nature” toward better 
outcomes for both humanity and nonhuman nature. It is time to embrace 
what makes us human, ultrasociality, and turn it towards the grand 
challenges of the Anthropocene—to intentionally build better societies 
and cultures of nature (Ellis, 2016).   
However, Bonneuil and Fressoz, in one of the most insightful chapters of their book The Shock 
of the Anthropocene take issue with this idea that “our generation is the first to recognise 
environmental disturbance” (Bonneuil and Fressoz, 2017, p170). Actually, previous 
generations were also aware of the role of human activity in modifying their surroundings. 
They give examples from the 18th and 19th centuries of different forms of environmental 
reflexivity and debates over the nature of “environment” and reactions to resource scarcity, 
including Vernadsky’s concept of the biosphere. For these authors, treating earlier societies as 
inadvertently heading down a path of environmental destruction depoliticises these 
discussions. Instead, the biosphere has been an area of political contestation for at least the last 
three centuries (Bonneuil and Fressoz, 2017, pp171-172).  
Advocates of the idea of a good Anthropocene, who offer an “optimistic vision” of a future 
society founded on increased use of technology, have tended to see the new epoch as an 
opportunity to utilise the ability to manipulate nature that humans now seem to possess. 
Among advocates of the good Anthropocene, as with post-political narratives generally, there 
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is often little discussion of who will be responsible for implementing all the proposed 
technological innovations. Paul Crutzen, one of the originators of the Anthropocene 
terminology, seems to assume that it will be the “scientists and engineers” who will “guide 
society towards environmentally sustainable management” (Crutzen, 2002).  
Perhaps unsurprisingly then, Crutzen has suggested that high-tech geoengineering solutions 
might be needed to solve climate change and favours a strategy of trying to cool the climate by 
firing sulphur into the air (Connor, 2006). Space here does not allow for a full discussion of the 
arguments around geoengineering. However, one criticism of this approach is that, even if one 
of the various proposals actually works (by no means guaranteed), it would address the 
symptoms but not the ultimate social cause of climate change. Cooling the planet down would 
not solve any of the other multiple environmental problems beyond global warming and would 
almost certainly have its own negative consequences. A more immediate concern is that, as 
climate scientist Kevin Anderson has pointed out, the promise of possible geoengineering fixes 
in the future can feed into political inaction today. For Anderson, the targets for greenhouse 
gas reduction set at the UN talks in Paris in 2015 were not as radical as he hoped; they were 
premised on the idea that humanity would, at some point, come up with a way of sucking 
carbon dioxide out of the air. Geoengineering may therefore have gone from being a “last ditch 
Plan B” to part of the only plan (Anderson, 2015). 
 
3.2.1: Malm’s critique 
Reading these mainstream narratives of the Anthropocene, it is not hard to see why some 
Marxist commentators have been suspicious of the concept. Capturing some of these 
criticisms, Andreas Malm has referred to the “Anthropocene Myth” (Malm, 2015). He pursues 
a similar line of reasoning to Bonneuil and Fressoz by refusing to naturalise climate change, 
although he seems more dismissive of the Anthropocene argument in its entirety than these 
authors.  
Malm has shown how climate change has historical roots in the actions of a small group of 
wealthy British people during the Industrial Revolution. It is neither caused by humanity as a 
whole, nor does it affect humanity equally (Malm, 2016). Returning to Crutzen’s suggestion 
that the Anthropocene began with the invention of the steam engine and the associated 
increase in fossil fuel use, Malm offers an important counter-narrative to the assumption that 
this was a direct result of humankind’s earlier mastery of fire. He points out that Crutzen and 
his associates do not say a lot about the political processes that led to the adoption of steam 
power in Britain around the 1830s. Addressing this omission, Malm argues that steam engines 





In fact, for an individual factory owner, buying coal was the more expensive option. However, 
coal did offer several other advantages for the capitalist; it provided a regular supply of energy, 
it didn’t require different capitals to band together and invest jointly in infrastructure in the 
way that water power did and it could be used at a convenient time of day. Perhaps most 
centrally, steam power brought industrial production into cities like Manchester. Cities 
increasingly provided a plentiful supply of cheap and exploitable labour power and, according 
to Malm, it was hoped that workers in urban areas would be more easily forced to accept the 
discipline of factory life (Malm, 2016). Note that, according to this narrative, steam power was 
“presupposed” by an early capitalist system in which a small minority owned the means of 
production and much of the rest of society were being drawn into wage labour: 
While it is admittedly banal to point out, steam engines were not adopted 
by some natural-born deputies of the human species. The choice of a 
prime mover in commodity production could not possibly have been the 
prerogative of that species, since it presupposed, for a start, the institution 
of wage labour. It was the owners of the means of production who 
installed the novel prime mover (Malm, 2015). 
Therefore, Malm’s work, as well as addressing debates around the Anthropocene is also a 
critique of technological determinist arguments (including among Marxists)—where it is 
assumed that changes in technology prefigure social changes—in favour of an account that 
sees changes in energy use as contingent rather than necessary. For example, Malm takes issue 
with the work of the philosopher  
GA Cohen, who assumed that newer technologies tend to be superior to older technologies and 
that, once adopted, new technologies have the power to reorganise social relations (Malm, 
2016, pp32-35). 
Central to Malm’s argument is the idea that climate change is political, and the adoption of 
coal came about as a result of class struggle. In this particular struggle it was the emerging 
capitalist class who were able to implement their chosen technology at the expense of workers 
(and in the face of resistance from workers). Malm, like Bonneuil and Fressoz, concludes that 
the Anthropocene was brought about consciously. Factory owners in the 19th century could 
not have understood climate change as we understand it today. But they nevertheless 
deliberately took action to shift to burning fossil fuels. This shift didn’t happen as part of some 
natural process of human evolution. 
Another point that follows from Malm’s general line of argument is that, of course, humans are 
not equally responsible for the burning of fossil fuels. To this day energy use depends to an 
overwhelming extent on the type of society a person lives in. The energy consumption of an 
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average Canadian is 1,000 times greater than that of a typical farmer in the Sahel and overall, 
the poorest 45 percent of humanity generate just 7 percent of the carbon emissions (Malm, 
2016, p269; Malm and Hornborg, 2014). Of course, the scientists currently debating the start 
date of the current epoch do accept this argument. Crutzen himself has argued that 
anthropogenic climate change has “largely been caused by only 25 percent of the world 
population” (Crutzen, 2002). After receiving some criticisms (including from social scientists), 
further work has been produced that differentiates between humans based on whether they live 
in rich or poor countries (see Steffen et al, 2015) although this is not the same as the historical 
and class analysis of the ultimate roots of the problem that Malm might advocate.  
There is much to agree with in Malm’s arguments. It makes sense to try to repoliticise climate 
change and to question essentialist views of human nature or linear historical narratives. It is 
also worth noting here that Malm’s argument is not necessarily a critique of the word 
Anthropocene per se. What he objects to is a particular narrative associated with its use. But 
equally it is fair to say that he is sceptical about how useful it would be for Marxists to take up 
the term Anthropocene. Referring to the tendency for Anthropocene narratives to flatten 
differences in influence between different humans, he has described it as 
“an indefensible abstraction at the point of departure” (Malm, 2016, p391). However, several 
commentators, including Marxists, have argued against dispensing with the term. Much of 
Malm’s argument hangs on a critique of Crutzen and of a few others who sometimes say 
problematic things, and it seems premature of Malm to associate the Anthropocene so closely 
with the Industrial Revolution, especially now this that start date is unlikely to be formally 
accepted and mid-20th century dates are increasingly discussed.  
Malm, together with Alf Hornborg, also complains that discussions of the Anthropocene have 
been dominated by natural scientists and are therefore “the illogical and ultimately self-
defeating foray of the natural science community…into the domain of human affairs”. He 
argues that such people “extend their worldviews to society” and that “geologists, 
meteorologists and their colleagues are not necessarily well-equipped to study the sort of 
things that take place between humans” (Malm and Hornborg, 2014, p66). However, as 
evidenced in the previous chapter, Marx and Engels themselves would not have been so 
dismissive of the insights of scientists in their own time. In contrast to Malm, Angus argues 
against “carping from the side-lines about the scientists’ lack of social analysis”, and calls for a 
synthesis of insights from Earth system science and ecological Marxism: “ecosocialists need to 
approach the Anthropocene project as an opportunity to unite an ecological Marxist analysis 
with the latest scientific research in a new synthesis—a socio-ecological account of the origins, 





There is also a more fundamental argument to be raised against Malm’s ontological approach. 
He tends towards explaining historical developments in terms of class struggle between one 
group of humans and another where the most powerful group will win out (an approach that 
could be described as class struggle determinism in contrast to technological determinism). 
This examination of what happens between humans gives very little emphasis to the way 
human societies develop in a relationship with the rest of nature. Indeed, as discussed at the 
end of this chapter, Malm has more recently developed a defence of dualist thinking about 
society and nature (especially in Malm, 2018). Jason Moore, who, as we have seen, argues that 
capitalism develops through nature in a relationship described as a double internality, has 
sharply criticised Malm’s thinking, pointing out that “human activity not only produces 
biospheric change, but relations between humans are themselves produced by nature” (Moore, 
2017a; see also Moore, 2015). Moore consequently argues that the origins of the epoch should 
be traced to profound shifts in socio-natural relations beginning as far back as the late 15th 
century with the origins of the capitalist system rather than with the 19th century expansion in 
fossil fuel use.31  
However, as the following section of the chapter shows, not all critical theorists have been as 
sceptical of the implications of the Anthropocene as Malm. Using the example of Jamie 
Lorimer’s work on wildlife, this section shows that some have found the concept of the 
Anthropocene useful in developing critical approaches to socio-natural relations. Lorimer’s 
work is chosen here as it is representative of a broader trend in new/vital materialisms which 
have become popular in geography and cognate disciplines. Lorimer has also written on 
human-created or novel ecosystems which have also interested dialectical biologists (see 
chapter six) although, as will be explained in this chapter, Lorimer is critical about the utility 
of a dialectical approach.  
 
3.2.2: Lorimer’s multinatural approach 
Counterintuitively, instead of adopting the hubristic view of humans as capable of 
manipulating the biosphere at will, several commentators in geography have taken the opposite 
view of the Anthropocene. The new epoch has been seen as an opportunity to reflect on the 
complex interconnections between humans and other species and to develop “multinatural” 
approaches that do not rely on notions of an external nature and treat humans as anything but 
                                                          
31 Some have suggested that if environmental problems can be located with capitalism rather than with 
humanity, “Capitalocene” might be a better word to use (for example, Moore, 2017a). However, one 
disadvantage is that it is less likely to be accepted by geologists and other physical scientists (it doesn’t 
fit with the conventions of geological terminology). As the word “Anthropocene” has already entered 
common usage it may simply be too late to start proposing alternative terms. 
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centre stage. Therefore, the Anthropocene makes a contribution to a body of work within the 
social sciences that has always questioned the concept of “nature”. Lorimer describes the 
designation of the new epoch as “the public death of the modern understanding of Nature 
removed from society” (Lorimer, 2012, p1). His (2015) book Wildlife in the Anthropocene, 
which discusses the wildlife that lives in human-created environments such as cities, criticises 
the spatial association of nature with “wilderness” (see also Whatmore and Thorne, 1998), and 
provides an important example of this type of non-dualist Anthropocene thinking.  
For Lorimer, the Anthropocene is interesting precisely because it offers a challenge to the 
assumption that “nature” can be rationally ordered, understood and managed. His work offers 
an alternative view of a world where human influence is entangled with the actions of non-
humans, outcomes are unpredictable and socio-natural processes are “non-linear, rather than 
being in balance” (Lorimer, 2015, p2). Lorimer admits that his reading of the Anthropocene 
goes against the grain of most interpretations. Mainstream narratives tend either to emphasise 
human domination or control over nature or to assert that humans have too much influence and 
ought collectively to scale back their impact. As Lorimer points out, both of these viewpoints 
share the same flaw in that both rely on a binary view of nature and society. However, Lorimer 
argues that it is not necessary to adopt a dualist view; the concept of the Anthropocene is still 
young and can instead be harnessed in order to dispense with this binary thinking. Although 
Lorimer is critical of the ideal of wilderness, he maintains that there is nevertheless a need to 
account for wildlife—including the plants, animals and other living things that reside in cities 
and the microbiota found inside the human body (Lorimer, 2015, pp7-8; Lorimer, 2017). Such 
an approach integrates an understanding of processes at the global scale with those at much 
smaller (even microscopic) spatial scales.  
Lorimer’s research compares traditional wildlife conservation with newer trends such as 
rewilding. The former involves an attempt to manage populations of wildlife and to conserve 
ecosystems in a steady state. Conversely, for advocates of rewilding, uncontrolled processes 
are the ideal. Rewilding is defined by one UK charity as: “the large-scale restoration of 
ecosystems where nature can take care of itself… It is not geared to reach any human-defined 
optimal point or end state. It goes where nature takes it” (Rewilding Britain, 2018). Lorimer 
uses the experiment at the Oostvaardersplassen in the Netherlands as an example of this trend. 
Started in the late 1980s, this project involved attempting to re-establish grazing processes 
thought to have been present in the Pleistocene era by introducing Heck cattle and konik 
ponies (similar to two extinct breeds) to a piece of land in the Amsterdam suburbs that had 
been reclaimed from the sea. Although the site was initially created by human activity and 
humans still actively manage it, it cannot be said to be fully under human control. Animal-





have produced some unforeseen and unpredictable results such as a sudden and unexpected 
collapse in the population of wild spoonbills (Lorimer, 2015; Lorimer and Driessen, 2014). For 
thinkers like Lorimer, the Anthropocene invokes a world where human and non-human agency 
are inextricably bound and where ecosystems are constantly being constructed and 
reconstructed. 
Lorimer’s work has interesting implications for how social scientists might engage with 
knowledges from the natural sciences. He states that “science…is political” (Lorimer, 2015, 
p2) and shows how the interests of conversation ecologists have shifted over time. To give one 
of his examples, there is now much greater interest in, and acknowledgement of, the 
biodiversity in urban areas than there perhaps has been in the past (Lorimer, 2015, chapter 8). 
But, more centrally, Lorimer’s ontological argument and emphasis on human intervention in 
biospheric processes means he acknowledges the role of human action in shaping the non-
human world. He consequently doesn’t assume that scientists are observers from the outside of 
processes within nature. In other words, he takes a very different approach to science and 
scientists than the stereotype of the disinterested scientist discussed in the previous chapter in 
relation to Lukács’ interpretations.  
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, critiques of dualism have also been discussed in 
various ways by Marxist ecological thinkers. However, in geography and other related 
disciplines, variants of new/vital materialism, actor-network theory and posthuman thinking 
have emerged as the dominant paradigm within which to discuss non-dualist approaches to the 
socio-natural world. Lorimer describes his own work as “vital materialist”. Rather than Marx, 
Engels or Gramsci, he lists Latour, Haraway, Deleuze, Bennett and Whatmore as his 
influences (Lorimer, 2012, pp595-597; 2015, p21). Accounts of non-human nature within 
human geography increasingly deal with questions of agency, they seek to engage with what 
non-humans can do rather than assuming that the non-human environment is something that 
humans act on. This “materialist turn” (Kirsch, 2013) will be addressed in the remainder of 
this chapter. After outlining the main tenets of new materialist thought, this section will 
address its influence in thinking about environmental issues and some of the disagreements 
between its supporters and ecological Marxists. 
 
3.3: New materialisms 
In Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things, Jane Bennett memorably describes a “sunny 
Tuesday morning” when she was struck by the “affect”—an intangible feeling or sensation—
experienced when encountering a collection of seemingly inert objects in a storm drain—a 
dead rat, a bottle cap, some pollen, a wooden stick and a discarded workman’s glove:  
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Glove, pollen, rat, cap, stick. As I encountered these items, they shimmied 
back and forth between debris and thing—between, on the one hand, stuff 
to ignore, except insofar as it betokened human activity (the workman’s 
efforts, the litterer’s toss, the rat-poisoner’s success), and, on the other 
hand, stuff that commanded attention in its own right, as existents in 
excess of their association with human meanings, habits, or projects. In 
the second moment, stuff exhibited its thing-power: it issued a call, even 
if I did not quite understand what it was saying. At the very least, it 
provoked affects in me… (Bennett, 2010, p4, emphasis added). 
As this short vignette makes clear, Bennett hopes that social theorists will take seriously the 
influence that non-human things have on the humans who observe them. But, furthermore, 
they might even come to see something like a bottle cap as having a kind of power “in its own 
right”, an ability to act that exhibits itself whether or not a human being is involved. Bennett 
hopes that theorists will engage with the materiality of things and consider what properties 
might enable them to exert their influence. In marked contrast to Malm’s work, which 
foregrounds relations between humans, work such as Bennett’s asks whether social theorists 
might also acknowledge the role of non-human things. Her writing is a key contribution to 
what has come to be called new materialism but could equally be referred to as a vibrant (or 
vital) materialism.  
The term “new materialism” is also sometimes conflated with non-deterministic or 
immanentist ontologies (Braun, 2015). It covers a range of sometimes divergent theories and 
has been applied to the work of followers of Hobbes, Spinoza, Deleuze, Foucault, Latour, 
Derrida and others. However, both Braun and Diana Coole argue that these approaches have 
several characteristics in common, making it possible to lump them together. Coole states that 
thinkers from these diverse traditions “all seem happy to fly under the new materialist flag” 
(Coole, 2013, p452, see also Coole and Frost, 2010). As this work seeks to unsettle the 
distinction between humans and non-humans, some have also referred to a “posthuman” turn 
(see Braidotti, 2013).  
The renewed engagement with materialism in geography and other disciplines is an attempt to 
overcome some of the perceived inadequacies of earlier forms of thought. In particular, such 
approaches have been described as a reaction to the dominance of language, discourse and 
representation in geography and other disciplines, especially in the 1970s and 1980s. This 
“cultural turn”, it is argued, tended to marginalise discussions of the material (Coole and Frost, 
2010; Arboleda, 2017, p366). Since the mid-2000s, alongside renewed awareness and interest 
in ecology and engagement with the natural sciences, the human-centric assumptions of the 





new materialisms also purport to address what are sometimes seen as omissions in Marxian 
socio-natural thought. 
Although the term “new materialist” encompasses a diverse body of work, there are several 
tenets that its followers generally hold in common (Connolly, 2013). Firstly, new materialism 
represents a renewed engagement with “matter”. Rather than being considered inert “stuff”, 
matter is said to be “alive with the creative potential of endless evolutions and innovations” 
(Kearnes, 2006, 67). For example, Bennett (2010, pp58-60) reflects on the properties of 
metals, describing their crystalline structure and suggesting that metals have a capacity to 
transform themselves as cracks spread through their structure. These capacities are seen as 
integral to the nature of the materials themselves rather than imposed on them from without, 
for example by human action.  
There are, of course, many differing strands of materialist thought including historical 
materialism.32 As discussed in the previous chapter on ecological Marxism, materialists assert 
that what exists depends on matter, as opposed to idealists who assert the primacy of ideas 
(Bhaskar, 1992). However, Bruno Latour (in a 2007 paper entitled “Can we get our 
Materialism Back Please?”) argues that what has come to be referred to as “materialism” is 
really a form of idealised thinking that treats the material world as a set of objects that we 
mistake for “things”. For Latour, new forms of description are needed to account for the things 
of the world. The properties of objects can be described using methods such as technical 
drawing. Such representations provide knowledge; Watt’s diagrams of steam engines can help 
us understand how the elements that make up an engine fit together. But drawings fail to 
account for the material properties of the parts of an engine, for example the need of the parts 
to maintain themselves and avoid rot and decay. Therefore, the current wave of new 
materialisms differs from historical materialism in that its advocates call for a much greater 
engagement with the properties of specific things rather than asserting that work is materialist 
if it is based on real relationships between humans. An account of migration from rural parts of 
England into the cities in the 19th century, the development of capitalist relations of 
production and the associated changing relationship with the natural world might interest a 
historical materialist. However, it would not satisfy Latour’s criteria for materialism—unless 
perhaps the migrants were also shown to act as part of a network where water, cotton, rats, 
bricks, coal, etc, are equally seen to participate.    
As well as its interest in matter, new materialism can be described as an “ontology of 
becoming” or a process-based ontology. It turns its attention to the processes that constitute 
                                                          
32 Marx and Engels themselves described the materialism they advocated in their own day as “new 
materialism” (Graham, 1973).  
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things rather than focusing on those things in themselves (Coole, 2013). The socio-natural 
world is seen as made up of constantly shifting relations—things are always either coming into 
being or going out of existence: “socio-ecological systems” have a “never exhausted potential 
to assume other forms” (Braun, 2015, p3). Like Harvey and Ollman’s dialectics, this is a 
radical relational approach in that it doesn’t start by looking at things in isolation before going 
on to analyse the way in which they might relate. Instead, it takes as its starting point the 
notion that those things are themselves “composed of nothing more or less than relations” 
(Fraser, Kember and Lury, 2005).  
Furthermore, when things are not things but processes, they also become more lively, 
exhibiting properties including creativity and a capacity to surprise (Fraser, Kember and Lury, 
2005; Connolly, 2013). Ideas that non-human nature is “chaotic”, “eventful”, “vital”, “feral”, 
“instable” and “volatile” have rapidly gained in influence (Braun, 2009). This way of thinking 
acknowledges that aspects of the non-human world have properties that are unpredictable and 
that defy full human explanation. Lorimer similarly reflects on the idea of “charismatic” non-
human species and shows how affect might sway wildlife conservation priorities by 
influencing the attitudes of conservation scientists and members of the public towards different 
kinds of animal species (Lorimer, 2007). This renewed philosophical engagement with non-
humans as lively is sometimes taken to mean that they exert a kind of “power”, as 
demonstrated by Bennett’s references to “thing power” (Bennett, 2010).  
Thirdly, the diverse approaches referred to here as new materialist have expanded the scope of 
what counts as “agency”, which, as Coole (2013) points out, has been a particularly vexed 
issue within various social scientific disciplines. Rather than agency being reserved for humans 
alone, things now exhibit “agency”, or at least a capacity to make things happen. In the words 
of Braun and Whatmore, this thinking is about showing an interest in “the performances of 
things and not just the actions of humans” (Braun and Whatmore, 2010, p.xx). Such work is a 
decisive shift away from anthropocentrism: which sees humans as uniquely able to exhibit 
agency or makes rational human action the yard-stick against which an entity’s capacity to act 
is measured. For example, William Connolly (2013) opposes seeing human subjectivity as the 
“fundamental ground of things” (see also Braidotti, 2013, pp13-14) and for Karen Barad 
“agency is not aligned with human intentionality or subjectivity” (Barad, quoted in Malm, 
2018, p88). This project of displacing humans as the sole possessors of agency is often referred 
to as a flat ontology. For many of the thinkers who have engaged with these ideas, agency is 
not a property or attribute possessed by a particular human or non-human. Rather, it is better 
thought of as emerging as a result of the relationship between non-humans. In Hinchliffe’s 
work on urban wildlife, the capacity of water voles to live alongside other species such as the 





voles and rats become able to adapt their behaviour to live alongside one another (Hinchliffe, 
2008).  
Finally, and related to the other points concerning materiality, becoming, liveliness and 
agency, new materialist ontologies preclude seeing the world as fundamentally divisible into 
“social” and “natural” realms. Objecting to the “common sense division of the world into 
lively humans and brute matter” (Braun, 2011, p390), these ways of thinking pose a radical 
challenge to approaches that start from nature and society as two opposing poles. Here, the 
new materialists again take their cue from Latour, who identified the treatment of nature and 
society as two distinct realms as a peculiarly modern way of understanding the world (Latour, 
1993). Instead, for Latour, the world is constituted by multiple hybrid things, none of which 
can be split apart into societal and natural elements: 
Latour…would abandon the concept of nature, suggesting instead a world 
of socio-natural quasi-objects. There is neither nature nor society outside 
the cultural and discursive practices that produced this binary. Rather, the 
imbroglios of human and non-human things that proliferate in and 
constitute the world consist of continuously multiplying nature-culture 
hybrids that stand between nature and culture: for example, greenhouse 
gases, Dolly the cloned sheep, dams or electromagnetic waves 
(Swyngedouw, 2015, p134).  
Latour’s work has been cited by various thinkers in geography. Notably, Whatmore develops a 
geography populated by hybrids, which in Latour’s terms cannot be conceived “as a mixture of 
two pure forms” (quoted in Whatmore, 2002, p2). And Noel Castree also refers to Latour’s 
modern constitution in an overview of ecological Marxism (Castree, 2000). 
As explained above, new materialists demolish the nature/society binary by allowing for non-
human entities to be considered as agents and therefore endowed with some of the capacities 
conventionally reserved for humans. They have also drawn attention to the inhuman forces that 
constitute humans themselves. The fact that all humans have a microbiome, a community of 
microorganisms living on and inside us, is often used to demonstrate how entangled human 
lives are with those of non-human species (see Gilbert, Sapp and Tauber, 2012). Therefore, 
one result of increased interest in the microbiome on the part of social scientists is to challenge 
individualistic assumptions about the human. If much of the cells making up the body of a 
human do not actually contain human DNA but that of multiple other species, can we so easily 
treat the human body as distinct from non-human nature? Can we argue that humans act on 
nature when human action is itself a multi-species achievement? (see, for example, Connolly 
2013; Lorimer, 2017). 
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Although new materialism has become popular within the last decade or so, it is influenced by 
earlier strands of thought, especially actor-network theory, and by neo-vitalist thought. The 
new materialism has in turn become influential within animal geography and in environmental 
geography more generally. Therefore, the following briefly addresses the roots and influence 
of new materialist ideas before assessing the criticisms of these ideas and the debates between 
their advocates and ecological Marxists.  
 
3.3.1: Actor-network theory 
Lorimer (2007) says that his own vital materialist thinking is influenced by actor-network 
theory (ANT). Perhaps most closely associated with Latour (2005), ANT is premised on the 
idea that actions are the result of the coming together in networks of diverse entities, which 
might be human or non-human. Malm also refers to the influence of Latour on new 
materialism with its emphasis on the capacity of non-humans to act (see Malm, 2018, pp78-
118).  
As with the new materialist approaches discussed above, ANT is profoundly relational, agency 
arises as a consequence of the way elements of a network relate to each other rather than being 
an inherent property of something existing prior to its incorporation into such a network 
(Castree, 2002). Despite the use of the word “theory”, advocates of ANT have been reluctant 
to refer to it as a theory in the sense of trying to impose an explanatory framework on the 
world (Castree, 2005, p231). Instead they prefer a more modest approach whereby actors are 
allowed to build their own networks which are then described rather than explained. This 
sensibility is shared by Bennett who also refuses to treat things as separate bodies that can be 
analysed in isolation (2010, chapter 2).  
ANT is also opposed to nature-society dualism. For Latour, “nature” as a way of organising 
non-humans should be dispensed with in favour of a recognition of hybridity. But his work is 
also an attempt to redefine “the social”. In his introduction to ANT, Reassembling the Social 
(Latour, 2005), Latour critiques the treatment of “the social” as a thing with its own properties 
that causes things to happen, an assumption made by social scientists when they refer to social 
constructionism or to the search for “social explanations” of phenomena. In contrast Latour 
sees the social as what is constructed by heterogeneous actors rather than the thing that does 
the constructing.  
For Murdoch (1997), ANT is useful for geography as it focuses on interconnectedness rather 
than on oppositions such as that between society and nature, micro- and macro- scale or local 
and global. According to Murdoch, approaches that focus only on local interactions between 





account for this, an approach such as ANT is useful in that it shows how human action results 
from networks that also include non-human resources and technologies thereby amplifying the 
actions of humans across space.  
 
3.3.2: Neo-vitalism 
As well as being influenced by ANT, Braun (2009), detects a kind of neo-vitalism evident in 
the work of “new materialist” authors such as Latour and Whatmore. Traditional forms of 
vitalism, associated with thinkers from the 18th and 19th century including Newton, proposed 
the existence of a spark of life or vital force (“élan vital”) in living things that animates what 
would otherwise be inert (Greco, 2005; Henderson, 2012). In the life sciences, vitalists propose 
that life is uniquely endowed with this force, bestowing properties on living things that cannot 
be comprehensively explained in terms of physics or chemistry (Greco, 2005). By contrast, 
mechanist philosophical viewpoints assert that life—however enigmatic and unpredictable it 
seems—is in principle explainable using the models of chemistry and ultimately those of 
physics. Paradoxically, accounts that seem to be based on mathematical laws, such as 
Newton’s explanation of the movement of planetary bodies or comparisons of the human body 
to a machine, can have vitalist implications. A theory that reduces everything to knowable 
laws leaves no room for explanation as to how movement arises in the first place—this can 
only then be understood by recourse to statements about “sparks of life”. Vitalism has fallen 
out of favour within biology. However, it is evidently still a concern of social scientists. 
Various authors, including Canguilhem and Foucault, despite recognising the problems with 
using the term, have seen vitalism as still useful as a concept. For example, Canguilhem uses it 
as a polemic position or means by which to reject mechanist ideas even if it does not 
necessarily have any positive meaning (Greco, 2005).  
Importantly, where traditional vitalism has proposed that matter is essentially inert and living 
things are sparked by some (mysterious) outside force, the neo-vitalism of the new materialists 
supposes no such external influence. For Bennett and for Elizabeth Grosz in Becoming 
Undone, liveliness is seen as emerging and developing from matter itself: “life is not suffused 
of a special substance, soul, mind, or consciousness that separates it from materiality. It is the 
vital indeterminacy of the material world that enables life and that life exploits for its own self-
elaboration” (Grosz, 2011, p34). This power is not bestowed on objects from the outside, 
either by humans or by an animating force (evidently, for Bennett thing power doesn’t leave a 
rat when it dies). Instead it emerges as a consequence of the material properties of things and 
the way a collection of things is arranged (Connolly, 2013, p400).  
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3.3.3: Animal geographies 
Alongside the growth of new materialist thinking, human geography has undergone something 
of a revival in its engagement with animals in recent decades. Animal geography seeks to 
explore the relationships between humans and other animals, the role of animals in constituting 
the societies in which humans live and the ways in which animals come to be associated with 
particular places. Geography’s engagement with animals can be traced back at least to the 
early 20th century. Zoögeography, a branch of physical geography, sought to measure and 
explain the global distribution patterns of wild animals. However, a “new” animal geography 
has emerged since the mid-1990s, especially among human and cultural geographers, with 
several calls to “bring the animals back in” (see Emel, Wilbert and Wolch, 2002).33 One 
theoretical contribution of this animal turn has been to draw attention to the constituent parts of 
“nature”—the attributes of particular species and even the lives of individual organisms (Bear, 
2011). Indeed, research on specific animals has been key to adding texture to environmental 
geography, opening the black box represented by the abstract term “nature” (Wolch and Emel, 
1998). 
Although animal geography is not synonymous with new materialism, the two strands of 
thought have undoubtedly informed each other. Many animal geographers have become 
concerned with issues of agency, particularly with understanding the active role animals might 
play in producing space (Wolch and Emel, 1998; Wolch, 2002; Emel, Wilbert, and Wolch, 
2002). Animal geographers, like the new materialists, have called into question whether the 
type of conscious intentionality associated with humans is necessary for something to be an 
agent (Emel, Wilbert and Wolch, 2002). 
Philo and Wilbert cite Latour as a key influence on animal geographies (Philo and Wilbert, 
2000, p5). For these authors, the new animal geography is related to the turn away from 
discourse alluded to earlier. Rather than concentrating solely on the ways in which animals are 
represented by humans, therefore giving the impression “that animals are merely passive 
surfaces onto which human groups inscribe imaginings and orderings of all kinds” they have 
drawn attention to the ways in which animals themselves are capable of transgressing the 
spatial orderings to which people have attempted to assign them. To do this Philo and Wilbert 
offer several examples of animals in captivity that have either literally escaped from zoos or 
have evaded zookeepers’ attempts to discipline them (Philo and Wilbert, 2000, pp14-23). And, 
for the co-authors of another recent edited collection, to be an animal geographer necessitates 
acknowledging non-human agency and rejecting human exceptionalism: 
                                                          
33 This growth in interest in animals partly reflects growing public concerns over animal welfare, 
biodiversity conservation, the environmental impacts of meat production and the ethical implications of 





We are both firmly animal geographers. For us this means taking seriously 
the agency of the more-than-human world and acknowledging the 
capacity of all the earth’s inhabitants to affect and be affected. As such, 
we reject the idea of human exceptionalism and, along with other scholars 
who embrace the posthuman turn, seek to unsettle the presumed 
boundaries between the organisms that make up this world. Indeed, 
humans and other animals are always co-constituted—our ontologies are 
relational, even if the effects of co-constitution are always asymmetrical 
(Wilcox and Rutherford, 2018, p1).  
Animals have often been both conceptually and materially assigned to particular places. For 
Philo and Wilbert (2000) animals can be “placed”, both in terms of being assigned to a place in 
a classification system such as the system of naming and classifying different organisms 
developed by Carl Linnaeus in the 18th century (Anderson, 2014), and by being more literally 
associated with particular physical places such as the wilderness or the outdoors. This obscures 
not only the physical presence of animals in urban environments (Wolch, 2002), but also the 
role animals play in human societies, for example as a source of food and clothing or in 
providing companionship, entertainment and inspiration. Animals are often seen as part of 
“nature”. Therefore, studies of the ways in which humans have come to be understood as 
distinct from other animals and the cultural and scientific practices that maintain this 
distinction offer a way of understanding how the nature-culture divide has itself been 
established. However, some animals such as pets can be viewed as “part of the family” and 
imbued with human-like characteristics, therefore demonstrating the difficulties with which 
such dividing lines between society and nature are drawn.  
Animal geographers have also investigated the role played by human-animal relations in 
establishing and differentiating human identities. Elder, Wolch and Emel (1998) show how the 
practice of animal sacrifice in the Santería religion is seen as violating dominant ideas around 
human-animal relationships (in US cities where animal killing is otherwise hidden from view 
in the slaughterhouse). Differing ideas about how to relate to animals therefore contributed to 
the racialisation of a migrant group. Critical animal geography has argued that human-animal 
relationships cannot be understood without taking into account social relations between 
humans and has incorporated ideas from political economy to look at how animals have 
become commodities (Srinivasan, 2016; Collard and Dempsey, 2013).  
As well as animals, plants are also described now as exhibiting a “lively presence”, becoming 
“fundamental players in human lives” as organisms we relate to in gardens and as the 
providers of our food and oxygen (Head and Atchison, 2009). And microorganisms are also a 
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focus of research, for example in Labban’s study of the role they play alongside humans in 
extracting metals from mineral ores (Labban, 2014). 
 
3.3.4: New materialisms and environmental problems 
As well as being influential in studies of animals, new materialism, with its emphasis on non-
human agency and its challenge to dualism, clearly has implications for ecological thought 
more generally. For example, Bennett asks what effect it would have on politics if things that 
had previously been seen as inert objects came to be viewed as possessing qualities—like 
liveliness—usually only reserved for living creatures. She suggests that waste in a rubbish 
dump might be treated differently if it came to be seen not as something that can simply be 
disregarded but as vital matter that continues to possess a liveliness of its own. In this case the 
rubbish emits liquid pollution and methane into the atmosphere, continuing to “do stuff” even 
after humans have forgotten about it (Bennett, 2010, p6).  
New/vibrant materialisms have therefore become influential in environmental geography. 
Divya Tolia-Kelly (2011) argues that we should take inspiration from Bennett’s (2010) book 
Vibrant Matter and “embrace the call of matter”. Karen Bakker has tried to bring together 
literature on neoliberalisation with that on materialism and non-human nature, arguing that 
failing to address the constitutive role that non-humans play in economic and societal 
formations has led to a “failure to address the full scope of environmental processes and socio-
natural entities subsumed within processes of neoliberalisation” (Bakker, 2010, p717). These 
ideas have influenced geographers concerned with wildlife conservation (Lorimer, 2007; 
Hinchliffe, 2008), genetically modified foods (Bingham, 2006) and the role of liveliness in 
understandings of the commodification of living things (the subject of a set of paper 
presentations and a panel discussion at the AAG annual meeting 2014). Kirsch (2013), 
commenting on the material turn, sees materialism as connective wiring linking together 
various disparate approaches within geography. Although materialism is understood in 
different ways, approaches that emphasise the specific properties of things have become 
commonplace.  
Perhaps one reason new materialist ideas are so compelling is that they present a challenge to 
the assumptions of existing political theory. Politics, it is argued, tends to focus on humans and 
their relationships with each other while relegating those things awkwardly referred to as “non-
humans” to the background (Braun, 2011). Such a position would imply that humans see the 
non-human world as merely the page on which political history is written or, more 
problematically, as a pool of resources for human use or as barriers to human activity. It would 





Steve Hinchliffe puts it (2008, p88), or as raw material that “just exists” prior to being 
appropriated (Haraway, 1989, p13). This is not the same as seeing non-humans purely as 
recalcitrant—resisting the efforts of humans. After all, human societies would not exist 
without the non-human actants that have enabled them to come into being. But it does remind 
us that non-humans are not merely the objects of human will (Braun, 2009). As well as 
avoiding the dualist position that humans simply act on a passive nature, new materialism also 
seeks to avoid the equally problematic assumption that non-humans act due to some 
autonomous “natural” laws that humans are not subject to. It has even been argued that the 
common sense notion of agency as a capacity of intentional, thinking subjects stems from the 
assumption, characteristic of economic liberalism, that humans act in a rational and self-
serving manner (Braun, 2008).  
In summary, new materialism involves engagement with the material properties of things and 
some creative attempts to account for these properties in written work such as Bennett’s, an 
emphasis on process over fixity, a rejection of dualism and a rethinking of agency that extends 
the concept beyond intentional human action. It has become popular in geography and, 
particularly in environmental geography, where it has provided an antidote to approaches that 
treat the non-human world as brute matter to be worked on by humans. Somewhat 
counterintuitively, a Latourian inspired vital materialist approach is evident in Lorimer’s work 
on the Anthropocene despite the common association of the epoch with overwhelming human 
agency.  
It should also be clear from the above that new or vital materialism shares a lot in common 
with the ecological Marxism discussed in the previous chapter. Like the new materialists, 
Marxists have attempted to theorise ecological relations while avoiding dualist assumptions. 
The approach to dialectics outlined by Harvey and Ollman can, like the new materialism, be 
described as an ontology of becoming that starts with relations rather than things (Sheppard, 
2008; Braun, 2006). However, there continue to be disagreements between advocates of 
dialectics and new materialists to which this chapter now turns.  
 
3.4: False antitheses? 
Both dialectics and new or vital materialisms are part of what has been described as a more 
general “radical shift to a relational ontology, a world of relations and processes and not 
things-in-themselves” (Kirsch and Mitchell, 2004, p689). Similarly, in the book Nature, 
Castree refers to both Harvey’s “new dialectics” and to actor-network theory in the same 
chapter on “post-natural” geographies (Castree, 2005, chapter 5). Braun (2006, p193) also 
points out that Harvey’s approach has drawn him into “strange proximity” with other, non-
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dialectical, materialisms where both are defined here by their rejection of the notion of an 
external nature. But, as Castree points out, dialectics “has thus far proved less influential 
than…actor-network theory” (Castree, 2005, p234).34 
But, despite their shared ontological preferences, new materialists often differentiate their 
work from dialectics, with many thinkers associated with the trend setting our explicitly to 
develop a “non-Marxist” materialism. Bennett states, for example:  
I pursue a materialism in the tradition of Democritus-Epicurus-Spinoza-
Diderot-Deleuze more than Hegel-Marx-Adorno. It is important to follow 
the trail of human power to expose social hegemonies (as historical 
materialists do). But my contention is that there is also public value in 
following the scent of a nonhuman, thingly power, the material agency of 
natural bodies and technological artefacts (Bennett, 2010, p.xiii).  
As this quote demonstrates, Bennett does recognise the “importance” of human power 
relations. But she objects to Marxism’s apparent anthropocentrism: “Dogged resistance to 
anthropocentrism is perhaps the main difference between the vital materialism I pursue and 
this kind of historical materialism” (p.xvi). 
For some of its critics, dialectical thinking is, despite its claims to the contrary, unhelpfully 
predicated on the prior establishment of two distinct and opposing entities—nature and 
society—that come to relate to each other. It therefore fails to deal adequately with socio-
natural concerns. Whatmore states (or at least, once stated) that: “far from challenging [the] a 
priori categorisation of the things of the world, dialectics can be seen to raise its binary logic 
to the level of a contradiction and engine of history” (Whatmore, 1999, p25). Similarly, Braun 
has suggested that dialectics is “too crude…to overcome dualism” and that it retains the terms 
of the nature-society binary “even as it seeks to place them in relation” (Braun, 2006, p199). It 
is hardly surprising that some can assume this given the prevalence of definition of dialectics 
as “the perpetual resolution of binary opposites” (Gregory, 2009, p157). Such an approach 
would indeed approach nature and society as if they are two separate realms and would also be 
crudely deterministic. However, Whatmore and Braun misrepresent dialectics here. As argued 
in the previous chapter of this thesis, the thinking that Whatmore criticises is precisely the kind 
of philosophy of external relations that Ollman and Harvey also make such a compelling case 
against with their contention that the things of the world are constituted by processes. As 
discussed in the previous chapter with reference to Brecht, dialecticians would also take issue 
                                                          
34 Castree argues that “this reflects the current unpopularity of Marxism within human geography” 
(2005, p234) although this seems to be an overstatement given, for example, the Marxist influence on 
political ecology referred to in chapter one and the success of Marxist thinkers in geography more 





with the emphasis on resolution of opposites. Therefore, Castree can easily dismiss 
Whatmore’s criticism: “strangely this plenary claim is not based on any in-depth analysis of 
Marxian theorisations of the nature-society interface” (Castree, 2002, p115).  
For Castree (2002), therefore, “false antitheses” have framed the encounter between 
environmental Marxism and approaches such as actor-network theory that call for a 
recognition of multiple forms of agency. While maintaining that ecological Marxism has made 
an important contribution to critiquing specifically capitalist environmental relations, he argues 
that there is a weak form of ANT that could be combined with ecological Marxism. Such a 
synthesis would complicate environmental politics by acknowledging the role of multiple 
actors (Castree, 2002, p111).  
Following Castree (2002), more recent work on lively commodities has tried to bridge the 
divide between emerging work on non-human agency and materiality and Marxian concepts of 
labour, value and commodification. For example, Boyd, Prudham and Schurman (2001) have 
utilised Marx’s distinction between formal and real subsumption of labour, arguing that this 
distinction applies to the ways in which natural processes are incorporated into industrial 
production as well as to human labour. Maan Barua (2016) demonstrates how, in encounters 
between humans and large animals, for example between tourists and elephants, the physical 
features of the animals contribute towards what, following Donna Haraway (2008), he calls 
“encounter value”. The intention here is to move beyond the notion, common in political 
economy, that non-humans are a mere resource or a substrate on which human labour occurs 
towards seeing animals themselves as active participants in a process of capital accumulation. 
However, this work departs somewhat from the classical Marxist interpretation of value theory 
outlined in chapter two which relies on distinguishing a form of value that can only originate 
with human labour.  
Despite Castree’s intervention, there is still a “muted standoff” (as Loftus, 2012, p4, puts it) 
between followers of Marxist and of new materialist approaches. Lorimer has raised slightly 
different criticisms of dialectics to Whatmore. He critiques dialectical approaches for 
apparently foregrounding human agency at the expense of recognising the role of non-humans, 
and for giving insufficient attention to the materiality of non-human nature as well as that of 
the human body (Lorimer, 2013). Lorimer, for whom dialectics lies “at the heart of Marxist 
geography” (2013, p127), contends that a version of vital materialism is much more able to 
account for a diverse range of actors, for example in his own research into the way non-human 
charisma shapes the priorities of wildlife conservation (Lorimer, 2007; 2015). Smith’s (2008) 
production of nature thesis attracts particular criticism here. With its explicit focus on the role 
of human labour in producing natures and its unapologetic anthropomorphism, it is seen as 
tending to “minimise the influence of nature as a material force” (Boyd, Prudham and 
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Schurman, 2001, p557; see also Loftus, 2012, pp13-16; Lorimer 2013). Lorimer interestingly 
suggests that Marxist thinkers have downplayed discussions of non-human agency due to a 
“residual Marxist antipathy…to discussions of the environment as a limit” (2013, p127). 
However, it could be argued in response that the production of nature is a description of how 
the “natural” world is treated under capitalism—not a normative statement of how Smith or his 
supporters might want the human relation with nature to be, but a recognition of the way 
nature is subsumed today. Conversely, there are criticisms of the new/vital materialisms that 
can be raised when considering their work in the light of the discussion of ecological Marxism 
in the previous chapter. 
 
3.4.1: Criticisms of the new materialisms 
While Malm’s Marxist approach usefully politicises climate change and highlights 
(differentiated) human responsibility, Bennett’s new materialism does seem limited when it 
comes to addressing political issues.35 Bennett gives the example of a black-out that struck the 
US electrical grid in 2003 and considers the grid as a network of diverse actants. Participants 
as diverse as wire, wood, heat, lifestyles, economic theory and “dreams of mastery” are 
presented in an (inexhaustive) list of things that must cooperate with each other to ensure the 
continuation of the power supply (Bennett, 2010, p25). One immediate concern raised by this 
example is that—if all of these are seen as exhibiting vitality and agency—it implies that, 
when the electrical grid fails, there is no single or ultimate cause of the problem. Bennett 
herself acknowledges that her approach makes it difficult to find someone to blame. How 
would one hold the electricity company accountable, for example, if the wires that make up the 
network are implicated just as much as the people involved? More generally the approach 
developed seems to prohibit the idea that elements in a network could gain power over others. 
Does the economic theory play a greater role in the power network than that played by the 
wood? Or at least act in a different way?  
The assertion that everything has a kind of agency has also been accused of setting the bar too 
low in defining what counts as agency. The levelling up of non-humans to give them power 
and agency implies the levelling down of humans to the status of the non-human. Some, like 
William Connolly argue that they do not wish to “erase the human subject” with its own 
distinct capacities, they merely advocate greater acknowledgement of the role of multiple 
others in making human action possible (Connolly, 2013, p400). Nevertheless, one problem 
new materialist ideas might encounter when it comes to theorising lively commodities is that it 
                                                          
35 Where “political” is understood here in the broad sense as addressing relations of exploitation, 






leaves little room to consider the differentiated ability of humans to act when compared to 
other living things or inanimate objects. Indeed, it is difficult to distinguish between anything 
as everything is an effect of the networks in which it exists. Kirsch and Mitchell (2004), while 
in agreement with much of Castree’s (2002) arguments for reconciling Marxism and ANT, 
argue that ANT would have us ignore problems of causality or the directedness of social 
relations and argue that we should take these seriously in order to give accounts of non-human 
agency some political efficacy (Kirsch and Mitchell, 2004, p687). Likewise, in the context of a 
discussion of science and technology that is largely in agreement with the aims of this thesis, 
Martín Arboleda describes how the movement of capital can be understood as a driving force 
in shaping technological change therefore playing a differentiated role to the actions of the 
things involved. Arboleda develops this argument without wishing to silence “the multiplicity 
of actors and agencies involved in the making of natures” (Arboleda, 2017, p362).  
New materialist accounts often have relatively little to say about social relations between 
humans (whether exploitation of workers, gender relations, racism or other forms of 
oppression). As Lorimer acknowledges: “This emerging literature on multinaturalism has had 
very little to say about political economy and the relationships between the shifts it identifies 
and the ascendance of neoliberal capitalism” (2012, p602). This is not to argue that these 
issues are neglected entirely in this work. Lorimer (2015, chapter 7) does refer to the ways in 
which human relationships with wildlife differ along class and racialised lines. For example, 
he describes how rural Indians have very different attitudes to elephant conservation than 
urban Europeans (for the former, the animals pose are a threat to their livelihoods and even 
their safety while the latter are more often concerned with protecting endangered elephants). 
However, this work focuses on the question of the relationship between humans and other 
species, tending to flatten power relations between humans. By contrast, ecological Marxism 
as outlined in the previous chapter necessarily builds on an integrated analysis of the way 
capitalist social relations have entailed damaging socio-natural relations. In an earlier paper 
Lorimer himself seemed to recognise this lacuna in his work, arguing that, as political ecology 
often does engage with an analysis of capitalist social relations there ought to be scope for 
collaboration between political ecologists and vital materialist geographers (Lorimer 2012). 
Similarly, Krithika Srinivasan (2016), from a critical animal geography perspective, has 
highlighted the lack of a “political” animal geography. 
Lorimer also suggests that an ontology that stresses the fluidity of natural processes and the 
vitality of non-human life might be unhelpful for resisting the commodification of nature. He 
points out that the inventiveness of non-human life is the very thing that capital seeks to 
incorporate (Lorimer, 2012, p603). Therefore, approaches to biodiversity conservation that 
emphasise the active role of non-humans might, although it is far from the intention of 
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new/vital materialists, end up furthering the kind of subsumption of nature to capitalist logics 
discussed in relation to Smith’s work in the previous chapter. Braun (2015) anticipates this 
criticism and points out that there is indeed a relationship between the increased interest in 
non-linear processes among critical theorists and the neoliberal drive to financialise the 
productivity of nature.36 For Braun, however, we ought to distinguish between the radical 
potential of these ideas and the ways in which capitalism has sought to contain them. In other 
words, these ideas might be useful to a neoliberal project but not necessarily be inherently 
capitalist themselves. Braun’s solution is to bring together new or vital materialist theories 
with critical studies of the neoliberalisation of nature including Castree’s eco-Marxist 
influenced work (Braun, 2015, p2).  
In the black-out example mentioned above, Bennett (2010) describes how the different 
elements in a network collaborate to make things happen and describes the impression a 
fleeting encounter with some objects in a storm drain had on her. Therefore, new materialisms 
seem apt for describing how a group of things might hang together at a particular point in time. 
However, although Bennett does refer to “things” as coming together in networks rather than 
acting in isolation, her approach at times tends to—ahistorically—emphasise the properties of 
artefacts as they are encountered, rather than the processes that constitute and maintain them 
(Arboleda, 2017, p364). Therefore, it could be argued that the celebration of the power and 
vitality of things can end up treating them as distinct entities, calling into question the new 
materialism’s own claims to be profoundly relational. By contrast, ecological Marxism as 
outlined in the previous chapter, treats existing socio-natural formations as temporary and 
seeks to historicise them by addressing the processes by which our present situation came 
about (see Brincat and Gerber, 2015).  
There are also epistemological reasons why Marxists have been critical of new materialist 
thought and of actor-network theory. Latour’s version of actor-network theory as expounded in 
Reassembling the Social (Latour, 2005) starts from a completely different perspective to 
Marxism. A “thoroughly empirical philosophy”, it is based on building an account of a 
particular situation from the ground up by engaging with or studying the way different actants 
come together to form networks that make things happen. As mentioned above, its advocates 
are often reluctant to refer to ANT as a “theory”, despite the name (see Bingham, 2009, p6). 
Latour is completely opposed to any kind of approach that adopts a particular framework and 
imposes that understanding on the situation to be studied such as by restricting in advance the 
number of actants that make up the social world (Latour, 2005, p250).  
                                                          





Therefore, a strong interpretation of actor-network theory is indeed incompatible with 
Marxism. Marx distilled a series of general categories, such as value and exploitation, from a 
study of the commodity. Because his dialectics is about processes rather than things, he was 
able to go beyond surface appearances in order to get at “underlying” social relations (see 
Tyner and Inwood, 2014, p774). But these abstractions can supposedly then be applied to 
concrete situations in order to make sense of the world. Marxists therefore approach their 
chosen subject of study equipped with at least some assumptions about the workings of 
capitalism, referred to by Marx as the “essence of things”, rather than approaching a situation 
with no preconceptions and building up an understanding by observing the formation of 
networks. Essentially, most Marxists are not as suspicious of “theory” as actor-network 
thinkers.  
Expanding on this point, Kirsch and Mitchell point out that, for actor-network theorists, the 
overriding role of competition between capitals in shaping what happens in the workplace is 
downplayed in favour of an approach whereby social relations are seen as the outcome of 
relationships between people, machines and other things (Kirsch and Mitchell, 2004, pp700-
701). This lack of attention to the relations of competition and exploitation that structure the 
capitalist system leaves ANT oddly “politically inert”, with some of its advocates even averse 
to making normative judgements (Kirsch and Mitchell, 2004, pp694-695). The political 
propositions put forward by Connolly, a prominent new materialist thinker, are indeed 
extremely limited, especially given the dangers represented by climate change and the global 
resurgence of authoritarian politics that he describes in the same paper. Connolly proposes 
modest measures such as encouraging a local church congregation or trade union to take an 
interest in environmental issues, buying a hybrid car or joining the slow food movement and 
explaining your reasons why to your friends so that alliances of people with similar 
convictions might develop (Connolly, 2013, p411). Most of these are uncontroversial. But 
Connolly here seems to wilfully avoid searching for root causes of the problems he identifies 
(capitalism, perhaps) that might need to be addressed to solve them.  
Finally, Braun has suggested that new materialist theories may be at odds with current thinking 
among natural scientists, including biologists. One of the aspects uniting various adherents of 
the new materialism is an interest in science. However, Braun (despite his sympathies with 
new materialism) cautions that some have offered partial accounts of scientific thinking or 
even overlooked theories in the natural sciences that do not fit easily with their worldview. 
They also forget that the natural sciences have undergone paradigm shifts with the dominant 
ideas changing over time and are themselves influenced by the dominant philosophical trends 
(Braun, 2015, p4). Elsewhere, Braun suggests that David Harvey may have been right to refer 
to processes as crystallising into forms at particular moments, rather than “completely 
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dissolving things into their relations” as new materialists tend to do. The latter, “runs counter 
to the same biological sciences that provided such a rich source of concepts for...non-
essentialist ontology”. Braun argues that for entities such as biological organisms to exhibit 
agency, they must possess some kind of stability rather than simply occurring as a contingent 
outcome of historical processes (Braun, 2006, pp209-210). This critique is, as will be 
explained in subsequent chapters, remarkably similar to the work on the agency of non-human 
organisms developed by dialectical biologists, who agree that organisms should not be seen as 
merely the objects of external forces (see chapter six). 
 
3.4.2: The return of dualism 
The Marxist historian Andreas Malm, whose work on the Anthropocene has been discussed 
earlier in this chapter, has been vociferously critical of new materialist thinking, particularly in 
his most recent book, The Progress of this Storm: Nature and Society in a Warming World 
(Malm, 2018). Malm’s critique of the new materialists is related to his differences with Moore 
discussed in the previous chapter. The latter has sometimes referred approvingly to the recent 
“explosion” in relational approaches such as actor-network theory and assemblage thinking 
that have challenged nature-society dualisms (2017b, p289). But Moore is elsewhere also 
critical of such thinking, stating, in line with some of the points raised above, that approaches 
based on flat ontologies have been unhelpful when trying to understand power relations: “A 
flat ontology might be useful in very particular settings but there is nothing you can do with it 
when you want to understand capitalism, because capitalism is a decidedly unflat ontological 
formation” (interview, 3 November 2016). Nevertheless, to Moore’s own critics he is seen as 
flying too close to the orbit of the new materialism.   
Malm attacks the new materialists specifically for their rejection of dualism and for their 
references to non-human agency. He maintains that there really is a difference between society 
and nature and makes the related point that it is humans that act on a nature composed of 
passive matter. While Malm recognises the importance of representations of, and ideas about, 
nature, these are seen as distinct from actually existing nature itself: “some sort of distinction 
between ‘society’ and ‘nature’ remains indispensable” (p30). Saving particular criticism for 
Latour, Malm remarks that a hybrid worldview, whereby it is impossible to distinguish society 
and nature, is central to the latter’s political thought. But, counters Malm, just because two 
categories become inextricably entangled, it does not follow that the categories themselves are 
obsolete (Malm, 2018, p51). In place of hybridism, he asserts that historical materialism is a 
property dualism. In other words, we ought to accept that humans and the rest of nature are of 
the same substance, enabling society and nature to be closely interlinked and to influence each 





intentions not seen elsewhere in nature. Attributes unique to human society are described here 
as emergent properties and as dependent on nature but not reducible to it (2018, pp55-58). 
Malm’s response to the criticism of dialectics advanced by both Latour and Whatmore above 
is interesting here as he actually agrees with both when they say that dialectics is built on 
binary oppositions: “Yes, dialectics is the dance of opposites and requires at least a dyad” 
(p59). This is clearly in contrast to Castree, for whom Whatmore is ill-informed and mistaken 
in her assumption that dialectics relies on binary oppositions.   
As well as its critique of dualism, Malm also disagrees with the new materialist interpretation 
of agency. For Malm, there are many situations where it is morally or politically inappropriate 
to assign agency to non-humans. To use his example, if there is a riot and someone 
intentionally throws a stone and breaks a window, or unintentionally hits and injures another 
human, it is not feasible to say that the stone itself plays the same role and bears the same 
amount of responsibility for the action as the person (even if it is accepted that the stone has 
some material properties that allow it to hurt someone when thrown with force—Malm, 2018, 
pp93-94). Of course, this is a valid, if somewhat obvious, point. And, as mentioned above with 
regard to Bennett’s example of the black-out, new materialism does indeed raise issues when it 
comes to finding someone to blame for a particular event. Few would argue that stones should 
be tried in a court of law for their role in breaking windows! However, this tends to miss the 
point. The new materialists are trying to avoid conflating agency with rational human action 
which some see as a liberal assumption. The legal system must necessarily treat people as 
individuals and as rational decision-makers when assessing who is responsible for committing 
a crime. However, it ought to be possible to acknowledge the things that non-humans can do, 
as in Bennett’s other example of the landfill spewing out waste into its environment, without 
the rubbish needing to act rationally and consciously and while also acknowledging the actions 
of humans in dumping the waste.  
By resurrecting a distinction between society and nature, Malm pits himself against not just 
new/vital materialist tendencies, but much of contemporary political ecology. As explained in 
the previous chapter, there are Marxist approaches to theorising socio-natures such as Smith’s 
production of nature thesis and Loftus’ work in urban political ecology that are also founded 
on a rejection of dualism (Smith, 2008; Loftus, 2012). This thesis argues that there are genuine 
reasons to be critical of dualism and to acknowledge the role of non-humans in modifying the 
biosphere. Therefore, new materialism, by raising these two issues, offers a challenge that 
Marxists ought to take seriously, despite some of the limitations of new materialist work 
referred to above. Furthermore, the work of the dialectical biologists accepts this challenge by 
suggesting a non-dualist Marxist approach that does indeed theorise the actions of non-
humans.  
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3.5: Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced the concept of the Anthropocene, a proposed new epoch defined 
by human influence on Earth system processes. It has provided an overview of some of the key 
debates around when the Anthropocene began—and why it began at that time—and argued 
that these debates matter to environmental geographers as well as to geologists. For some 
optimistic advocates of a “good” Anthropocene, the new epoch provides an opportunity to 
envision a future of conscious human manipulation of planetary processes towards more 
beneficial outcomes for humans and other species. However, as demonstrated in the preceding 
chapter, this deeply problematic post-political approach evades questions of what kind of 
future we might be heading for and who gets to decide. In contrast, it is argued here that the 
Anthropocene is more interesting for what it tells us about the past than the glimpse of a high-
tech utopian future offered by some of its advocates. It can be seen as an opportunity to 
develop an understanding of how socio-natural relations have developed through time and 
address the causes and consequences of what appear to be abrupt shifts in these relations at 
different points in human history.   
The Anthropocene raises several questions relevant to the subject of this thesis. Firstly, there is 
the question of the type of knowledge needed to make sense of the new epoch. For some, it 
cannot be adequately understood without insights from the social and natural sciences; there is 
a need for an integrated approach to analyse changes within human societies and the way in 
which humans adapt their external environments. Therefore, new collaborations across the 
disciplinary divide generally placed between the social and natural sciences are needed (a point 
made in Castree, 2015). Secondly, the concept of a human-created epoch gives a new urgency 
to long-standing debates about the status of “nature” and particularly the extent to which 
nature can or should be considered as separate from human societies. Thirdly, and related to 
the second point, the debates about the Anthropocene rest on differing interpretations of 
human and non-human agency. For some, humans seem to possess an unprecedented power to 
control what happens to the biosphere. However, this is not the only interpretation.  
This chapter has contrasted the response to the Anthropocene from Andreas Malm and Jamie 
Lorimer, representative of ecological Marxism and of the new/vital materialist tradition in 
geography. Malm is dismissive of the term Anthropocene and pursues an approach that 
foregrounds conscious human agency and particularly class struggle. However, Lorimer, 
although recognising the problems with some accounts of the Anthropocene, nevertheless 
finds the term useful, particularly as it signals the “public death” of nature as removed from 
human society (see Lorimer, 2012). Lorimer has brought together a particular interpretation of 
the Anthropocene with vital materialist thinking. The two ideas might seem counterposed, the 





geological force, while the latter body of work seeks to extend agency to make it a 
consequence of networks of actants rather than the sole property of human agents. However, 
for Lorimer, the two can be brought together for those willing to adopt a multinatural 
approach, understanding the Anthropocene as arising from both human and non-human agency 
and resulting in an unpredictable world of hybrid spaces and things (Lorimer, 2015). In this 
way, work such as Lorimer’s offers a counter to human exceptionalism, with its associated 
post-political emphasis on using technology to guide the way to a more sustainable future. 
Conversely, Malm, by singling out what is unique about intentional human agency and 
referring to the rest of nature as inert matter tends to buttress these exceptionalist ideas.  
In summary, although some Marxists have written on the Anthropocene, it is new/vital 
materialists who seem to have more fully addressed the theoretical consequences of the new 
epoch. The dominance of such approaches in geographical discussions of the Anthropocene 
may reflect the relative popularity of new materialist approaches among environmental 
geographers generally. However, as recounted in this chapter, there are several criticisms that 
can be made of new materialist thought, particularly the tendency of these theories to 
downplay causation and power relations and to overlook the processes through which 
networks of actants come into being.  
Although many within the new materialist fold explicitly oppose their approaches to Marxist 
accounts of socio-natural systems, as explained here there are more similarities between the 
two ways of thinking than is sometimes assumed, particularly as both are part of a shift 
towards relationality. The argument made by some that dialectics relies on a binary logic has 
been effectively refuted. But the other criticism—that ecological Marxism plays down non-
human agency and materiality—poses more of a challenge to Marxist discussions of nature. 
Some argue that historical materialism, as it centres on an analysis of production under 
capitalism, is anthropocentric, privileging relations between humans and relegating non-human 
actors such as animals to the background (Braun, 2009). Therefore there is an ongoing debate 
between followers of Marxist approaches, who politicise and historicise environmental change 
but sometimes have little to say about non-human agency (or are even actively opposed to 
accounting for it), and new/vital materialists, who are centrally concerned with non-human 
agency but (as they recognise themselves) underemphasise the political dimension of 
environmental questions.  
After a brief methodological chapter, chapter five will speak to both sides of this debate by 
addressing the contribution of the dialectical biologists. It is argued here that, far from 
rejecting issues of materiality and non-human agency, these are actually major concerns within 
the work of this particular group of Marxist thinkers. Therefore, it is useful to engage with the 
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way in which biologists have developed an understanding of dialectics within their own 









Chapter 4: How to study scientists? 
This thesis is a largely theoretical work. However, I have also made use of interviews with key 
informants in order to triangulate the information gained by reading articles these biologists 
have written about their thinking. As Richards (1996, p199-200) points out, information about 
a person’s beliefs and ideologies, their subjective analysis “can rarely be gleaned from 
examining books, documents or records”. Arksey and Knight (1999) add that this type of 
methodological triangulation can be useful as a way of ensuring that an understanding gained 
from another method such as by reading what the person has written is valid (confirmation) 
and that it can lead to insights that, in this case, could not be gained just by reading their work 
(completeness). Triangulation is a method of looking at the same subject from different angles. 
So that the interview responses can be related to written work by the same person, the 
participants in the study are mostly identifiable by name in the final thesis (subject to their 
informed consent).  
Existing studies of scientists and their ideas are often based on either ethnographic or 
interview-based research. Ethnographies, spending extended periods of time accompanying 
and observing scientists, have perhaps been most useful when studying their everyday 
practices and how these relate to the way they “construct” scientific knowledge. Examples of 
this approach include Latour and Woolgar’s (1979) classic Laboratory Life and more recent 
work such as that of Eva Hayward (2010), who worked alongside a PhD marine biology 
student as a lab assistant. Hayward developed a theory of human-animal interactions similar to 
Donna Haraway’s work in When Species Meet (2008) and based on her own experiences of 
handling the animals as well as conversations with her biologist colleague.  
However, reading scientific papers and carrying out interviews is still a common way to 
research scientists, particularly when it is their ideas that are of primary interest rather than 
their everyday practices. For example, the various extended interviews collected together as 
part of the British Library's Oral History of British Science project chronicle the life stories of 
well-known scientists in various fields (http://sounds.bl.uk/Oral-history/Science). Simon Reid-
Henry's research on the Cuban biotechnology industry, although originally intended to be 
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“ethnographic” was, in reality, primarily based on studying archival material and interviewing 
key informants. Reid-Henry adds that attending conferences was a useful way of getting an 
impression of the social relations under which such research was being carried out (Reid-
Henry, 2003). Lastly, Rachel Mason-Dentinger's PhD research on the history of the theory of 
co-evolution within biology involved oral history interviews with five named biologists who 
were instrumental in the development of the idea as well as archival research (Mason-
Dentinger, 2009 and personal communication 20 February 2014).   
Marxist biologists work on a diverse range of subjects including developmental biology, 
genetics, neuroscience, evolution and ecology. This suggested that an extensive approach 
involving speaking to several different people would be more appropriate to my own research 
than an intensive ethnographic study of one particular scientist or laboratory. The focus of the 
interview research on scientists’ approach to, and understanding of, their work means that a 
qualitative approach proved more appropriate than one based on quantitative methods such as 
a multiple-choice survey. As a part-time student, constraints on my time and budget also made 
it difficult to visit a field site for a single continuous period of time although it did have the 
advantage of giving me a comparatively long overall time period in which to identify and 
contact suitable interview respondents. 
 
4.1: Finding the sample 
The interview participants in chapter five are ten biologists who use the word “dialectical” to 
refer to their work. Many of them were associated with the group Science for the People 
(SftP). Four were recruited by contacting participants in the 2014 Science for the People 
conference (which I attended). Additionally, Richard Lewontin was a key informant in this 
research as one of the co-authors of the 1985 book The Dialectical Biologist. Other interview 
participants were contacted either by asking for volunteers on the SftP email list, because they 
had contributed to edited book collections on dialectical biology, or by recommendation from 
other interviewees. Interviews were carried out in person or by Skype or phone where it wasn’t 
possible to meet up and audio recorded. Early in the project I also spoke informally to Richard 
Levins, Steven and Hilary Rose and to Oxford based Marxist biologist John Parrington.  
It became clear that Levins and Lewontin’s work is a significant influence on a particular 
group of scientists and that most of the interview participants had worked with one or both of 
them; the participants therefore represent a distinct tradition who refer to dialectical thought 
and are closely associated with these two influential individuals. One exception to this was an 
interview participant who was not sympathetic to the Levins/Lewontin project but who refers 





argument that there is a “visible college of Marxist scientists in the USA” as well as a more 
general culture of science criticism (2010, p241) although those explicitly advocating a 
Marxist approach are, of course, a minority among biologists in general.37  
Many of the participants in this research had been members of Science for the People (SftP), a 
left-wing and anti-imperialist organisation that campaigned on various political issues related 
to ideas within science and to its uses. SftP was active between 1969 and the mid-1980s. 
Former members use an email forum to keep in touch and were reunited at a three-day 
conference in 2014: “Science for the People: The 1970s and Today” organised by Sigrid 
Schmalzer and colleagues at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. I attended this 
conference and in writing this chapter I am indebted to the organisers for hosting it and for the 
resources collected at the conference website (http://science-for-the-people.org/) and in the 
associated book (Schmalzer, Chard and Botelho, 2018). There are also efforts by the 
University of California, Berkeley to archive and make available copies of a bimonthly 
magazine produced by SftP. Although I didn’t systematically utilise the magazine archives in 
this thesis they could provide material for future research.  
Some biologists, while not seeing themselves as dialectical thinkers or part of the same radical 
milieu, have incorporated the ideas of these thinkers into their own work. In particular, 
research in niche construction biology is strongly influenced by Lewontin’s work (see chapter 
six). I interviewed a further two leading figures in this area of biology in order to find out more 
about their philosophical approach and influences. In addition to this, a group of six 
environmental social scientists (broadly defined here as political ecologists) were recruited on 
the basis that they had referred to the dialectical biologists in their work and had been 
particularly prominent in debates around the influence of dialectical biology in the social 
sciences. On contentious issues such as the debates between advocates of world-ecology 
approaches and metabolic rift theories I made efforts to speak to representatives of both sides.  
In several cases I used snowball sampling—asking each respondent to suggest other people 
that it might be worth contacting—as a method of identifying further suitable respondents. 
Snowball sampling is associated with hard-to-reach groups of respondents. However, it has 
come to be used quite widely in social research (Biernacki and Waldorf, 1981). One advantage 
of this approach is that it allows for an understanding of the dynamics of a social network, for 
example in this case it could mean that participants refer to each other’s work and discuss any 
similarities or differences in interpretation. A referral by someone known to a respondent can 
also help to gain the new respondent’s trust. However, the snowball method has been criticised 
                                                          
37 The term “visible college” is a reference to Werskey’s classic (1988) study of left-wing British 
scientists of the 1930s.  
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as interview participants might (whether intentionally or not) lead the researcher towards 
others who share their own view and therefore exclude those with differing views. This could 
lead to partiality if a small group who personally know each other are interviewed and others 
left out. I minimised this risk by ensuring that I found at least some of the respondents—
starting new chains of contacts—by other means such as by searching the literature (Biernacki 
and Waldorf, 1981, p149). However, as the group of scientists studied here are quite a small 
group with a shared interest who make their own attempts to contact one another (by 
organising conferences and email forums) it seems almost inevitable that many of them will 
know one another personally or at least be aware of one another’s work.  
 
4.2: Carrying out interviews and interpreting the results 
I used semi-structured interviews with suitable probes during the interview in order to 
encourage the respondent to elaborate on points of particular interest and to explain further any 
areas requiring clarification (Arksey and Knight, 1999). It was also useful to listen to each 
interview after carrying it out and reflect both during and after the interview on whether the 
interview had adequately achieved its goal (see Keats, 2000, pp50-51). 
Some of the intended study participants, both the biologists and the political ecologists, are 
well known and influential in their fields. Therefore, the literature on “elite” interviewing, 
where the power balance is tipped in favour of the interviewee rather than the interviewer, 
proved particularly useful (Richards, 1996; Dexter, 2006 [1970]). There is no definitive answer 
to the question of what makes someone an “elite” and the term is more often used to refer to 
political elites. However, various characteristics of the people interviewed here put them in the 
elite category: having been interviewed before (although by researchers with different agendas 
to my own); respect and recognition within their own professional circles; being well 
informed—including having some knowledge of the social sciences and therefore 
understanding of my research aims—and being themselves academics familiar with the norms 
of academic research. In elite interviewing the researcher must be open to the idea that the 
interviewee may wish to control the interview in order to put across their particular viewpoint. 
Therefore, in the interviews I found it useful to have a clear idea in advance of the most 
important questions to ask and to make sure to ask those while allowing the conversation to 
stray from the topic to some extent in order to build rapport. As various textbooks on social 
science methodology make clear, it is not possible to replicate interviews exactly with different 
respondents: “the contradiction between the need for ‘rapport’ and the requirement of 
between-interview comparability cannot be solved” (Oakley, 2003, p255). Dexter (2006) also 
advises that it can be counterproductive to attempt to carry out interviews from a position of 





participants with some common understandings, rather than adopting the position of a sceptical 
or critical commentator.  
Richards (1996) advises that it is very important to gain a thorough knowledge of the subject 
area in general and the particular individual’s background before attempting to carry out an 
“elite” interview; advice that I took on board. A question that might make sense to an ecologist 
would be less immediately relevant to a developmental biologist. Therefore, the questions 
needed to be specific to the participants’ own individual research interests. The range of 
research interests also meant that I needed to gain a reasonable level of understanding of the 
participants’ work in order to have a meaningful discussion of their ideas. This was helped by 
my own background in biology but meant that it was beyond the scope of the project to 
interview practitioners of other areas of science such as physics or mathematics in the required 
detail.  
The interviews allowed for an in depth understanding of the context in which the scientists 
developed their ideas, for example, how their approach to their subject relates to that of their 
peers, whether and in what ways they see Marxist or dialectical approaches as distinctive and 
what influenced them in taking such an approach. As some of the participants have had long 
careers, it was also an opportunity to discuss the extent to which they feel their work has 
continued to be influential. Many of the scientists spoken to here have taken a considerable 
interest in the philosophy of biology (for example, one respondent with whom I discussed his 
early work in biology would probably now consider himself a sociologist of science). 
Therefore, they often had lots to say about the wider social implications of their work and it 
was possible to speak to them in an atmosphere of mutual understanding about these ideas.  
Interpreting and presenting qualitative interview data offers its own challenges that in some 
ways go beyond those of interpreting quantitative data using statistical methods (Arksey and 
Knight, 1999). In this case the interviews were transcribed, coded and arranged by theme into 
comments about reductionism or complexity, dynamism/change and materiality, themes that 
emerged from the interviews as well as regularly appearing in their written work.  
This research was approved by the relevant research ethics panel (GSSHM reference: 
REP/13/14-13) initially for three years from the 4 February 2014 to 4 February 2017. The 
approval period was extended for a further year from 13 March 2017 to 13 March 2018. The 
research was carried out according to the British Sociological Association’s guidelines for 
ethical practice (www.britsoc.co.uk/about/equality/statement-of-ethical-practice.aspx) and the 
departmental risk assessment procedure.  
  






Chapter 5: Making and practising a dialectical biology  
This chapter asks what it means to practise dialectical biology—in other words what difference 
a Marxist philosophical influence can make to a biologist’s core assumptions. It is based on 
interviews with ten biologists carried out between 2014 and 2017, many of them members of 
Science for the People (SftP) as well as their written outputs and other supplementary sources 
such as published interviews carried out by others and video recordings of conference 
presentations.  
But before expanding on the ideas common to the biologists interviewed, this chapter begins 
by situating the 1970s and 1980s generation of radical scientists in the context of debates about 
left-wing politics and science dating back to Marx and Engels’ own engagement with the 
natural sciences in the 19th century and encompassing the experiments in “proletarian” science 
in the Soviet Union in the 1930s (see chapter two). SftP developed an approach to the role of 
ideology in scientific practice distinct from that of previous generations. The chapter continues 
by exploring the key contributions of the dialectical biologists, with particular emphasis on the 
themes of reductionism/complexity, dynamism and materiality, themes that emerged during 
the course of the interviews as well as being prominent in their written output. As Kircz (1998) 
points out, Marxian social scientists and historians have tended to focus on issues such as the 
role of science and the context in which scientific practice takes place. Relatively little 
attention has been paid to what Marxism might contribute to the content of scientific 
knowledge. This chapter therefore interrogates what might be described as debates “internal” 
to science, although, as discussed below, it makes little sense to strictly separate what is 
internal and what is external to scientific practice.  
The existence of self-identified dialectical biologists demonstrates that biology is far from 
unified; in fact, as will be explained, there is an ongoing and sometimes fractious debate 
between evolutionary biologists who propose a major rethink and those who feel that 
evolutionary theory is essentially fine as it is (see Laland et al, 2014). If social scientists are to 
make reference to ideas in biology (as many say we should) we should remain aware that 





By focusing on dissident and sometimes controversial scientists, which are relatively under-
researched, this chapter adds to our knowledge of this diversity. Scientists are not thought of 
here as having privileged and unmediated access to the truth. Their understanding is structured 
by metaphor (and those metaphors are themselves debated) and in this case they are often 
openly influenced by their political ideologies.  
Many of the thinkers discussed in the previous chapters of this thesis have asserted that science 
is “political”. Both Erik Swyngedouw (2015) and Jamie Lorimer (2015) have stated this and 
both have argued, in different ways, that social scientists cannot treat ideas from the natural 
sciences as the ground on which to build theory; scientific knowledge itself is open to 
examination and critique. However, the implications of a political science are not always 
themselves fully interrogated. As this chapter will show, for some radical scientists, although 
science is not seen as neutral, they are nevertheless able to hold the apparently contradictory 
view that science is different from other forms of enterprise in that it does find out truths about 
the world. 
 
5.1: Science for the People  
Described by Schmalzer and others as the “most important radical science movement in US 
history” (Schmalzer, Chard and Botelho, 2018), Science for the People was a movement of 
scientists and activists initiated in the United States in 1969 (Moore, 2013). The organisation 
was sympathetic to various causes on the radical left; as Katherine Yih recalls: “it was very 
much part of the larger social movement”, the “New Left” of the late 1960s and 1970s (Yih, 
2014). Members worked with trade unions particularly around workers’ health issues, 
developed science teaching programmes for inner city schools, were involved in the women’s 
movement, opposed racism and police violence and took part in solidarity campaigns for Cuba, 
Vietnam and Nicaragua. In 1973 ten of its members visited China to observe what they saw as 
the development of a non-elitist approach to science (Greeley and Tafler, 1980, p374). SftP 
published a bimonthly magazine, also called Science for the People (Moore, 2013).  
By 1970, SftP had established around 10 chapters (Moore, 2013) and by 1975 was able to list 
29 chapters in the US alone on the back page of its magazine (Science for the People, 1975, 
p39). There was a related organisation in Canada and, in Britain, the British Society for Social 
Responsibility in Science was also established in 1969 (Rose and Rose, 1972, p123; Castree, 
2017, p64). A French collective of socialist scientists and journal, Impascience, emerged from 
the student movements of 1968, and there were groups of radical scientists in Italy, Australia, 
Ireland and at the Max Planck Institute in West Germany (Rose and Rose, 1979, p320; Science 
for the People, 1975, p39).  
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In the US, SftP had a decentralised structure with its chapters operating somewhat 
independently of the national organisation and with decisions largely being made by 
consensus, although there were attempts to hold regional and national conferences (Greeley 
and Tafler, 1980, p377). Although the membership seems to have agreed on a broad set of 
principles at least in its early years, different groups were free to engage in different campaigns 
depending on the expertise of members and what was judged most relevant in their locality.   
SftP attended major scientific conferences, often using demonstrations and political theatre, 
distributing leaflets and sometimes publicly confronting individual scientists they disagreed 
with and disrupting conference sessions. According to physicist Herb Fox, a prominent 
member, they “decided to make a lot of noise and disrupt things” (Fox, 2014). On one 
occasion blood was spilled; SftP member Frank Rosenthal was stabbed with a knitting needle 
by the liberal biologist Garrett Hardin’s wife Jane for refusing to stop heckling a conference 
speaker, an attack from which he still has a scar (Moore, 2013, p166). Some of SftP’s 
members attracted the attentions of the FBI and one early supporter, mathematician Chandler 
Davis, was called before the House Un-American Activities Committee in 1954 after his name 
was found on a cheque used to pay a printing company for leaflets. Davis was fired from his 
job at the University of Michigan and blacklisted, forcing him to move to Canada to seek work 
(see Woodhouse, 2011).  
 
5.1.1: The myth of the neutrality of science 
From the start, the very existence of a highly politicised group of science activists called into 
question the common sense assumption that the natural sciences are “neutral”. The 
organisation grew out of the anti-Vietnam War movement and SESPA (Scientists and 
Engineers for Social and Political Action) which had campaigned to try to get the American 
Physical Society, the professional organisation for physicists, to make statements of members’ 
views on political issues, in particular to take a stance against the war (Rose and Rose, 1972, 
p120).  
A related campaign begun in 1971 by SftP against the Jason Program also brought into 
perspective questions of the supposed neutrality of scientists. The Jason Program, ultimately 
funded by the US Department of Defense, offered physicists substantial funding to carry out 
research of military significance while still having opportunities to pursue their academic 
research. Liberal Jason scientists defended their roles in the programme by arguing that they 
were doing “good” science, in other words providing accurate and testable information about 





that it would be better for the Department of Defense to have access to accurate physical 
information rather than “bad” or inaccurate information.  
This position reflects a general assumption that science is in itself neutral or even progressive 
and problems arise when that knowledge is abused—in other words that the uses of science are 
distinct from its content. It is also argued that the response of some of the Jason scientists 
reflected the individualism of scientific practice in a capitalist society, the appropriate role of 
the scientist became an issue of individual moral responsibility rather than scientists 
recognising and seeking to transform the social structures within which their work is carried 
out (Rose and Rose, 1972, pp106 and 128). By contrast, for the activists in SftP/SESPA, there 
could be no “good” science that aided the military. Not taking a position against militarism 
during the Vietnam War was not a neutral act but implied accepting the existence of the 
imperialist capitalist system in which science is practised. For Hilary Rose, the experience of 
confronting the militarisation of science meant that the attitude of science activists after the 
1960s differed significantly from the Marxist orthodoxy of the previous generation which, as 
mentioned in chapter two, had tended to assume that science was neutral and had only to be 
utilised in a more socially just society (Rose, 2004 [1983], p69).   
The radical scientists of the 1960s and 1970s have argued that the very idea of science as 
objective can benefit people who don’t want society to change. Science can naturalise society 
in its present state, giving the impression there is an underlying objectivity to the status quo, 
most perniciously when science adopts some of the assumptions of society and reflects them 
back at us while telling us they are objective facts (see Muñoz-Rubio, 1999). Therefore, SftP 
members were critical of the idea that scientists should abstain from political matters. 
Lewontin argues that the social role of science and its practice cannot be separated out: “It is 
time to stop saying that science stands outside of society. Science is a social activity just like 
being a policeman, a factory worker or a politician” (Lewontin, 1970, quoted in Moore and 
Hala, 2002). 
As this quote from Lewontin suggests, another way to challenge the assumption of scientific 
neutrality is to question the perception that the social and natural sciences are inherently 
different. Levins and Lewontin emphasise that they see dialectics as a method applicable to 
both “social” and “natural” sciences because there are fewer differences between the 
disciplines than has been assumed. They refute the stereotype of a social scientist who is 
engaged in their object of study as opposed to the purely objective natural scientist (Levins and 
Lewontin, 1998). But, furthermore, from a non-dualist point of view, the similarities between 
the social and natural sciences can also come about due to the underlying similarities within 
the subject matter of both. For example, Levins and Lewontin criticise the assumption that the 
natural sciences deal with deterministic systems that are essentially reducible to mathematical 
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equations. Like the social sciences, biology must also account for complexity and 
contradiction (Levins and Lewontin, 1998).  
 
5.1.2: Of the people or for the people? 
In the late 1960s the Black Panther Party (BPP) had set up a network of free clinics to provide 
healthcare to those who could not otherwise afford it (as well as initiating the better-known 
Free Breakfast for School Children Program). Science for the People members saw this as an 
opportunity to try to democratise access to scientific knowledge. They set up the Technical 
Assistance Program (TAP) with the aim of providing support for the BPP and some acted as 
volunteer doctors (Zimmerman et al, 2018 [1972]). Fox helped set up an electricity generator 
to support one of the community medical projects—when the generator proved too noisy, he 
recalls going out in the middle of the night and covertly hooking wires up to the city power 
supply (Fox, 2014). Biologists Richard Lewontin and Richard Levins also refer to their 
association with and sympathy for the Panthers. As they recall in one of their books on 
biology: “On the day that Chicago police murdered Black Panther leader Fred Hampton, we 
went together to his still bloody bedroom and saw the books on his night table: he was killed 
because of his thoughtful, inquiring militancy. Our activism is a constant reminder of the need 
to relate theory to real-world problems as well as the importance of theoretical critique” 
(Levins and Lewontin, 2007, p10).  
As SftP grew, its members often found themselves working on a range of projects including 
those with manual workers and trade unions, black and Latino/a Americans and people in the 
Global South. It would be possible to treat the scientists as a privileged layer separate from 
“the people”. As scientists they often possessed not only relative wealth but also substantial 
expertise and found themselves using that expertise to help others—in other words, doing 
science for the people rather than engaging the public in a science of or by “the people”. This is 
an issue that Greeley and Tafler (1980), reflecting on the organisation’s first ten years, were 
keenly aware of and that was also brought up at the 2014 conference. Several of SftP’s 
members were themselves from working class backgrounds and the group involved some 
students, teachers and industrial scientists as well as academics. However, it remained a 
predominantly professional (and mostly white) organisation. Greeley and Tafler also mention 
that women members “had to struggle to be heard” on the issue of sexism and that some left 
the organisation as a result (1980, p380). However, they add that progress had been made to 
address this and the Science for the People magazine did regularly address issues of women’s 
liberation including the marginalisation of women in scientific professions (see Rose, 2004 
[1983] for a useful discussion of women in science and of the limitations of groups like SftP in 





Kelly Moore (2013, chapter 6), following Brian Martin, refers to four possible ways of doing 
citizen centred science: 
1. Science for the people with research agendas set by industry or government. 
2. Science for the people but where agendas are set by knowledge of wider social needs. 
3. Science by the people where citizens actively participate in scientific research. 
4. “Science shaped by a citizen-created world” where society is organised so that citizens 
determine all productive activity.  
Moore says that SftP tended to practise science for the people of the second type. Although its 
members were responding to real societal needs, there was still something of a separation 
between them and “the people”. For that reason TAP, referred to above, was ultimately short-
lived. It resulted in scientists doing work on behalf of community organisations rather than 
providing them with the expertise to help themselves, its original aim (Greeley and Tafler, 
1980, p372).  
The original SftP became much less active after the mid-1980s but since 2014 there have been 
efforts to revive it. As scientists and their supporters demonstrated against Donald Trump’s 
policies on 22 April 2017, several of the group’s members (from the original organisation and 
the revitalisation effort) took part in the protests (Mervis, 2017). And a public launch event for 
a new magazine and documentary film took place in New York in July 2018.  
Members of the group came from a range of disciplinary backgrounds. However, this thesis is 
concerned in particular with biology and especially with the work of Richard Levins and 
Richard Lewontin. In 1985 the pair published a popular and influential collection of essays: 
The Dialectical Biologist. The book was dedicated to Engels: “who got it wrong a lot of the 
time but who got it right where it counted” (Levins and Lewontin, 1985). As political 
economist Paul Burkett notes, they are two of the most prominent scientists to say that they 
were doing science in an explicitly historical materialist way (Burkett, 2013). They are the 
thinkers who have most clearly and consistently articulated a dialectical view of biology. 
Levins and Lewontin both became professors at Harvard University, working on population 
biology and evolutionary theory respectively, and combined their distinguished academic 
careers with active involvement in SftP. Between them they have a wide range of interests. 
Within their book one can find criticisms of some of the statistical methods used in biology, 
their thoughts on human nature and accounts of their work on agriculture in the Global South 
(especially Cuba). Lewontin in particular has been associated with a critique of the notion of 
biological race, pointing out that there is greater genetic diversity within supposed races in 
humans than there is between people from different racial backgrounds, a critique that 
addresses head-on the issue of the supposed neutrality of scientific knowledge as it exposes the 
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racial assumptions of some of Lewontin’s contemporaries (see Lewontin, 1995). Levins and 
Lewontin’s ideas have proved influential among biologists in the US and elsewhere with, for 
example, the emergence of the theory of niche construction, most closely associated with 
Richard Lewontin. As discussed in chapter five, various social scientists including Ted Benton, 
Paul Burkett, Brett Clark, John Bellamy Foster, Maria Kaika, Giorgos Kallis, David Harvey, 
Hannah Holleman, Jason Moore, Erik Swyngedouw, Michael Watts and Richard York have 
also cited their work.  
Levins and Lewontin are not the only biologists associated with SftP. Stephen Jay Gould was, 
as well as being a notable palaeontologist and a famous populariser of science, active in SftP 
and involved in protests against the Vietnam War (according to Levins and Lewontin who 
worked closely with him, Levins and Lewontin, 2002).38 Gould argued that “dialectical 
thinking should be taken more seriously by Western scholars, not discarded because [the 
Soviet Union] have constructed a cardboard version as an official doctrine” (quoted in Gasper, 
2002) and pointed out that dialectics attempts to overcome the limitations of both reductionism 
and holism (see also Holleman, 2015), precisely the limitations that biology seemed to be 
running up against.  
Other biologists who were members of, or otherwise associated with, SftP include geneticist 
Jon Beckwith, Anne Fausto-Sterling, who specialises in gender and gender identity, Jonathan 
King, who researches the biology of protein structure, ecologists Doug Boucher and Margaret 
Reeves, epidemiologist Katherine Yih, neuroscientist Martha Herbert, Ivette Perfecto and John 
Vandermeer, both agro-ecologists, and biological anthropologist Alan Goodman. David 
Schwartzman, these days more likely to be found advocating a rapid global transition to solar 
power, was also an SftP member and professor emeritus in biology at Howard University 
(Schwartzman, 2015). In Britain the neuroscientist Steven Rose is one of the best-known 
advocates of a Marxian method in biology. With Hilary Rose, he has also co-written several 
articles on the politics and sociology of science. The “dialectics of biology” conference in 
Bressanone, Italy in 1982 brought together biologists interested in these ideas and resulted in 
the publication of two volumes of articles: Against Biological Determinism (Rose, 1982a) and 
Towards a Liberatory Biology (Rose, 1982b) both edited by Steven Rose. 
 
                                                          
38 As well as writing critiques of scientific racism, Gould was an anti-racist activist. As an 
undergraduate student in the 1960s he organised protests against a Bradford dance hall that operated a 





5.1.3: Breaking with Lysenko 
Science for the People are often mentioned in the same breath as earlier radical science 
movements including the generation of left-wing scientists of the 1930s described in chapter 
two. For example, Noel Castree includes a brief section on political scientists of the past to 
assess the prospects for a more politicised geoscience today (Castree, 2017, p64). Castree 
refers to the visible college of the 1930s and to scientists in both Britain and the US in the late 
1960s and 1970s (the experience of the Russian Revolution is not mentioned). However, 
American scientists in the 1970s were operating in a very different context from that of their 
predecessors. The following section therefore discusses the important but subtle and somewhat 
overlooked differences between the generations.  
At first glance, there are indeed some similarities between the ideas of the 1970s generation 
and those of earlier Marxist thinkers. The resemblance between Levins and Lewontin’s ideas 
on the relationship between organism and environment and the earlier insights of Christopher 
Caudwell mentioned in chapter two is one example of a striking similarity between the 
thinking of the 1930s and 1970s generations. Figures from the 1930s like Haldane and Bernal 
undoubtedly influenced SftP’s thinking (Levins and Lewontin, 2002; Schmalzer, Chard and 
Botelho, 2018, pp13-15).39  
However, as Schmalzer and others point out (2018, pp14-15), by the late 20th century, the use 
of nuclear weapons in war had eroded the assumption on the left that science was a force for 
good that had merely to be harnessed towards creating a better society and the Soviet Union 
was no longer a key point of reference. As part of the post-war New Left, biologists 
interviewed for this thesis were more likely to cite contemporary political struggles such as 
opposition to the Vietnam War, solidarity with Nicaragua or civil rights in the US as formative 
influences than the ideas of the 1930s left. Perhaps more fundamentally, scientists involved in 
SftP were less interested in dispensing with bourgeois science and developing an all-
encompassing “proletarian science” in its place than those of earlier generations. We can 
address the differences between Levins and Lewontin’s generation and that of their 
predecessors by looking at how these authors themselves responded to the proletarian science 
debate. Fortunately for this purpose Levins and Lewontin included their thoughts on 
Lysenkoism as a chapter in The Dialectical Biologist (partly intended for their own “self-
clarification”—Levins and Lewontin, 1985, p166).  
There are two inadequate ways to respond to Lysenkoism—Levins and Lewontin reject both of 
them. Firstly, many commentators have described the issue as if it was simply a case of 
                                                          
39 Richard Lewontin also met Haldane, who lived until 1964, and Haldane associated with Lewontin’s 
doctoral supervisor Theodosius Dobzhansky so there were personal connections between the two 
generations (Dronamraju, 2017). 
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“ideology” distorting science. For example, science writer Mark Pilkington concludes that: 
“The Lysenko story serves as a powerful warning against the collusion of ideology and 
science, a threat that is very much with us today” (Pilkington, 2003). Similarly, one writer in 
Nature strongly condemns “political intervention” in science, adding that the Lysenko episode: 
“ought to be seen as an example of the devastating consequences that ideology and excessive 
political involvement can have on science” (Soyfer, 2001, p724). This view treats science as if 
it is in itself neutral and assumes it would develop according to its own internal logic if its 
course wasn’t swayed by external factors such as the actions of malicious politicians. It 
implicitly rests on the assumption that there is a neutral vantage point from which science 
produces a picture of a natural world that is “out there”, although the quality of that picture 
might sometimes be distorted by ideology (Erickson, 2016, p87).  
Clearly, given the politics of SftP, an interpretation that treats ideology as simply an 
obstruction to an otherwise neutral body of scientific thought would be inadequate. For Levins 
and Lewontin, viewing the rise of Lysenkoism as simply as a result of political interference is 
not a sufficiently materialist approach to history. It is a reflection of a liberal tendency to see 
historical change as resulting from the actions of individuals. Writing on the Lysenko issue, 
they contend that it is not possible to practise science without having an ideology, stating: 
“we…cannot accept the view that philosophy must (or can) be excluded from science” (Levins 
and Lewontin, 1985, p165).  
Liberal critiques of Lysenkoism also tend to over-simplify the analysis of Stalinism itself. So, 
rather than developing an understanding of the direction in which scientific policy in the 
Soviet Union was heading and why its leaders embraced certain viewpoints and silenced 
others, it treats Stalinism as merely an irrational ideology. Clearly there were malicious 
individuals and abuses of power involved. But drawing attention to these is not sufficient to 
explain Lysenkoism. Louis Althusser, writing in 1977, makes this point in his introduction to 
Dominique Lecourt’s book Proletarian Science? The Case of Lysenko: it is not enough to 
dismiss Lysenkoism as merely a “personality cult” surrounding someone whose ideas suited 
Stalin’s despotism or to treat the “affair” as something that has since been “rectified”. Rather, 
there is a need for a material analysis of the social forces at work that had allowed Lysenko’s 
ideas to be embraced. For Althusser, Lysenko’s interpretation of dialectics was evidence of the 
way in which dialectical philosophy itself had been turned into an ontology of laws following 
the Soviet Union’s reading (or misreading) of Engels’ Dialectics of Nature. At the time of his 
writing, with the Soviet Union still in existence and its ideas influential on the left 
internationally, there was a pressing need to address this problematic interpretation of Marxist 
philosophy even after the more specific debates concerning biology and genetics were over 





The second inadequate response, associated with some scientists of the left at the time of 
Lysenko, was to make apologies for his views. Some commentators, although critical of 
Lysenko’s falsification of experimental results for example, neglected to consider whether 
there was a more fundamental problem with the interpretation of dialectical materialism 
pursued in the Soviet Union. As Rose and Rose (1972) point out, several British scientists 
were taken in by Lysenko’s claims. Although it may well be true for example, that 
vernalisation has some effect on wheat yields, pointing out that some of the ideas peripheral to 
Lysenkoism were correct misses the point. This kind of apologetics for Lysenkoism represents 
just as much a failure to fully interrogate the causes of the phenomena as the dismissive 
interpretation discussed above. It sidesteps the key issue of why the Soviet Union was so 
willing to ditch Mendelian genetics which was, and is, central to the modern synthesis in 
biology established by Haldane and others.  
Levins and Lewontin instead try to explain why Lysenko and his followers might have been 
suspicious of the mainstream genetics of their time. A major factor in his success was that he 
was able to associate “orthodox genetics” with “the racialist views of the Nazis” (Rose and 
Rose, 1972, p113). Eugenic ideologies, for example the view that “superior” humans might be 
bred from those people judged to be most intelligent, were common among geneticists in the 
West at the time and made Western biology an easy object of criticism for the Lysenkoists. 
Many Western scientists held deterministic views about the role of genes, suggesting that 
genes completely controlled an organism’s development with little role played by the 
environment. They subscribed to a strict causal separation between gene and environment, 
something Levins and Lewontin themselves call into question in their own work. They even 
suggest that these views of genetics would almost inevitably “invite” an anti-genetics backlash 
from Soviet scientists (Levins and Lewontin, 1985, p180). Levins points out that Lysenko was 
“dreadfully wrong, especially in trying to reach biological conclusions from philosophical 
principles”, but that rather than simply dismissing Lysenkoism “in Cold War fashion”, a more 
productive approach would be to “respond to his challenge by developing a deeper view of the 
organism-environment interaction” (Levins, 2007, p366). The following section therefore 
shows how Science for the People members have developed an approach to the contradictions 
inherent in practising Marxist science that distinguishes them from the left-wing scientists of 
previous generations before addressing some of their contributions to biological debates. 
 
5.2: Science as contradictory activity 
With the emergence of studies into the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) in the 1970s 
and 1980s (and Science and Technology Studies or STS more broadly), the view that science 
is a social activity has become more widely accepted. According to SSK, scientific knowledge 
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itself, as well as scientific practice, is open to sociological examination. However, it was 
radical scientists themselves who first made these claims; SSK owes a debt to social 
movements such as SftP and their investigation of the content of science as itself social as well 
as to earlier pioneers of this thinking such as the Russian scientist Boris Hessen, mentioned in 
chapter two (Graham, 1985): one reason to study the history of SftP “is its significance in the 
birth and development of STS… Members of SftP frequently drew from the analyses of STS 
scholars” (Schmalzer, Chard and Botelho, 2018, pp6-7). 
One of the propositions of SSK is the principle of symmetry: scientific ideas perceived to be 
true should be seen through the same sociological lens as those perceived to be false (Erickson, 
2016, pp86-87). A scientific discovery that later comes to be generally accepted as correct 
such as Oparin’s theory of the origin of life should be understood in its context—as the ideas 
of a scientist influenced by Marxism—just as Lysenko’s false ideas are attributed to his 
Marxist influence. As the historian Loren Graham says: “The tendency to explain an 
acknowledged calamity in science as a result of Marxist philosophy while assuming that a 
brilliant page in the history of biology has nothing to do with Marxism is a reflection, at least 
in part, of the biases and historical selectivity of anti-Marxist journalists and historians” 
(Graham, 1973, p258).  
So, if Levins and Lewontin are critical of crude attempts at a proletarian science, how do they 
propose to relate their work to that of what might be described as “mainstream” biologists? 
Should the insights of the latter be dismissed wholesale? Despite their critique of scientific 
claims to objectivity, it seems they would answer “no” to this question. Levins says that “the 
fact that all science is socially located does not by itself make it true or false” (Sur, 2008, p35).  
As mentioned earlier, Lewontin compares scientific work to other forms of work. Levins 
likewise talks about scientists as workers. But science is still seen as differing from other 
forms of human activity in that it is about trying to find out the truth: “We are workers in the 
knowledge industry. The products of our industry, the commodities, knowledge, ideas, theories 
and so on are sold, marketed and invested in. As a result of this, scientific labour is 
increasingly carried out by a working class of scientists… There are ways however, in which 
as workers we are different from other workers” (Levins, 2014). For Levins, scientific workers 
have a stake in the products of their labour in a way that many other workers do not. So, as 
well as defending their interests as workers, for example by demanding higher wages or 
opposing sexist attitudes in the lab, activist scientists are also concerned with contributing to 
“knowledge about the world” (Levins, 2014). 
The fact that science is owned sets its agenda. We started out in Science 





misuse and we thought that there was a correct way of using science and 
there’s a bad way that we have to purify the system from. That’s not the 
case… Our recognition that science is owned is one of the ways in which 
we not only have a different orientation towards scientific questions but 
also a more exciting one. I’ve found examples of people whose 
radicalisation came about through the critique of the content of the 
science, through recognising reductionism, through recognising the 
limitation of science, the narrowing of the agenda of science (Levins, 
2014). 
Therefore, dialectical biologists have avoided the relativism of some approaches to SSK 
whereby scientific claims are seen as painting equally valid pictures of nature (Erickson, 2016, 
p87). For example, Hilary and Steven Rose complain that what is sometimes referred to as the 
“strong programme” of SSK offers nothing to “distinguish true from false theories” (Rose and 
Rose, 1979, p324). Levins has also referred to the limitations of a kind of postmodern 
relativism that only goes as far as saying that everyone’s ideas come from a particular 
perspective without addressing why people hold different ideas (Sur, 2008) and Levins and 
Lewontin have jointly stated that they reject the “postmodern view” that denies the validity of 
knowledge (Levins and Lewontin, 2007, p9).  
At around the same time that Levins was addressing these issues, feminist standpoint theorists 
(including Hilary Rose) were developing their own approach to epistemology rooted in Marx’s 
method. Although there are many debates among standpoint theorists and criticisms to be 
made of much of their work, suffice it to say here that they argue that women’s life 
experiences are different from those of men and that this forms the basis of a distinct 
standpoint from which to observe social and natural relations. However, the emphasis is often 
on feminists’ differential ability to reveal the real social relations behind ideology rather than 
on philosophical relativism (Hartsock, 2004 [1983]). Rose argues for a feminist critique of 
science that acknowledges the role of capitalist and, in this case, “masculinist” ideology in 
producing scientific knowledge but is clearly against the “antipathy to science that rejects all 
scientific investigation” (Rose, 2004 [1983], p67). Rather, she calls for the building of a 
feminist science that fuses women’s subjective knowledge with objective knowledge (Rose, 
2004 [1983]).   
Similarly, in place of relativism Levins has put forward an alternative view of the relationship 
between science and ideology that expresses the contradictions inherent to scientific enquiry. 
He often states that: “all science is class science yet science also finds out real truths about the 
world” (Levins, 1981, see also Sur, 2008). Levins admits that this is a contradiction; if science 
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in a class society is inseparable from class interests, how can it also be true? But, importantly, 
Levins continues by arguing that “you don’t resolve contradictions…”: 
The resolution of the contradiction between science as the growth of 
human knowledge and science as ideology of oppression comes only with 
political revolution. The break from radical philosophy to Marxist 
dialectical materialism is the recognition that contradictions aren’t 
resolved by intellectual exercise. Rather, you recognise those 
contradictions, examine them, understand them, fight them, participate in 
them (Levins, 1981). 
For Levins, the truth of scientific claims and the non-objectivity of those claims could be held 
in tension with neither seen as more important or more worthy of attention. Yih adds that 
Levins’ “single contradictory proposition” informed and guided SftP as activists. They were 
critical of the dominant ideologies guiding science but also at the same time recognised the 
power of scientific knowledge, hence they wanted the tools available to scientists to be shared 
with humanity or “the people” (Yih, 2014).  
What does Levins’ approach to science’s contradictions mean for debates about scientific 
ideas? Most significantly, it means science becomes more than merely ideology (Sur, 2008). It 
isn’t only the purpose of science that radical scientists should take seriously (Levins calls such 
a position “a false view”), it is also the content of science that is open to examination or to 
challenge, this is Levins’ more exciting orientation towards scientific questions (Levins, 1981). 
In this Levins echoes Engels, who also, by discussing contemporary scientific questions in his 
Dialectics of Nature, advocated for the contribution of Marxist or dialectical ideas to debates 
within science as well as its uses.  
Levins’ use of contradiction here echoes the points made by David Barnett, referred to in 
chapter two in a discussion of post-Brechtian theatre. Like Levins, Barnett stresses that 
dialectics does not deal in resolution of contradictions and sees such an emphasis on 
commensurability as itself an aspect of bourgeois thought (Barnett, 2013). To return to the 
case study with which this thesis began, the case of forest conservation and the northern 
spotted owl, Levins’ contradictory approach to science hints at a way forward for thinking 
about environmental problems such as this. Perhaps, following his example, we should argue 
that the forests and the species that live in them are socially produced, but simultaneously, 
when considering real biological species, they should be understood as real material beings 
with their own attributes that cannot be understood purely with reference to the human. This 
provides a contradiction; but perhaps it is a real contradiction that should be held in tension 





Furthermore, in their collection of essays Biology Under the Influence (2007) Levins and 
Lewontin talk about the “dual nature” of science: “on the one hand, science is the generic 
development of human knowledge over the millennia, but on the other it is the increasingly 
commodified specific product of a capitalist knowledge industry” (Levins and Lewontin, 2007, 
p9). Out of this contradiction what has emerged is, in some ways, an impressive level of 
sophistication of biological knowledge. Modern biology, with programmes like the Human 
Genome Project, has produced an extraordinary amount of information about the living world. 
But at the same time, science in a capitalist society has developed with its own internal 
limitations causing it to reach an impasse (see Burkett, 2014, pp158-163). It has resulted in an 
approach to biological theory that sees the parts of a system rather than the whole, that see 
stasis rather than dynamism and that separates what should be connected. The reductionist 
tendency to separate processes that could be viewed as dialectically related puts obstacles in 
place of its ability to make sense of all this data. As will be explained in this chapter, the 
dialectical biologists have countered the predominant reductionist views in biology with their 
own contrasting approach, providing what Levins describes as a “counterweight” to the still 
prevalent reductionism (Levins, 2007, p367). 
 
5.3: Metaphors 
A further related theme that emerged from the interviews with scientists was that they often 
made use of metaphors. The use of metaphors and the ways in which different metaphors can 
conflict with each other further highlights how radical scientists are able to make realist 
statements while at the same time avoiding claims of objectivity or neutrality. Once seen as a 
rhetorical device for use in literature, the fundamental importance of metaphor to scientific 
thought is now much more clearly understood. Metaphors are indispensable for 
conceptualising ideas and communicating findings; allowing the unknown to be “seen through 
the lens of the known” (Nicholson, 2014, p162).  
Metaphors are so essential to science that David Harvey refers to them as “the primary means 
whereby the human imaginary gets mobilised to gain understandings of the natural and social 
worlds (Harvey, 2006, p163). As Harvey explains, the prolific use of metaphors by scientists 
makes it difficult to extract “socially untainted information” from the metaphor and shows how 
the choice of metaphors can often reveal something about the social position of the scientist. 
As an example, Charles Darwin uses the concept of a niche to suggest a division of labour 
among species where each has a distinct “role” to play in an ecosystem. Harvey (2016, pp159-
164) supposes that this reflects Darwin’s knowledge of the factory-based production of his 
time (his grandfather was the industrialist Josiah Wedgwood). As Harvey stresses, if ideas 
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about nature import ideas about society, this means that projects that try to use the natural 
sciences as the basis on which to argue for a particular type of society are misguided.  
Biological metaphors have often been superseded by newer metaphors when viewed as no 
longer appropriate. For example, neuroscientists have tended to focus their interest on neurons, 
the cells in the brain that transmit electrical signals. Glial cells, closely associated with the 
neurons, were considered to play a supporting role and were referred to in terms associated 
with traditionally female gender roles such as being described as “nursemaid” cells or 
“housekeepers”. When the importance of these cells in brain formation was recognised, they 
apparently lost their feminine characteristics, subsequently being described as the “architects 
of the brain” (Upchurch and Fojtová, 2009).  
Nicholson points to one metaphor that has played a particularly limiting role in biology; the 
notion, associated with Descartes, that organisms are like machines (Nicholson, 2014). Clearly 
a living organism is made up of parts that have evolved and therefore appear to be designed 
for a function, for example the mammalian heart pumps blood around the body through the 
arteries in a manner analogous to the way a mechanical pump circulates fuel through an 
engine. To some extent it is therefore useful to think of organisms as machines, for example 
when teaching basic anatomy to students. However, the machine concept also produces limits 
to understanding. Organisms are fundamentally different from machines in several ways. 
Importantly, living organisms do not serve the purpose of an external designer or engineer, 
they act on their own behalf and can be described as self-organising. Secondly, unlike in a 
machine where each part of the whole has its own distinct properties, the different parts of an 
organism cannot be considered as independent of the whole. Each part has developed within a 
whole organism and the parts rely on each other for their maintenance and renewal (Nicholson, 
2014). Likewise, the Marxist biologist Steven Rose, in a discussion of animal rights, rejects the 
Cartesian notion that non-human animals are like machines (for Descartes this was because 
other animals do not possess a soul). Rose sees the treatment of animals as mere objects to be 
exploited by human subjects as a form of reductionist thinking (Rose, 1992). As explained in 
chapter three, dialectics and new materialist thought are often contrasted. However, in 
questioning the machine metaphor, Rose pursues similar strategies to that of the new 
materialists by refusing to accept that the human body is inert until it is enlivened by an 
external impulse.  
This use of metaphor is common to both mainstream and dialectical approaches to biology. As 
with the machine metaphor above, metaphors can limit understanding as well as enabling it. 
And, according to the principle of symmetry described above, “good” metaphors should be 





5.4: Contributions from dialectical biology 
As the previous sections explain, the dialectical biology developed by the radical scientists of 
SftP and their followers should be understood in the context of an approach to scientific 
enquiry that recognises and accepts that science is itself contradictory. It aims to find truths 
about the world but at the same time those truths are not arrived at from a position outside of 
society. The remainder of this chapter will discuss some of the substantive contributions for 
which the dialectical biologists are best known.  
Many of the scientists interviewed here referred to “complexity”. However, it became clear 
while carrying out the interviews that there are distinct ways of understanding what a term like 
complexity means. It may refer to a property of the object of study. For example, an ecologist 
researching a particular ecosystem might say that there is a “complex” and interconnected web 
of species living there or that emergent properties of the system result from this complexity. 
However, they might also use this terminology to describe the way in which they work, for 
example by stating a preference for observing a particular species in situ rather than in the 
lab—not treating it as separate from its surroundings. They might say that they see the “bigger 
picture” that reductionist thinkers fail to see. The interview responses were therefore divided 
into statements about the object of study and those about the act or process of observation.  
This distinction between subjective and objective references reflects the ongoing debate about 
whether dialectics is an ontology—a statement about how the world is—or an epistemology—
a comment on how we might think about the world. As Castree points out, in some 
interpretations dialectics is assumed to mean that reality is seen as possessing certain 
dialectical properties, while in others it is viewed more as a method of research or as a way of 
representing reality (Castree, 1996). However, Castree also states that there cannot be “any 
clear separation between the two positions” (Castree, 1996, p345). And clearly the two 
understandings of complexity in the example above are internally related. The emphasis a 
biologist places on complexity in the way they choose to carry out their work might enable 
them to better understand those properties of the world they are studying.  
Furthermore, taking a non-dualist and dialectical position means rejecting any attempt to draw 
a clear distinction between an external “nature” and the humans observing it. As explained in 
the previous section, such distinctions—between what is internal to science and what is 
external; between its content and its social role—should themselves be called into question. 
And, in an Anthropocene epoch, where nature itself is continually being manipulated by 
human activity in multiple ways, it makes little sense to treat scientists as if they encounter 
nature from the outside. What is needed is an approach to the study of science that recognises 
the contradiction between the content of science and its social role or purpose. As Ollman also 
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argues, ontology and epistemology are themselves internally related in his dialectical approach 
(Ollman, 2014, p574).  
To further illustrate the point, Steven Rose gives an example of a single event, in this case a 
frog jumping into a lake, with multiple causes that cannot be separated out (Rose, 1997). A 
group of scientists observing a frog jumping might come to different conclusions about why 
the frog jumps. An ecologist might argue that it is reacting to the presence of a snake and its 
instincts tell it to escape (the ultimate cause) whereas a physiologist might say that the 
interaction between the actin and myosin filaments in its legs cause its muscles to contract 
resulting in a jumping action (the proximate cause). Clearly neither is wrong about why the 
frog jumps into the lake—but they are asking very different types of questions about the 
causes. Rose’s example suggests an approach whereby ontological and epistemological claims 
are themselves dialectically linked. Multiple causes of an event are assumed to be present in 
reality regardless of who observes the event. However, the specific causes that one finds 
interesting or chooses to focus on evidently have a lot to do with the identity of the observer. 
Harvey’s notion of dialectical methodology being about the same process looked at through 
different windows depending on who is observing seems a particularly apt way of interpreting 
the situation (Harvey, 1982, see also Castree, 1996).  
Levins and Lewontin refer to dynamic processes, complexity and “complex webs of reciprocal 
determination”. They contrast their view with one that looks for singular causes of a 
phenomenon and that “treats what is variable as if it were constant and even universal” (Levins 
and Lewontin, 2006, p333). In their 2006 “Program for Biology” they make three statements 
about their dialectical method, that “the truth is the whole”,40 that “everything is not relevant to 
everything else”, and that “history matters”. This remainder of the chapter outlines how these 
principles are expressed in the work of the biologists interviewed.  
 
5.4.1: The truth is the whole 
Criticisms of gene-centric thought in “mainstream” biology are common among the dialectical 
biologists. 41 For Levins the emphasis on the information coded in the genes in much of 
biological theory is symptomatic of science under capitalism in that it attempts to explain a 
                                                          
40 The phrase “the truth is the whole” comes from Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (see Callinicos, 
2010, p78). The statement was considered so important to Richard Levins’ worldview that it also 
provided the title of a conference in honour of his 85th birthday in Harvard in 2015. 
41 Conventional biology as described here is sometimes referred to by its critics as neo-Darwinism. 
However, there is a radical interpretation of Darwin’s own views as well as a conservative one so here I 
avoid reference to Darwin and refer to a modern synthesis or to mainstream biology in contrast to an 





world that is both dynamic and complex by reducing it to its most basic and stable units. So, in 
evolutionary theory the changes in organisms through time are understood solely as a result of 
the shuffling around of different genes which are themselves viewed as “truly unchanging and 
stable” (Levins, 1981).  
For biologist John Parrington, one reason why biology has become so gene-centric “may be 
the pervasiveness of the ideology of bourgeois individualism within capitalism. This states that 
any complex system is best viewed as the sum of its individual components” (Parrington, 
2013, p104). The idea that the main focus of biology could or should be on the information 
stored within the genetic code is seen as symptomatic of a legacy of thinking about biological 
systems analogous to the way capitalist economics treats people—as independent and 
individual elements that merely interact with each other (“there is no such thing as society”). 
As Levins further explains, as the profit incentive has become more central to scientific 
research this has resulted in greater specialisation among scientists; a greater focus on very 
specific aspects of the natural world. Someone working in the pharmaceutical industry, for 
example, might only be interested in the active ingredient of a plant with medicinal properties 
rather than the organism as a whole (Levins, 2014). But, alongside this need to commodify the 
products of scientific expertise, when practised in a capitalist society there is also an 
ideological drive towards reductionism (Rose, 2012).  
Reductionism suggests that phenomena within ecology can be explained using ideas from 
physiology, which can themselves be reduced to molecular biology and so on down to sub-
atomic physics. Processes at the “lower” levels—those described by physics—tend to occur at 
smaller spatial scales and to be more universally applicable; physics applies to all matter 
whereas ecology only applies to living things (Rose, 1997). An extreme version of 
reductionism was taken up by James Watson, responsible with Francis Crick for describing the 
molecular structure of DNA, who reportedly stated that “there is only one science, physics; 
everything else is social work” (in a 1996 debate with Steven Rose, quoted in Rose, 1997, p8). 
In contrast to such ruthless reductionism, approaches influenced by dialectics have stressed the 
role of multiple causes of biological phenomena acting at different levels.  
Relatedly, dialectical biologists have often spoken in terms of opposition to deterministic 
explanations. Levins and Lewontin give a simple example of why: a determinist thinker might 
say that because pests kill plant crops, using a pesticide will protect those crops. However (as 
is by now well known) there can be unintended consequences of using pesticides, including 
that they might kill the predatory animals that would eat those same pests, actually 
contributing to pest outbreaks. Levins and Lewontin maintain that avoiding “unidirectional 
causation” and making multiple causation and non-linear processes central to their worldview 
cuts against common sense ways of thinking about biology (Levins and Lewontin, 2006, 
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p334). Similarly, an organism’s genotype or genetic make-up is often thought of as 
determining its phenotype in a one-directional way. Crick even referred to this one-way flow 
of information as the “central dogma of molecular biology” (Parrington, 2015, p39). However, 
dialectical biologists are often very critical of the assumption that an organism’s genetic make-
up determines what it will be. Instead, they point out, there are multiple contingent processes 
that occur inside a cell that influence how a protein is produced.  
As Rose points out, although it is commonplace to state that there is a gene “for” brown eyes 
in humans, the actual mechanism by which possessing this gene leads to a person developing a 
brown eye colour involves a more complex process than this implies. The cells in a human iris 
must contain certain pigments to appear brown (in their absence the person will have blue 
eyes), but these are produced in a sequence with multiple stages involving different enzymes 
transforming one chemical to another. To produce each of these enzymes the information 
encoded in a gene must be transcribed and translated into protein form by a mechanism itself 
involving further proteins whose role is to carry out this translation process (Rose, 1997, 
pp113-116; Rose, 2012). In order to understand this a materialist approach is needed rather 
than one that, in an idealist manner, sees information as the primary cause of something 
happening. Meloni draws attention to the problematic view of genetics as providing a basis for 
understanding human action and points out that biologists themselves seem to be moving 
towards placing greater emphasis on the context in which genes operate (Meloni, 2014, 
p732).42 
In a radio interview, biologist Stuart Newman criticises genetic determinism, and especially 
the idealist tendency to refer to genetic information in terms borrowed from computing. 
Relating to the discussion above about the use of metaphor in biology, this emphasises that 
metaphors can provide limitations to knowledge:  
If you have a computer and you want the computer to do something you have 
to write a program, or you buy a program and it instructs the computer to 
carry out certain steps under specified conditions and therefore you could say 
the program determines what the computer does...the idea takes hold that 
genetic determinism—that is that all important features of a living system are 
determined by the genes and that other determinants are subordinate to what 
the genes do. I would say that’s not really the case, even though many people 
                                                          
42 Human eye colour is relatively well understood. Biologists are on much shakier ground if they 
propose that there is a gene “for” violence or that sexuality is coded in the genes. All a gene can do is 
specify a particular protein for the body to produce so it is unclear what proteins such genes would code 





believe it and even scientists write as if it was the case (Newman and Cohen, 
2014, emphasis added).  
This quote demonstrates that it is possible for scientists to make realist claims while still 
recognising that their understanding is structured by metaphor. Newman, above, refers to what 
is or is not “really the case” rather than suggesting that there is no objective reality beyond 
metaphor, while also recognising that metaphors channel and delimit understanding.  
Martha Herbert’s own opposition to reductionism comes across in her critique of approaches 
that treat the gene as something that operates independently of the other molecules around it. 
Herbert, a neuroscientist who spoke at the Science for the People conference in 2014, wrote a 
book chapter on “Marxism and Biology” while working with Richard Levins 30 years 
previously (Herbert, 1984). Explaining her differences with “mainstream” thinkers, she says: 
It’s amazing how many of my mainstream colleagues don’t have a 
problem with thinking that a specific gene can determine specific 
behaviour whereas the way I look at it, you know a gene creates lots of 
proteins that it regulates and proteins get involved with tissues and the 
tissues interact and then there are emergent properties because of the 
chemical changes which interact with the environment (interview, 12 
April 2014). 
Herbert feels strongly that neuroscience has focused on neurons at the expense of other aspects 
of brain architecture and that the conventional approach has abstracted these cells from their 
surroundings. This is particularly evident in representations of the neuron both in textbooks 
aimed at students and in other media such as advertising where the neuron is pictured as if it is 
surrounded by empty space. For her this imagery constrains and delimits the “way we like to 
think” about the brain. She argues that the brain should be seen as a “wet organ”; the fluid that 
surrounds neurons as well as the other cells (including the aforementioned glial cells) results in 
material properties that cannot be understood by treating the neurons as if they exist in 
isolation.  
More recently, John Parrington, making the previously under-acknowledged complexity of the 
genome central to his work, suggests, like Herbert, that genetics requires a more materialist 
analysis than treating genes as if they simply determine behaviour (Parrington, 2015, see also 
Royle, 2016). Writing in terms of emergent properties of complex systems, Parrington explains 
that there has recently been a paradigm shift in how we think about genetics (2015, p201). A 
reductionist approach, which breaks a system down into its constituent parts and treats each in 
isolation, has reached the limits of its usefulness. For example, thanks to the Human Genome 
Project (HGP), the sequence of bases (like letters in a code) that make up the human genome is 
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now known. But, although Parrington is somewhat sympathetic to the HGP (Parrington, 2013), 
he sees it as too simplistic to treat the genome merely as one long line of code. Rather, genes 
ought to be thought of as material entities engaged in a complex relationship with the 
apparatus in the surrounding cell. For example, the three-dimensional structure of DNA 
matters. When DNA forms 3D structures some parts of the code are exposed to the rest of the 
cell where they are “read” while others are hidden (Parrington, 2015, p107). Commenting on 
the long-standing debate around whether nature or nurture is more influential to human 
development, Parrington says that it is neither one nor the other, but rather, what emerges from 
the interaction between genes and the environment ought to be emphasised: “the old division 
between nature and nurture appears far more fluid than previously suspected” (p173). In 
summary, opposition to reductionism has been central to dialectical work in biology.  
However, as Levins and Lewontin (2006) point out, just because the truth is the whole it 
doesn’t mean that it is possible, or desirable, to study the whole of the world at once. There 
needs to be some method of deciding which aspects of a totality are relevant to a particular 
analysis and which factors can be treated as having a negligible effect on the phenomenon 
under analysis. Like other scientists, dialectical biologists work with models that describe only 
particular aspects of a wider system. Here, Levins and Lewontin invoke Ollman’s method of 
abstraction, a way of momentarily bringing one dynamic into view in order to examine it 
(Levins and Lewontin, 2007, p186). Dialectics is therefore not simply a crude holism, as 
evolutionary theorist Julio Muñoz Rubio explains, it is not concerned “with a search for the 
relations of everything with everything in every moment, but with the relevant set of elements 
interpenetrated in specific moments or periods, and in the transitions among them” (interview, 
5 December 2015).  
However, this process of abstraction is itself a matter of judgement and the factors taken into 
account by a biologist who is a political activist may well be different from those that others 
prioritise. For some, blood sugar levels in humans might be seen as an essentially 
physiological issue. For Levins and Lewontin, factors such as whether those humans are 
exhausted factory workers, whether the foreman is pushing them to work faster and whether 
they are in a union also affect their blood sugar (Levins and Lewontin, 1985, p194). For these 
biologists, it is “not too far-fetched to speak of the pancreas under capitalism or the proletarian 
lung” (Levins and Lewontin, 2007, p37).  
 
5.4.2: History matters 
Besides an opposition to reductionism and determinism, notions of change and dynamism are 





interested in the ways things are, but in how they got that way: What processes led to things 
becoming the way they are? And how might these processes play out in future? (Levins and 
Lewontin, 2006, p335). Levins and Lewontin state that they start from the position that the 
world is fundamentally dynamic rather than starting with static objects and seeking to 
understand how they change. The dialectical thinker “regards constancy as the normal 
condition, to be proven otherwise” (Levins and Lewontin, 1985, p277). Agro-ecologist Ivette 
Perfecto agrees that: “things are constantly changing” (interview, 22 September 2014) and 
Julio Muñoz Rubio defines dialectics in this way: “dialectical method, more specifically 
materialist dialectics, is a conception that radically seeks for explanation of the phenomena in 
the world (be they social, economic or biological) as movement, as historical transitions, as 
wholeness” (interview, 5 December 2015). In this the views of these biologists are consistent 
with the emphasis on dynamism common to Ollman’s interpretation of dialectics (2003) and 
Harvey’s (1996)—which is of course to be expected as Levins and Lewontin are one of the 
latter’s key reference points.  
Levins has stated that “because [dialectical materialism] wants to overturn the existing order, 
change becomes the central object of interest” (Levins, 1981) and the emphasis on dynamism 
is one of the most obviously political elements of the approach to biology laid out here. It is 
capitalism’s apologists who treat existing social relations as fixed, dialectical thinkers seek an 
understanding of the potential for change inherent in those relations. Here, their views clearly 
align with those of Marx, for whom, as stated in chapter two, dialectics “includes in its 
comprehension and affirmative recognition of the existing state of things, at the same time 
also, the recognition of the negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up; because it 
regards every form in the flux of movement, and therefore takes into account its transient 
nature not less than its momentary existence” (afterword to the second German edition of 
Capital—Marx, 1976, p103).  
Some of the common metaphors in biology can give the impression that living things have 
always existed in their current state. Take for example the term “knockout” mouse. A 
knockout mouse is one that has had an individual gene deactivated.43 These animals can 
therefore be used by scientists as models to understand what removing that gene does and 
therefore what role the gene would play were it to be present (National Human Genome 
Research Institute, 2015). However, an adult mouse has around 10 billion cells in its body, 
with each containing its own copy of the mouse genome. The image invoked by the term 
“knockout” mouse, of a scientist taking an adult animal and “knocking out” the unwanted gene 
from every one of those cells simultaneously is clearly ridiculous. In reality, the gene is 
                                                          
43 As the mouse genome was sequenced in 2002 and is fairly well studied it is possible to select a 
particular gene for removal with some precision. 
132 Chapter 5: Making and practising a dialectical biology 
 
removed from a single cell, a stem cell from a mouse embryo, and the resulting mouse will 
have lived without that gene throughout the whole period of its development. Therefore, rather 
than asking “what happens to this mouse when gene x is removed?” scientists are really asking 
“in what ways has this mouse developed from an embryo when it never had gene x?”  
Similarly, in ecology dialectical thinkers have pointed out that ecosystems, as we observe 
them, are not necessarily in their final phase but that their composition may continue to change 
over time. For dialectical biologists this dynamism results from the actions of the organisms 
within the system transforming their environments rather than from a factor external to the 
system that impacts on it from without (such as a fire or flood). In other words, an ecological 
system is assumed to be dynamic rather than the assumption being of stasis until the system is 
perturbed (Preston, 2003, p54). Here again the critique of the distinction between external and 
internal pressures is evident as dynamism can emerge from processes internal to the ecosystem 
and there is no need to invoke a separation between the system and its outside. This is also one 
of Harvey’s examples of biological metaphors. Harvey notes that many ecologists seem to be 
looking for examples of harmony and security—the conclusion of a process—in biological 
systems (Harvey, 1996, p163). By contrast dialectical thinkers tend to emphasise disruption 
and open-ended processes that are not resolved.  
Beyond stating that “everything changes” there is also a need to make sense of the nature of 
that change. Dialectical thinking lends itself to considering the ways in which a complex 
system develops through time and goes through irreversible changes. In other words, there is a 
particular understanding of change involved. For example, Chris Sinha refers to living systems 
as “dynamically developing systems…you can’t treat the growth of organisms as if it’s an 
instantaneous process—as if it’s blueprinted from the start. It’s not” (interview, 19 August 14). 
For dialectical thinkers, time is not thought of as separate to the material world, a distinction 
established in Cartesian thought. Rather historical development is inherent to what happens to 
the material world.  
To illustrate this idea, it is useful to consider how dialectical biologists think about the ways in 
which organisms relate to their environments. These ideas will be developed further in the next 
chapter which addresses ideas of non-human agency as developed in biology. But the ways in 
which organisms react to their environments also relates to how evolution is understood. 
Darwin implied that the environment in which a species finds itself drives evolution in a 
particular direction. This is analogous to the way in which a spherical ball placed on a table 
can roll freely in any direction. A species could, in theory, become anything that the 
environment pushes it towards becoming. In contrast, Gould, referring to the work of Darwin’s 
cousin Francis Galton, has likened the constraints acting on evolution to those imposed by a 





back”, it can roll onto another of its sides but only when pushed with enough force and only 
then in certain directions. There is an interaction between the capacities of the organism itself 
and the force applied to it (Clark and York, 2005a). Dialectical biologists, Gould in particular, 
have argued that the material aspects of an organism impose these constraints on how it 
evolves: “Organisms are not mere putty to be sculpted over the course of their phylogeny 
(evolutionary history) by external environmental forces, but, rather, their structural integrity 
constrains and channels the variation on which natural selection operates” (Clark, Foster and 
York, 2007, p539; see also Blackledge, 2002, p10). These restrictions on the freedom of 
evolution to act come from the internal characteristics of the organism.  
 
5.4.3: Materiality 
This leads to the question of what these characteristics of the organism might be. The previous 
sections have suggested that, far from neglecting to address the material properties of the 
things of the world, as the new materialists suggest, the dialectical approach outlined here is 
thoroughly materialist. This is further illustrated here by the work of Stuart Newman, a 
professor at New York Medical College and associate of Levins and Lewontin. Newman’s 
work illuminates how he understands the development of, in this case, the animal form. It also 
demonstrates the focus on the material properties of the non-human world in his work. 
Newman specialises in evolutionary developmental biology or “evo-devo”. In other words, he 
researches how the processes involved in the development of an organism from embryo to 
adult evolved. Evo-devo integrates the insights of ontogeny (development of an individual 
during its lifetime) with phylogenetic development (changes occurring through the generations 
by evolution). It also seeks to understand how ontogenetic processes can in turn influence 
evolution. Newman sees his own field as inherently dialectical (“development so obviously 
lends itself to thinking in dialectical terms”—interview, 17 March 2014) in part because evo-
devo integrates approaches that had previously been seen as separate (Newman, 2007).  
Like many of the biologists discussed here, Newman doesn’t reject the theory of evolution but 
is critical of the over-emphasis on genes as a causal factor in development common to much of 
mainstream biology.44 One of his key contributions is the insight that embryos have an innate 
tendency to produce certain forms due to the physical characteristics of animal tissues and that 
this has implications for evolutionary theory. As he explains, in the (mainstream) 
                                                          
44 Newman is profiled on the website www.thethirdwayofevolution.com which advocates for an 
approach that incorporates knowledge of other processes beyond natural selection in evolutionary 
theory. This third way is neither limited to a strict application of the modern synthesis nor a detour into 
creationism, therefore it might also be described as materialist but not a mechanical materialist 
approach.   
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“populational biology version of Darwin’s theory” there is an assumption that a population of 
organisms, confronted with a problem posed the environment will either evolve to solve that 
problem or will die out. There are no inherent “constraints” on evolution. This approach aligns 
with a gene-centric position as it is mutations in the genes that provide the mechanism for the 
organism to freely evolve to “fit” its environment (interview, 17 March 2014). So, organisms 
are treated as almost infinitely malleable in terms of how they evolve and as essentially 
passive, they react to an environment that confronts them as an external force.  
By contrast, taking into account the material properties of animal bodies hints at quite a 
different view. In animals, biological tissues are made up of aggregates of cells. For Newman, 
these tissues have certain capacities. He uses the example of vertebrate segmentation to 
explain how biologists could understand dialectically the relationship between processes 
internal to a body and external to it as occurring within an animal as it develops through time. 
There is a tendency for animal tissues to form segments (serially repeated units) during 
development and these are found in the bodies of various animals including worms, insects and 
vertebrates (in the latter, the vertebrae that make up the spine provide one example of 
segmentation). This tendency towards segmentation is now explicable with reference to the 
relationship between the attributes of cells in the animal tissue and signals that the tissues 
receive (Baker, Schnell and Maini, 2006).  
In the “clock and wave-front” model, cells oscillate in unison between two states, one where 
they are capable of forming a somite (a block of cells that will go on to form a body segment) 
and one where they do not have this capacity. As they oscillate between states a chemical 
signal travels down the length of the animal’s body at a particular pace. As it reaches a section 
of tissue with the capacity to form a somite it will do so resulting in an alternating pattern of 
segments along the length of the animal’s body (Newman, 2007). The exact details of this 
process are still debated (Baker, Schnell and Maini, 2006). However, from the point of view of 
understanding Newman’s dialectical insights, the important aspects of the process are that the 
development of segments arises out of an interaction between the material properties of the 
animal cells and the influence of a chemical signal. Rather than an organism responding to its 
environment in a unidirectional way the form of an organism arises from a reciprocal 
relationship between the environment, organism and genes—mutual causation is also involved. 
And, rather than being “passively moulded by the problems it encounters” the properties of 
organisms themselves influence evolutionary processes (interview, 17 March 2014).  
Initially trained in physics, Newman describes how his background encouraged this interest in 
the material properties of animal tissues: “Tissues…in some ways are like liquids and, in some 
ways, are like elastic sheets. They have an inherent propensity to take on certain forms so it’s 





2014). In a recent book he explains, in terms not dissimilar to Bennett’s descriptions of the 
properties of metals and other substances, how the tissues of animal embryos have liquid-like 
properties and, in some ways, behave like viscous liquids (Newman, 2014). Indeed, Newman 
often uses the analogy of water to describe the way the properties of a substance constrain 
what that thing can do. Molecules of water have specific properties of their own. When they 
are aggregated, a pool of water has emergent properties not found in the individual 
molecules—but these properties are not limitless: 
If we want to build things out of liquid water we can’t build anything. We 
can make waves and we can make whirlpools and we can make just a 
limited number of things because that’s the nature of the material and we 
just can’t, we can’t make very complex sculptures with liquid water. 
Similarly, with biological tissues and the fact that we see that a lot of 
organisms have segments or they have interior cavities or they have 
appendages. That is what this kind of material can do…[evolution] can’t 
really go beyond that kind of thing (interview, 17 March 2014).  
These physical properties of animal tissues predated the evolution of genes “since physics is 
older than genes, it actually suggested ways of looking at the evolution of form” (interview, 17 
March 2014). In other words, the forms of animal bodies might have come about in part due to 
the constraints imposed by animal tissues rather than merely being produced by the trial and 
error process of natural selection. If biological tissues exhibit a “preference” for forming 
particular shapes or patterns this suggests to Newman that the evolution of particular body 
plans could have occurred at a faster pace than might be supposed if only natural selection 
were involved. Newman has also referred to matter as having “self-organising” properties: “In 
those cases where matter, either spontaneously or by interaction with other matter, arranges so 
that it is self-sustaining or self-organising then those are the things that draw our attention. 
And the first life forms were these self-organising entities” (Newman and Cohen, 2014). 
As Newman explains, his knowledge of Marxism—and particularly its emphasis on the 
potential for change contained within the conditions of the present—“prepared” his mind for 
his work in evolutionary developmental biology: 
My mind was already prepared for that because I was an activist in the 
1960s and 70s and had the good fortune of having kind of senior 
colleagues and teachers—people like Richard Levins and Richard 
Lewontin… Basically Marxism is about the development of social 
formations. And it tries to understand the historical development of 
societies but you have a kind of a transformation of each society. You can 
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see the connection between what goes on contemporaneously in a given 
society and tendencies for it to change for the future and evolve into 
something else (interview, 17 March 2014).  
He goes on to describe how his tendency to think in terms of organisms developing over time 
led him away from a deterministic view of genes being “in control of everything”, although he 
accepts that genetic influences play an important role: “there are some very essential individual 
components to these complex wholes [ie genes] that can’t be dispensed with, [but] nonetheless 
they are not the entire causal principle of the complex structure”. Newman sees evolution in 
terms of multiple determinants where development can be influenced by processes from the 
bottom up as well as from the top down. This is somewhat analogous to the way in which a 
society influences individuals as well as individual people influencing the societies in which 
they live. Although the processes at work in a human society are clearly different to those in a 
developing embryo, there are similar principles involved: “This is really a contribution of 
Marxist philosophy” (interview, 17 March 2014).   
However, despite the emphasis on materiality that Newman shares with some new materialist 
thinkers, he is dissatisfied with philosophical approaches that adopt a flat ontology. Citing 
various examples of what he refers to as “biological postmodernism”, he argues that the view 
that: “there are no essential differences within nature, no absolute differences between 
minerals, vegetables, animals and humans. Rather, matter is a vast continuum” (Thompson, 
2005, quoted in Newman, 2009) is typical of such postmodern thinking. For some, it doesn’t 
make any difference whether something is organic or inorganic, natural or artificial—it is all 
made up lively matter. Newman argues that this view has become the mainstream within 
biology and has started to affect policy making; the US Department of Agriculture based their 
arguments on this philosophical position when they employed the notion of “substantial 
equivalence” in 2000 to propose that genetically modified (GM) foods were really no different 
from those bred by traditional means (Newman, 2009). Newman contends that there are indeed 
real biological differences between crops bred traditionally and those produced using gene 
splicing techniques that are obscured when both are viewed merely as different instances of 
lively matter. This highlights one of the problems with new materialist thought raised in 
chapter three. That it tends to emphasise the properties of isolated things as they exist in the 
present while obscuring the processes that brought those things into existence. For critics of 
GM food such as Newman, the history of how a food product was produced is important as 
well as its material properties.  
If organisms simply reacted to pressures from the environment to evolve in a certain direction 
we might expect evolution to be smooth and gradual. However, if we accept the view that 





expect evolution to be typified by long periods of stasis punctuated by abrupt change. This is 
indeed what Stephen Jay Gould and Niles Eldridge proposed with the theory of punctuated 
equilibria. They pointed out that, rather than being characterised by “stately unfolding”, 
evolution involves long periods of stasis interspersed with instances of “rapid and episodic 
events of speciation” (Eldredge and Gould, 1972, p84).45 Although initially controversial, 
Eldredge and Gould explained in a later paper that the theory had become generally accepted 
among their colleagues (Gould and Eldredge, 1993). The theory of punctuated equilibria is a 
relatively well-known example of dialectical biology. However, what is not always appreciated 
is how central the dialectical view of the organism-environment relation is to the theory. The 
theory takes account of the ways in which the material properties and capacities of living 
things influences evolution.  
Evolution by punctuated equilibria has been viewed as an example of a shift from quantity to 
quality; small quantitative changes build up over a relatively long period of time until there is a 
sudden break and a new, qualitatively different, form emerges (Callinicos, 2006, p213). Gould 
himself hinted that his views on the subject were influenced by the dialectical approach of 
Hegel and Marx and the emphasis they place on transitions from quantitative to qualitative 
change (Gasper, 2002). However, Levins and Lewontin caution that: “The temptation to see 
some simple connection between Steve’s theory of episodic evolution and his adherence to 
Marx’s theory of historical stages should be resisted” (Levins and Lewontin, 2002). Instead of 
relying on a strict analogy between Marxist theories of history, Gould worked with a deeper 
understanding of change and contingency. 
 
5.5: Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the work of a small group of self-described “dialectical” biologists. 
It has demonstrated how their approach has arisen with the radical science movements of the 
late 1960s onwards, most famously with Science for the People in the US. Crucially, the 
approach of this generation of scientists differed from that of their predecessors in that, faced 
with the militarisation of science, they were unable to treat science as a source of good or 
neutral information that merely needed to be harnessed to the right cause (Rose, 2004 [1983]). 
By contrast, as Zimmerman and others state (in what is effectively a manifesto for Science for 
the People): “science is inevitably political” (Zimmerman et al, 2018 [1972], p16). For Hannah 
Holleman, a social scientist who appreciates their work, the key insight of the dialectical 
                                                          
45 The authors maintain that this is a result of the reality of evolution and not just an artefact of the 
incompleteness of the fossil record (Eldredge and Gould, 1972). 
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biologists is their recognition of “the role of philosophy, theory, ethics and worldview in the 
practice of science” (Hannah Holleman, by email 3 January 2018). 
This chapter has shown how the scientists associated with this movement recognised the 
internal contradiction inherent in discussing the social role of science and its content whereby 
one cannot be understood without reference to the other. They have opened up the very content 
of science to critique. As Herbert (1984) explains, the radical scientists of the 20th century 
were able to come to substantial conclusions within the theory of biology as well as critiquing 
what they saw as inappropriate, unfounded or wrong applications of science. They have put 
forward a strong critique of reductionist and determinist thinking and have posited that history 
matters to our understanding of the biological world (Levins and Lewontin, 2007). As well as 
drawing attention to the implicit dualism that separates the content of science from its context, 
they have also recognised that dualism pervades biological thought and have opposed theories 
that separate time from matter, organism from environment, nature from nurture, ecology from 
evolution and nature from society. Dialectical biology is an attempt to avoid both reductionism 
and holism and to be materialist without being mechanical.  
Like any scientists, dialectical biologists are of course fallible. Therefore, the coverage given 
to their work in this chapter is not intended to prove all of their theories correct. Some theories 
were initially controversial but have now been accepted, others are still disputed, yet others 
will doubtless be rejected at some point in the face of new evidence. However, my interest 
here is in the underlying logic to their approach to biological questions that can give an insight 
into what dialectics means in practice. As Harvey argues, as dialectics is inherently a critical 
philosophy it is often more appropriate to demonstrate dialectics by starting with the 
concrete—working through real world examples of it rather than starting with an abstract 
concept: “the only way to understand [Marx’s] method is by following his practice” (Harvey, 
1996, p48). 
This raises the question of the extent to which the work of these scientists is dialectical. This is 
not a simple question to answer. Levins and Lewontin describe their reluctance to put forward 
a set of laws of dialectics as Engels seems to have attempted. In their words, such an approach 
is a “vulgarisation of Marxism” (Levins and Lewontin, 1985, p183) that contradicts “the 
fluidity and historicity of the Marxist worldview” (p267). In place of such as rigid outlook, 
Levins and Lewontin state that dialectics is instead a reflection of “certain habits of thought, 
certain forms of questioning” (Levins and Lewontin, 1985, p267). As the name of their book 
The Dialectical Biologist suggests, they were not trying to create a dialectics of biology or to 
apply a dialectical method to the subject from without. Rather, they argue that they had 
adopted dialectics as a method and incorporated it into their practice as scientists. Therefore, as 





work of these biologists is often quite subtle. Although the biologists interviewed did 
sometimes make analogies between their findings and some aspect of Marxist theory, often 
their Marxism was more a methodological impulse than a fixed set of doctrines to be applied 
to biology. 
However, it is nevertheless possible to draw out some common themes—such as a shared 
opposition to reductionism and an interest in dynamism and materiality—that, it is argued 
here, are centrally important to the way dialectical biologists think about their work. Engaging 
with these recurring themes has allowed me to reflect on what is distinctive about “dialectical” 
as opposed to “mainstream” biology. But they are also relevant to the wider project of this 
thesis of developing a more dialectical political ecology in the light of this survey of biological 
thought. 
Furthermore, there is a sense, when speaking to dialectical biologists and reading their work, 
that the conventional ways of thinking in biology have taken knowledge so far. But, as there 
are contradictions inherent in the way science is carried out, scientific knowledge has produced 
limits to its own further development (Levins and Lewontin, 2007). For example, as will be 
discussed further in the following chapter, evolution has come to be thought of as simply the 
outcome of a relationship between an environment and its genes. The environment is treated as 
applying a “pressure”, resulting in the selection of particular genes. Laland and others (2009), 
a group of biologists influenced by Lewontin, argue that there are “conceptual barriers” to 
further understanding in evolutionary theory. Evolutionary biology, they say, is founded on a 
separation of causal factors whereby the ultimate causes driving the evolution of a species (ie 
natural selection) are given priority over proximal causes. Other processes such as the way 
species themselves modify their environments have been sidelined in biological theory. This is 
hindering not just theories of evolution but the integration of evolutionary biology with 
different branches of thought such as ecology, developmental biology and the “human 
sciences” (Laland et al, 2009).  
This sense that a reductionist way of thinking about science has created its own internal limits 
to understanding was familiar to Engels. In 1880 he was already arguing that:  
The analysis of nature into its individual parts, the grouping of the 
different natural processes and objects in definite classes, the study of the 
internal anatomy of organised bodies in their manifold forms—these were 
the fundamental conditions of the gigantic strides in our knowledge of 
nature that have been made during the last 400 years. But this method of 
work has also left us as a legacy the habit of observing natural objects and 
processes in isolation, apart from their connection with the vast whole; of 
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observing them in repose, not in motion; as constraints, not as essentially 
variables; in their death, not in their life. 
For Engels, this way of thinking “cannot see the wood for the trees” (Engels, 1970 [1880]).  
Critics of dialectical thought have sometimes argued that dialectics is a philosophy of external 
relations predicated on a binary opposition between society and nature (eg Whatmore, 1999, 
p25). However, this interpretation would not be familiar to Levins and Lewontin, for whom 
their method is founded on an antipathy towards binary oppositions including the conceptual 
treatment of humanity as alienated from the rest of nature (Levins and Lewontin, 2007, p14). 
Critics have also argued that dialectics does not pay sufficient attention to the agency or 
materiality of non-human life, concerns associated with more recent new/vital materialist 
trends in geography and political thought. However, this chapter has demonstrated that 
attention to materiality is actually centrally important to the conception of evolution developed 
by the dialectical biologists. The following chapter will continue to address these criticisms, 
explaining how dialectical biologists and their followers have addressed the issue of non-
human agency. It will further show how environmental social scientists have started to utilise 
the work of Levins, Lewontin and others and will start to address the implications of their 









Chapter 6: Constructed niches and novel ecosystems 
The previous chapter put the dialectical biologists in context by describing the political 
movement that many of them were associated with, Science for the People. The chapter argued 
that these scientists adopted a sophisticated interpretation of scientific practice that recognised 
the contradiction inherent in making truth claims while also denying that science is neutral or 
that scientists are endowed with unmediated access to a stable and fixed nature. The chapter 
concluded by discussing some of the key contributions dialectical thought has made to 
biology. Central to this interpretation of dialectics is that elements thought to be distinct are 
seen through the dialectical lens as inseparable. It is a way of thinking that opposes the type of 
reductionism that considers parts as ontologically prior to wholes (Levins and Lewontin, 
1985). Crucially, the things of the world are not essentially static and are changed when a force 
encounters them from without; dynamism is an inevitable and inescapable feature of the 
biological world.  
This chapter builds on this insight with a discussion of one of dialectical biology’s major 
contributions, the proposal that living organisms (be they humans, other animals, viruses, 
fungi, plants, etc) play an active role in constructing their environments (Levins and Lewontin 
1985; 2007; Lewontin 1982). This proposal, associated with Richard Lewontin in particular, 
has, since he first wrote about these issues, continued to gather enthusiastic advocates among 
biologists in the form of the theory of niche construction: “the process of organism-driven 
environmental modification” (Odling-Smee, Laland and Feldman, 2003). For John 
Vandermeer, an ecologist and member of SftP, niche construction continues Lewontin’s 
project of understanding the “dialectical” relationship of organism and environment 
(Vandermeer, 2004).  
As will be explained in this chapter, social scientists concerned with the Anthropocene have 
found methodological and substantive contributions from dialectical biology relevant to their 
own work. Niche construction theory (NCT) in particular has the potential not only to 
challenge assumptions within biology but also to provoke a rethink within political ecology. 
This chapter therefore turns to issues more familiar to environmental geographers. Returning 
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to the theme of the Anthropocene with which this thesis began, it develops Richard Lewontin’s 
interpretation of dialectics in conversation with that of geographers such as Harvey and 
Swyngedouw to show how it might also be used to develop a non-dualist approach that 
complicates problematic binary interpretations of society and nature. This chapter further 
shows how dialectical biology has addressed, and might further inform, understandings of 
what happens in novel ecosystems, defined here as those where human agency is 
acknowledged as a significant influence.46 In particular it does this with the example of the 
work of Ivette Perfecto and John Vandermeer, agro-ecologists and activists who have worked 
with Richard Levins and, along with their colleagues, have built on his insights. The intention 
here is therefore to show how quite abstract debates in ecological and evolutionary theory have 
been applied to address more concrete concerns. 
 
6.1: Organisms make their environments 
One of the major contributions and most innovative lines of reasoning of the dialectical 
biologists is a centring of the organism and its actions within biological enquiry (Levins and 
Lewontin, 1985, Rose, 1997). As Lewontin points out in his important 1982 essay “organism 
and environment”, biologists have generally viewed organisms as passively responding to 
forces beyond their control (Lewontin, 1982). In this work, Lewontin challenges two 
metaphors that have become widely accepted and have channelled thinking in evolutionary 
biology. The “trial and error” model assumes, firstly, that it makes sense to refer to the external 
environment of an organism (of which more below) and secondly that this external 
environment effectively poses problems that an organism must solve by evolution (Brandon 
and Antonovics, 1996). As Darwin observed, a population of organisms will tend to vary in 
their characteristics and those with traits most suited to the environment will be more likely to 
survive and reproduce, therefore increasing their chances of passing on their genes (and 
associated phenotypes) to future generations. In this account, the specific features of the 
external environment that organisms encounter will act on that population and “select” certain 
individuals for survival. This leads over time to particular genes becoming common in the 
population by a trial and error process whereby variation offers up different phenotypes that 
may or may not be successful in being selected for. It is important to note that, in this analogy, 
pressures originating from outside the organism shape evolution (Levins and Lewontin, 1985, 
Royle, 2014). Therefore, this classic model of natural selection is classed as “externalist” 
(Godfrey-Smith, 1996). Or, in other words it is assumed that organisms must fit into a pre-
                                                          
46 Strictly speaking, a novel ecosystem is established by humans but does not require continued human 
influence for its maintenance (see Hobbs et al, 2006). The term is used more loosely here for systems 





established template represented by their environment (Laland, Odling-Smee, and Feldman, 
2004). 
Lewontin’s converse analogy is more associated with developmental biology—it is the idea of 
an organism developing throughout its lifetime on a predetermined path laid out for it by its 
genes or “unfolding” according to a particular plan. This metaphor, like that of trial and error, 
sees the organism as responding to forces outside of its control, although in this case those 
forces are internal to the organism’s body, arising from its genes and driving its development 
(Lewontin, 1982). Both of these analogies originated in the 19th century and are still common 
sense today.  
Biology has therefore developed by imposing a separation between processes of heredity of 
genes and development of organisms on the one hand and the relationship between organism 
and environment on the other. As explained in chapter two, Lysenko erased this distinction 
entirely by supposing—wrongly—that individual organisms can freely assimilate aspects of 
their environment and pass down the influence of the environment directly to their offspring. 
Evolutionary biologists, have, in response to this, often been quite strict in delineating heredity 
from environmental influence. They have argued strongly that environments can only select 
the individuals within a population with the most beneficial genetic make-up rather than 
directly influencing an organism’s genes.   
However, for Levins and Lewontin (1985), although the analogies developed by biologists are 
not wrong as such, their explanatory power has reached limits. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, metaphors are essential to biological thought as a way of formulating an 
understanding of complex systems (and explaining them to others), but metaphors also 
produce their own limits to understanding. Like Laland and others (2009) referred to at the end 
of the previous chapter, Levins and Lewontin argue that there are conceptual barriers to further 
understanding in biology. Both of the metaphors Lewontin draws our attention to suggest that 
organisms passively respond to external forces, whether originating in their environment or in 
their own genes; both treat the organism as an object of evolution, or (in a striking metaphor) 
as a receptacle in which the environment and genes interact. This has led to the organism itself 
becoming “in a curious way” irrelevant to evolutionists (Levins and Lewontin, 1985, see also 
Clark and York, 2005b). 
By contrast, Levins and Lewontin argue that the organism ought also to be seen as a subject in 
evolutionary processes (Levins and Lewontin, 1985, pp87-89). This view is shared by Steven 
and Hilary Rose (2010), who note that “far from passively responding to a fixed environment, 
organisms…modify their environments”. Lewontin has even, strikingly, stated that organisms 
do not adapt to their environment. Instead they can be said to build or construct environments: 
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“organisms do not adapt to their environments; they construct them out of the bits and pieces 
of the external world” (Lewontin, 1983, p280); “they take bits and pieces of things that are out 
there already but to make them into an environment means to collect them together, to burrow 
in them, to chew them up, to do all kinds of things” (interview, 16 April 2014). Steven Rose 
has similarly used the term autopoiesis to refer to the ways in which organisms construct 
themselves (as “active players in their own destiny”), using their genes and environment as 
raw materials (Rose, 2012). Processes whereby living things alter their surroundings have been 
referred to as niche construction, and, as explained below, niche construction theory (or NCT) 
has gained some followers among ecologists and evolutionary biologists as well as some social 
scientists (see Odling-Smee, Laland and Feldman, 2003). 
Lewontin’s approach, by treating the organism as playing an active role, extends the dialectical 
critique of reductionist or gene-centric science discussed in chapter five by turning its focus to 
the level of whole organisms. For Lewontin, the biological organism as much as the genes is a 
site of selection. In other words, although it is genes that are passed on to future generations, 
the process of selection cannot be understood without taking into account what happens at the 
level of the organism. Ultimately what the organism does—how it behaves and therefore how 
long it survives for, whether and how often it reproduces—is fundamentally important in 
deciding which genes are replicated. That organism cannot also be understood as distinct from 
its environment. For some, this provides a critique of gene-centric thinking that actually 
revisits Darwin’s original conception rather than going against it (Sinha, 2015). For Chris 
Sinha “the critique [of gene-centric biology] has always focused on the lack of attention to 
organism level dynamics” (interview, 19 August 2014). 
 
6.1.1: Niche construction and ecology 
Organisms act to influence their environment in various ways. Of course, one way in which a 
living thing might react to an environment that is (or becomes) inhospitable is simply by 
moving to a new place. But living things also literally modify or change their surroundings, for 
example, when a beaver changes the flow of a river by building a dam. Therefore, they cannot 
be thought of as simply responding to circumstances that they encounter. Furthermore, Levins 
and Lewontin refer to organisms’ ability to determine which aspects of their immediate 
surroundings are “relevant” to them. To use their example, a woodpecker might treat the bark 
of a tree as an aspect of its environment but ignore other objects around it such as the stones at 
the base of the tree. Other birds that use the stones to smash snail shells will treat the stones as 
a relevant aspect of their environment (Levins and Lewontin, 1985, p99). Therefore, as well as 





some aspects of their immediate surroundings as part of their “environment” while ignoring 
others (Levins and Lewontin, 1985, pp98-99). 
Ecologists make a distinction between niche and habitat which is useful here. The world in 
which organisms live is referred to as their niche. However, the niche only refers to a set of 
conditions that are relevant to that organism, as opposed to the habitat which encompasses the 
totality of the living and non-living elements of a particular place. The term niche is therefore 
used in a more relational sense “to describe how, rather than just where, an organism lives” 
(Begon, Townsend and Harper, 2006, p31; Preston, 2003, pp47-72). For example, the 
woodpeckers described by Levins and Lewontin might only be able to tolerate temperatures 
within a certain range, humidity within a certain range, a certain minimum amount of food, etc. 
This already implies that a niche does not exist without the organism that lives in it. If there 
was no such thing as a woodpecker, the habitat (the woodland) would still be there but it 
would make little sense to refer to the niche of such a creature. Furthermore, the niche of a 
woodpecker consists of factors that relate to each other as well as to the bird in complex ways 
(the insects the woodpecker eats also relate to the bark of the trees) so the niche represents a 
complex of interacting factors that cannot be easily fully described or accounted for.  
Of course, those who point out that organisms construct their environments are making what 
seems an obvious point and, in a sense, NCT advocates are saying nothing new. It is well 
known that beavers change their immediate surroundings by building dams; that birds, ants 
and various other animals build nests and that plants change the composition of the soil 
(Odling-Smee, Laland and Feldman, 2003; Laland and Sterelny, 2006). Indeed, changing the 
composition of the external environment, even by taking in nutrients and expelling waste 
products, is fundamental to what all living things do (Levins and Lewontin, 2007, p33). 
However, these processes have often been neglected in ecological analysis. Biologists have 
found that niche construction is often omitted from mathematical models and that explicitly 
taking it into account in these models produces novel results (Feldman and Laland, 1996). 
Non-humans can often have dramatic effects on their surroundings. For example, leafcutter 
ants, which grow (or farm) fungi in gardens on a substrate of fresh vegetation, can utilise the 
steady supply of food this gives them to build massive colonies, sometimes with millions of 
workers. These colonies have been known to destroy citrus plantations in Brazil; they can also 
contribute to the regrowth of rainforests as the soil they expel is easier for young plants to root 
in. So, the actions of the ants modify the environment for other species, having a destructive 
influence for the citrus plants and the humans in this example but enabling other organisms to 
thrive. It is important here to grasp the key point that NCT theorists are making, that for an ant 
hatching in the colony, the environment it will be exposed to throughout its life is itself the 
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product of the actions of its fellow ants (Odling-Smee, Laland and Feldman, 2003). This 
constructed environment is sometimes referred to as an ecological inheritance. 
Interestingly, Lewontin noted the effects of niche construction long before concretising it into 
a theory. In order to carry out his work on the genetics of the fruit fly Drosophila 
pseudoobscura as a graduate student in the 1950s he kept fly larvae in the lab on a solid 
medium seeded with yeast. The larvae would burrow into the medium, increasing its surface 
area and therefore allowing more yeast to grow. The flies increased their own food supply by 
their actions. With an increasing population of flies, the amount of food available per 
individual, and consequently the likelihood of survival for each individual, would, at least up 
to a point, tend to increase rather than decrease as might be assumed (Lewontin, 1955 and 
personal communication). Lewontin referred to the ways in which the actions of the fly larvae 
facilitate the growth of the yeast: “The existence of an optimal density for larval survival, 
below which viability is lowered, seems a clear demonstration of a facilitation effect. If any 
resource is in short supply in the lowest densities, which is present in intermediate densities, 
this resource must be one which is supplied by the organisms themselves” (Lewontin, 1955, 
p36).  
The implications of this for human population growth have not been lost on some biologists. 
Lewontin suggests that a certain minimum number of individuals is beneficial—even 
necessary—within any given population in order to construct a suitable niche (Vandermeer, 
2008). This point applies to living things in general but, given the prevalence of concerns 
about human population, John Vandermeer has used the notion of a minimum necessary 
population to counter the assumption that “there are always too many people” (Vandermeer, 
2012). However, with human environmental issues also no doubt in mind, Odling-Smee and 
others have argued that when organisms make their environment less conducive to their own 
survival, perhaps by causing damaging pollutants to build up, this could be referred to as niche 
destruction. The substantial effects human activity is having in the Anthropocene might, for 
these authors, then be viewed as niche destruction on a global scale (Odling-Smee, Laland and 
Feldman, 2003, p47).  
Kevin Laland, one of the most prominent advocates of niche construction, explains further 
how it challenges the assumption that environments have a fixed carrying capacity (the number 
of individuals of a species an environment can accommodate). Laland has used niche 
construction to pursue interdisciplinary work including with economists. Here he touches on 
the relevance of this theory for the human sciences, of which more later: 
I think partly the inspiration for [working with economists] is a different 





economists. Ecologists tend to think about the environment as having a 
sort of fixed carrying capacity so populations will grow until they reach 
that carrying capacity and that’s how big the population will be and the 
carrying capacity reflects the properties of the external environment so it’s 
an exogenous property. Whereas economists—and of course if you’ve 
very much got humans in mind humans are champion niche 
constructors—economists tend to think of environments as being very 
much under endogenous control so it’s as if the carrying capacity depends 
on what you do (interview, 17 December 2015). 
Indeed, these ideas have taken root in and influenced a range of disciplines. A paper in Nature 
proposes that considering cancer cells to be engaged in niche construction by modifying their 
immediate environment to make it more suitable for their own development could 
fundamentally change how we view (and treat) the disease. It refers to a shift in focus from 
viewing cancer purely in terms of the genetics of the cancer cells themselves towards 
acknowledging a “dynamic interplay” between cancerous cells and the cells around them 
(Barcellos-Hoff, Lyden and Wang, 2013).  
 
6.1.2: A neglected process in evolution 
This chapter has, so far, given examples of niche construction in ecology, a sub-discipline of 
biology concerned with the “interrelationships between living organisms and their physical 
environment” (Walker, 2005, p78). Ecologists tend to deal with effects over short timescales, 
perhaps studying a particular group of animals for a few generations or monitoring an event 
such as the introduction of a new species to an ecosystem. However, according to NCT, these 
widespread processes of environmental modification, as well as being of interest to ecologists, 
also represent a “neglected process” in evolutionary biology, concerned with changes to 
species taking place over much longer periods of time (Odling-Smee, Laland and Feldman, 
2003), although this claim has been the subject of some debate. Erle Ellis, whose own 
background is in ecology, notes how niche construction thinking is only recently—in the last 
few years—gaining traction among biologists. For Ellis: “It is a very disruptive, powerful 
theory in ecology. It really changes the way you think about evolution and ecology and it 
provides a linkage between evolution and ecology” (interview, 23 August 2016). 
According to its supporters, niche construction is not incidental to evolution but, on the 
contrary, represent a major force that had been somewhat overlooked in the past: “We weren’t 
following through and thinking about how that change in the environment then fed back to 
influence selection… So we tended to think of things in what you might think of as a 
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unidirectional causal way” (Kevin Laland, interview, 17 December 2015). The ability of 
organisms to construct a niche has often been thought of as a consequence of evolution; the 
result of thousands of generations of evolution. However, according to theories of niche 
construction, it is also a causal factor. Living things alter their own surroundings (and those of 
other organisms around them) and thereby expose their own offspring to these constructed 
environments—as in the case of the leafcutter ants discussed above. In this way an organism’s 
actions can be said to drive the evolutionary process by influencing the selection pressures on 
its own offspring. Therefore, niche construction represents a second route through which 
organisms pass on information to their descendants, by environmental modification as well as 
in the form of genes passed from parent to offspring via reproduction. Niche construction, for 
some of its advocates, is as general a process within evolution as natural selection, and as 
significant. But, this second route “has been almost completely ignored in evolutionary 
biology” (Brandon and Antonovics, 1996, p176) in favour of a standard evolutionary theory 
(SET) that tends to play down the active role of organisms (Odling-Smee, Laland and 
Feldman, 2003; Laland and Sterelny, 2006; Royle, 2017). 
The example of the way earthworms modify their environment is often used to demonstrate the 
principle. Worms construct their environment by their digging behaviour, aerating the soil, 
mixing it with organic matter and facilitating plant growth. This means that, like many other 
species, they live in and adapt to an environment that has been substantially altered by their 
own ancestors (Laland, Odling-Smee and Feldman, 2004). But furthermore, because 
earthworms have modified the water levels in their surroundings, they have been able to 
maintain many of the traits of their aquatic relatives including external kidney-like organs 
(nephridia) not generally found in land animals. In an aquatic environment the nephridia serve 
to remove excess water from the animal’s body; in worms the same organs extract moisture 
from the soil (Odling-Smee, Laland and Feldman, 2003).  
Niche construction theorists argue that the presence of earthworms—essentially aquatic 
animals—on land cannot be adequately explained by the SET as these animals simply cannot 
survive in their environment without making substantial changes to it (Odling-Smee, Laland 
and Feldman, 2003, pp374-376). The worm hasn’t adapted itself to become more suited to its 
terrestrial environment. Instead, earthworms have constructed a niche that suits their 
physiology. According to the classical interpretation of natural selection, adaptation results in a 
good “fit” between phenotype and environment. For example, in a population of worms living 
in soil they will evolve to be well adapted to moving through soil. In NCT, by contrast, a 
“dynamic interaction” between niche construction and natural selection produces this 
organism-environment match (Odling-Smee et al, 2013). NCT additionally draws attention to 





retention of nephridia. The worms’ digging activity also affects other organisms, for example 
plants and soil-dwelling microbes. 
But the idea that the actions of organisms today can influence their offspring, and especially 
that they might drive evolution in a particular direction, has been controversial within 
evolutionary biology. This isn’t helped by the fact that niche construction is sometimes 
described as “Lamarckian”, even by sympathetic commentators. For example, Stallins says: 
“niche construction is Lamarckian in that organisms have the propensity to pass [their 
relationship with their environment] on generationally” (Stallins, 2012, p433). However, 
Laland and his colleagues have repeatedly referred to it as a “non-Lamarckian” mechanism of 
inheritance (see Laland et al, 2009). Lamarckism is often defined as the inheritance of 
characteristics developed by an individual throughout its lifetime and passed to its offspring 
and therefore has some similarities with Lysenko’s views. There has been some debate as to 
whether this characterisation unduly focuses on just one aspect of Jean-Baptiste Lamarck’s 
wide-ranging thought, and indeed whether recent findings in the field of epigenetics have 
proved him partially correct (Parrington, 2015, chapter 9). However, as niche construction 
doesn’t involve the direct transmission of acquired characteristics from parent to offspring via 
the genes the term “Lamarckian” is best dispensed with here.  
It should be noted also that niche construction does not make the theory of natural selection 
redundant. Indeed, NCT can complement Darwinian natural selection. Take the example of the 
African elephant. Clearly, elephants are adapted to living in hot, dry, grasslands: large ears 
help them keep cool; they can survive for long periods without water; their trumpeting calls 
carry well across the savannah. These adaptations can be interpreted by natural selection—the 
most adapted animals are best able to survive and pass on their genes. However, the grassland 
to which they are adapted is to a large extent created by past generations of elephants, known 
to prevent forest succession by destroying small trees (Laws, 1970). Therefore elephants are 
increasing their exposure to grassland environments and facilitating natural selection. In other 
words, NCT demonstrates how an organism being a subject in evolution and simultaneously an 
object of what it has created can act to increase the selection pressures to which it is exposed. 
This view recognises that, although the variation within a population of individuals is random, 
the environmental influence on evolution is anything but random (Clark, Foster and York, 
2007, p537), natural selection drives evolution in a particular direction—ie towards a better fit 
between organism and environment—and this non-random influence might also be created by 
the actions of the organism itself.  
Due to this emphasis on processes that are not due to chance, New Scientist magazine 
suggested in a 2013 feature article that the idea of niche construction was “heretical” and likely 
to “make steam rise from an evolutionary biologist’s ears” as it suggests that something other 
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than changes in the frequencies of particular genes can act as a driving force of evolution 
(Holmes, 2013). Richard Dawkins, a popular science writer and niche construction sceptic, 
declined the magazine's request for comment. In the past Dawkins has described the reasoning 
behind the theory as “pernicious” (Dawkins, 2004).47  
The following year, in October 2014, the scientific journal Nature ran a debate between two 
groups of biologists on the subject of whether evolutionary biology needs an urgent rethink 
(Laland et al, 2014).48 Some, including NCT supporter Kevin Laland argued in favour of a 
shift in the central tenets of evolutionary theory. Indeed, niche construction is just one element 
of the call for an extended evolutionary synthesis mentioned in the previous chapter (Odling-
Smee, Feldman and Laland, 2003). Advocates of an extended synthesis hope to overcome 
some of the limitations of standard evolutionary theory (SET) and to integrate work in 
evolutionary theory with that in other fields such as developmental biology, ecology and even 
the social sciences. For example, supporters of this extended synthesis also wish to integrate 
evolutionary theory with a greater understanding of new findings in epigenetics (Laland et al, 
2014). Laland and others also propose that theory should incorporate an understanding of the 
processes by which organisms develop throughout their lifetimes as well as the complex ways 
in which they interact with their environments. Evo-devo which, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, integrates insights from developmental biology into an understanding of evolution, is 
therefore also an aspect of the extended synthesis.   
Laland’s interlocutors, who say that “all is well” with evolutionary theory, agree that biology 
should deal with organism-environment relationships. However, they claim biology already 
does this. They say that the discipline has already been carrying out work on how organisms 
change their immediate surroundings “for well over a century” (Laland et al, 2014, p163). As 
Vandermeer puts it, the response was “we have been thinking about these things all along and 
there is nothing to do here”; for Vandermeer, this is merely proof that: “Most evolutionary 
biologists kind of accept the dialectical approach even though they might not admit it” 
(interview, 8 April 2015).  
But Dawkins does have real differences with the niche construction theorists. He proposes an 
alternative model—the extended phenotype (Dawkins, 2004). In addition to the aspects of an 
organism’s physiology coded for by its genes (and therefore considered part of the phenotype), 
Dawkins suggests that genes also express themselves in an “extended phenotype” outside the 
                                                          
47 It has also been argued elsewhere that niche construction makes a limited difference to biologists’ 
findings although its followers refute this claim (Laland and Sterelny, 2006). 
48 Apparently, some biologists have, understandably, felt that they ought to emphasise natural selection 
and play down other processes that may be at work in evolution in order to present a united front against 





organism’s body. The dam a beaver produces—under the instruction of its genes—is, for 
Dawkins, as much a part of its phenotype as its teeth and fur. There is essentially no distinction 
between what is inside the body and what is without; no process by which the environment can 
influence the body. It should be expected that Dawkins takes this view, it is consistent with his 
famous assertion that the phenotype, including the body itself, should be considered as 
essentially a means for genes to replicate themselves. He considers the organism’s body as a 
niche for its genes “we are survival machines—robot vehicles blindly programmed to preserve 
the selfish molecules known as genes" (Dawkins, 1976, p.ix).  
However, niche construction theorists are dissatisfied with Dawkins’ extended phenotype 
proposal. Dawkins accepts that the consequences of niche constructing activities could act 
back on the organism and affect its evolution, for example the beaver’s ability to build a dam 
results in a “fitness payoff” benefiting the genes involved in dam building. However, the same 
could be said of other elements of the beaver’s phenotype such as its fur. In niche construction 
the environment acts back on an organism affecting other aspects of its genetic make-up. This 
makes it more than just an extension of its phenotype (Odling-Smee, Laland and Feldman, 
2003, pp131-132). For niche construction to make sense, the environment must also be able to 
act on the organism and its descendants, causing natural selection, as well as just being a 
consequence of the organism’s genes. The constructed environment cannot simply be 
dissolved into an extension of the organism as Dawkins implies.  
This chapter has so far demonstrated how the theory that organisms actively construct their 
environments has challenged existing thinking in ecology and evolutionary theory. It will go 
on to address the implications of this for what we mean by “environment”. But first, there are 
two questions that remain to be answered here: whether niche construction is a theory of non-
human agency and whether it is a Marxist theory. 
 
6.1.3: A theory of non-human agency? 
As explained in chapter three, complicating claims that only humans possess agency has been 
a central contribution of new materialist thinking and of much of recent animal geography. It is 
also an aspect of new materialism that some historical materialist thinkers such as Malm have 
criticised (see Malm, 2018). Therefore, it is interesting to note that niche construction theorists 
have sometimes used the term “agency”, pointing to an interpretation of dialectics that does 
account for non-human agency. Kevin Laland at the University of St Andrews and his 
colleagues claim on their website that organisms “exhibit active agency”, are “co-directors of 
their own evolution” and “drive environmental change” (Odling-Smee, Laland and Feldman, 
2018). Strikingly, they have also referred to the way in which organisms modify environments 
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as “repeatable”, “directional” and “systematic”, even suggesting that such niche construction 
has a “purpose” (Laland et al, 2014, p162). This is not to say that non-humans act consciously 
in pursuit of a particular goal, but they do act in a particular way under the influence of their 
genes (a distinction between conscious, intentional action and agency in general that new 
materialist thinkers also seem largely to accept). NCT does imply that living things display 
behaviour that is “directed” in the sense that there may be positive feedback loops at work that 
channel action in a particular direction. For example, in Lewontin’s fly larvae example 
(Lewontin, 1955) the actions of the digging animals meant that more food was available, 
therefore increasing the population and in turn meaning that more food production could take 
place.   
Not all of niche construction theory’s advocates describe themselves as Marxists and the idea 
of organisms constructing their environments has spread far beyond the fairly select group of 
dialectical biologists. However, for some it is a major example, perhaps the most compelling, 
of dialectical thinking in biology. Indeed, for Lewontin niche construction is “the best example 
I can think of of a dialectical approach to biology” (interview, 16 April 2014). The Marxist 
writer Jason Moore has also referred to the centrality of the dialectical biologists’ insights into 
the way organisms and environments are mutually constituted to their worldview. Moore sees 
this approach as going against the “basic unit” approach that adds together society and nature: 
“Yeah that’s right at the centre, if you boil it down to the simplest arguments: species make 
environments and environments make species there’s a double internality there… That seems 
to me extraordinarily powerful because it defies the basic unit approach and the basic unit 
approach is still the approach of nearly all Marxists” (interview, 3 November 2016). 
Lewontin’s work on the dialectical relationship between environment and organism was 
raised, unprompted, in several of the interviews for this thesis, which, as well as its 
implications for the vexed issue of non-human agency, explains the amount of attention given 
here to this particular idea.  
For some of the biologists interviewed, the idea that organisms make their environments 
recalls Marx’s famous saying that people “make their own history, but they do not make it as 
they please” (Marx, 1852). And Lewontin is explicit about the analogy between niche 
construction and the view that society can change, explaining how social structures and human 
action are mutually transformative: 
The way organisms make their own environment—that’s a dialectical 
principle. That’s one of the most important political principles there is, 
that people don’t just experience classes, they don’t just experience 
society, they are in a constant process of making and transforming society 





that revolution will work because they claim everything about the way we 
live is a product of human behaviour which creates structures and those 
structures then reinforce that behaviour because we accept them as, you 
know, “out there” that you can’t do anything about—so let’s make a 
revolution (interview, 16 April 2014).  
His references to the organism as subject and object of evolution also echo the wording of 
Lukács, for whom the proletariat have the potential to act as “simultaneously the subject and 
object of the socio-historical process” (1971, p19). This point is of particular interest here. As 
discussed in chapter two, Lukács was (at least in his early writings) reluctant to apply 
dialectical thinking to processes in “nature”. The dialectical biologists’ work suggests, 
however, that he was mistaken to see the subject-object interaction as “absent from our 
knowledge of nature” and to refer exclusively to conscious human actors when describing 
them in these terms (Lukács, 1971, p24). Although many would agree with Lukács that 
workers in a capitalist society are unique in contributing surplus value by their actions, as 
Burkett (2013) concurs, Levins and Lewontin’s work has found subjective processes in the 
biological world as well as in the social.  
But niche construction theory raises a problem: its advocates deny that the environment is 
external to the organism, but does this mean that differences between organism and 
environment are dissolved into nothing more than a complex of relations? And if so, how can 
an organism also act on the environment to transform it? This chapter has so far referred to 
organisms as “making their environment” and suggested that the theory has implications for 
thinking about the human relationship with the environment in the sense of “environmental” 
politics in the Anthropocene. But the definition of “environment” is the subject of some 
debate: living things can be said to relate to the environment, produce an environment, 
construct an environment or act through their environment. Some have even argued that there 
is no such thing as the environment. This issue is relevant to the debates between Marxists 
discussed in chapter two. Whether dialectics is purely a theory of internal relations or whether 
there is also a need to take account of a reciprocal relationship between society and nature is 
one of the key points of difference between world-ecologists and metabolic rift theorists. 
Therefore, the following section discusses what insights dialectical biologists can provide for 
discussions of this thorny issue.  
 
6.2: On whether “the environment” exists 
Biologist Matthew Cobb, who is sympathetic to dialectics but critical of Lewontin (interview, 
22 October 2015) asks the question, is there an “environment” on Mars? As he points out, for 
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somebody studying atmospherics, there is something worth studying on Mars, elements of 
what might be called an environment. In Darwinian natural selection, it seems that there is 
such a thing as an environment and that it exists prior to the organism that lives within it. 
Living things are tacitly assumed to exist within particular limits that circumscribe what is a 
suitable environment—the implication being that if something encounters conditions to which 
it cannot adapt it will not survive. In this account, the arrow of causation goes in one direction, 
from environment to organism. 
However, for Levins and Lewontin, their dialectical approach, as with the various examples 
from dialectical biology discussed in the previous chapter, is founded on a rejection of such a 
strict separation of causes (Levins and Lewontin, 2007). As explained above, niche 
construction theorists remind us that a niche can also be said not to exist without the associated 
organism. NCT poses an explicit challenge to the idea of a niche as something existing without 
the organism that it must adapt to: “a hole in the wall and you come and sit in it” (interview, 16 
April 2014). The notion of a constructed niche is clearly in contrast to Darwin’s more 
conservative metaphor of the niche being something like a job role in the way that factory 
workers each have their own role to play in the workplace. 
It would be possible nevertheless to consider the organism-environment relationship as one in 
which there is reciprocal causation but where two separate entities influence each other in a 
back and forth relationship. Sometimes the metaphor of billiard balls colliding is invoked to 
describe such a relationship where one entity impacts on another from the outside (See 
Friedman and Rossi, 2011 for example). This notion of discrete entities relating to each other 
recalls what Ollman refers to as a philosophy of external relations (see chapter two). However, 
building such a model is clearly also far from the intentions of the dialectical biologists; it is 
precisely the notion that there is such a distinction to be drawn between organism and 
environment that is challenged by their thought (Vandermeer, 2008). Rather, by stressing the 
ways in which organism and environment construct each other over time, the dialectical 
approach reminds us that neither can exist independently of the other. So it emphasises a 
relationship between organism and environment while at the same time being inherently 
critical of dualist understandings which begin with the notion that they are two separate 
entities that must then come to relate to each other. 
Levins and Lewontin have sometimes spoken in terms of reciprocal relationships and feedback 
between organism and environment, for example when they say: “Changes within the 
organism alter the external environment, which in effect then feeds back into the development 
and metabolism of the organism itself” (2007, p83). And some niche construction theorists 





Smee, Laland and Feldman, 2003, p2). Here these biologists state that they are applying “a mix 
of externalist and constructivist explanations” (p373).  
For Clark and York (2005a), niche construction theory implies that an organism exists in a 
dialectical relationship with an environment and similarly a human society can be thought of 
as in such a dialectical relationship. These authors do sometimes slip into binaries. For 
example, they refer to a “dialectical interchange between the environment and the organism” 
(Clark and York, 2005b, p328, emphasis added) and “the interaction between humans and the 
environment” (p332). However, they also stress that this is a dynamic relationship of mutual 
transformation rather than a simple case of reciprocal interaction between internal and 
external. 
Similarly, John Vandermeer emphasises that a dialectical approach suggests a difference 
between organism and environment, a differentiated rather than an undifferentiated unity. He 
also refers to a contradiction between organism and environment that is ongoing and dynamic, 
rather than being “resolved”, for example by referring to the whole as an organism-
environment complex: 
I think the real dialectical approach recognises that there is some kind of 
difference between organism and environment but the fact they are 
dialectically related means that organism causes environment and that 
environment causes the organism, that there is a mutual interpenetration 
of the two ideas. And it’s not just a vague idea of a complex, of an 
environmental-organism complex but that rather there is a dynamical 
process whereby environment is created by organism and organism is 
created by environment. It seems to me that’s the proper way to look at 
it… They are relating to one another in a very dynamic and synthetic 
fashion… Constructing each other is a good way to put it (interview, 8 
April 2015).  
This view might not satisfy those who see “dialectically related” as retaining some dualist 
implications. However, in Vandermeer’s interpretation there is no possibility that environment 
and organism exist prior to one another as they are mutually creative. Also, importantly, he 
refers to a dynamic process, one that develops and changes through time.   
However, elsewhere Levins and Lewontin have more radically rejected the existence of the 
“environment” entirely, criticising any kind of prior distinction between organism and niche 
and adopting something closer to a philosophy of internal relations. For example, they state 
that: “one cannot make a sensible environmental politics with the slogan ‘save the 
environment’ because, first, ‘the’ environment does not exist, and second, because every 
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species, not only the human species, is at every moment constructing and destroying the world 
it inhabits” (Levins and Lewontin, 2007, p34). (Note here that the biologists are switching the 
focus of their critique from the specifics of evolutionary biology to making statements about 
humans and “environmental” politics).  
Lewontin’s view that “the environment does not exist” has also been adopted by some political 
ecologists. For example, Alex Loftus (2012, p.xiv) echoes this statement, declaring that 
“there’s no such thing as nature”. This is one aspect of dialectical biology that social theorists, 
including Maria Kaika (2005, p23) and Erik Swyngedouw (2014; 2015) have found 
particularly interesting. They have referred to Levins and Lewontin in order to question the 
adoption of “the environment” as a stable or predictable object of analysis. For example, in a 
recent discussion of politicised nature in the Anthropocene, Swyngedouw notes that, for 
Levins and Lewontin:  
The biological world is relationally constituted through contingent, 
historically produced, infinitely variable forms in which each part (human 
and non-human, organic and non-organic) is intrinsically connected to 
wider relations comprising the whole… Levins and Lewontin thus reject 
a simplistic, reductionist, teleological and ultimately homogenising view 
of nature—arguing that there [are] various different historical natures, 
relations and environments subject to continuous, occasionally dramatic 
and rarely (fully) predictable changes… There is no nature that requires 
salvation in the name of either nature itself or humanity (Swyngedouw, 
2015, p135).   
Here Swyngedouw agrees that the dialectical biologists offer a picture of nature as 
“relationally constituted” and that their outlook stresses the dynamism and contingency of 
natural processes. He also importantly shows how, in their work, there are multiple possible 
environments, rather than “the environment”. Natures are historical and therefore cannot be 
relied on to provide the basis for a natural state of things. Swyngedouw does not deny the 
physical existence of carbon dioxide molecules, or owls or earthworms—“this is not to ignore 
the real of natures” (Swyngedouw, 2015, p141). However, Levins and Lewontin’s work is 
used here to put the case for a repoliticisation of nature by recognising that it cannot be 
extracted from the relations including the political relations that constitute it. Richard Levins 
has also expressed something similar to this interpretation. He has stated, in terms quite similar 
to notions of the “production” of nature, that the key thing to know about geography is that 
every type of society creates a different environment and that organisms construct their 
environments at different spatial scales (personal communication, April 2014). Levins has also 





when not influenced by humans, an aspect of the “idealism” of early environmentalism 
(Levins, 2007).  
It could be argued that real biological systems are too complex and involve too many actors to 
be adequately accounted for by reference to two factors—organism and environment. This can 
be accused of reducing analysis to the interactions of two types when, in reality, ecological 
systems involve multiple interacting agents and processes including humans, animals, plants, 
microbes, technologies and geological processes. This is partly an issue of abstraction. As 
noted in the previous chapter, like any scientists, Levins and Lewontin must employ models 
that describe only particular aspects of a wider system. But they differ from mainstream 
biologists in that they invoke Marx (and Ollman) when describing their method of abstraction, 
a way of momentarily bringing one dynamic into view in order to examine it while recognising 
that “the truth is the whole” (Levins and Lewontin, 2007, p186).  
However, there also needs to be a justification for the choice of abstraction. In volume one of 
Capital, Marx started with the commodity form and uncovered the relations of value that 
manifest in commodities (Marx, 1976). For the dialectical biologists, their choice of organism 
and environment can be viewed as an abstraction that brings different elements into view at 
any one point. For Vandermeer, simply stating that systems are built of multiple interacting 
factors is more reminiscent of systems biology than dialectics. When asked about the 
differences between the two, he argued that systems biology is merely another form of 
reductionism as it takes all the elements in a system and seeks to establish every possible 
connection between those elements. The dialectical approach, by contrast, “is one that uses a 
modelling framework which asks which things are key to the system and which things are 
interacting with one another in a profound or meaningful way then takes a synthesis of these 
and takes a new thesis and antithesis out of the synthesis and goes in a stepwise fashion to try 
to understand the system” (interview with John Vandermeer, 8 April 2015).  
Critics of dialectical biology might also contend that new thinking in the life sciences treats 
organism and environment as themselves so entwined that it is no longer justifiable to use 
organism and environment as points of reference. For example, Gilbert, Sapp and Tauber 
(2012) say that, once the role of the microbiome is acknowledged, animals can no longer be 
thought of as individuals, a point that has been seized on by some new materialist thinkers 
among others (see chapter three). Here, it seems that Levins and Lewontin, if we interpret their 
work as being built on a philosophy of internal relations, would have little problem with these 
insights. For example, they also recognise that organisms are effectively “environments” for 
the other organisms that live on or in them, so what is an “environment” is defined relationally 
rather than something that just exists.  
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In summary, the view of organism and environment elaborated by Levins and Lewontin 
suggests a seemingly contradictory situation whereby an organism is inseparable from the 
environment and cannot be understood without reference to it, but also one where organism 
and environment act on and relate to each other. As explained in chapter two, Marx and 
Engels, in some of their writing on humans and the environment, similarly suggested that they 
thought of humans as part of nature while simultaneously being able to establish a relationship 
with external nature through acting on it (by exercising labour power in their terms). Writing 
in The German Ideology they stated that: “The first premise of all human history is, of course, 
the existence of living human individuals” and in Capital Marx refers to the way in which the 
actions of humans change external nature and simultaneously change their own nature (1976, 
chapter 7). Niche construction theory’s emphasis on dynamic processes, reciprocal causation, 
development of organism and environment through time and the ability to act on an 
environment and change it, all therefore have echoes in Marxist philosophy dating back to its 
founders’ own thinking. As the following section demonstrates, the approach to thinking about 
organism and environment has the potential to provoke a rethink in political ecology and 
human geography more generally.49  
 
6.3: Niche construction and human geography 
According to Richard Levins, niche construction has implications for thinking about space and 
scale. He has argued that, not only do organisms make their own environments, they also 
construct them at different scales. A mouse will be able to travel around over larger areas than 
an ant and therefore find processes operating at larger spatial scales relevant. Very small 
organisms such as bacteria are influenced by processes such as Brownian motion that are 
irrelevant to larger organisms (Levins and Lewontin, 1985, p104). This reminder that it is not 
just humans that construct scale has implications for the debates within geography about 
whether the concept of scale is necessary (see Marston, Jones and Woodward, 2005). 
For Stallins, the notion of scale, however it is conceived, cannot be done away with as all 
living things participate in producing space and scale by their niche constructing activities 
(Stallins, 2012). Furthermore, Stallins shows how niche construction can mean that organisms 
(human and otherwise) even out fluctuations in environmental conditions in order to survive. 
For example, the digging worms mentioned earlier are producing a stable, predictable 
environment with stabilising consequences for their physiology rather than driving evolution in 
a particular direction. More generally Stallins argues that new ideas about organism-
                                                          
49 Physical geographers have also referred to niche construction. For example, Corenblit and others refer 
to it as a feedback mechanism whereby evolutionary processes and the construction of landforms 





environment interactions offer the opportunity to fuse the biological with the geographical, 
proposing that engaging with current biological thought need not lead to the “crude 
reductionism or inflexible causal determinism” associated with earlier environmental 
determinist attempts to bring ideas from the natural sciences into geography (Stallins, 2012, 
p434). He argues that what is deterministic and what is contingent cannot easily be segregated 
when organismal agency is taken into account. Although he does not mention the roots of 
niche construction in dialectical thought, dialectics offers one powerful methodological 
framework for understanding how biological systems can exhibit both deterministic and 
contingent attributes (see Clark, Foster and York, 2007).  
In a way analogous to how Marx and Engels criticised both idealism and mechanistic variants 
of materialism, dialectical biologists such as Gould have also referred to contingent as well as 
deterministic processes as occurring in evolution. As Clark, Foster and York suppose, this 
emphasis on contingency in Gould’s work comes about partly as society and nature are 
themselves inseparable, so contingent and open processes are common to both social and 
natural history. They also note the influence of 1930s Marxist thinkers in biology: 
Marx’s dialectics of nature and society continues to serve as a powerful 
base for a critique… It includes a commitment to a materialist conception 
of natural and social history—and thus to the interaction of necessity and 
contingency. From this tradition, which has influenced noted scientists, 
such as JBS Haldane, JD Bernal, Hyman Levy and Lancelot Hogben in 
the 1930s and 1940s and Stephen Jay Gould, Richard Lewontin, Richard 
Levins, amongst numerous others in recent years, we can gain insights 
into the dynamic development and interaction of society and nature. 
Stephen Jay Gould noted that it was from the social sciences and 
humanities that he came to learn the importance of contingency: “The 
more we learn about complex systems,” writes Gould, “the less we can 
sustain a belief that classical reductionism might work, and the more we 
must suspect that emergence and contingency will enter in ever more 
important ways as we mount the scale of complexity in nature’s material 
reality”. While this statement is a critique of hyper-reductionism within 
science, it also serves as a reminder that the future is contingent and open 
(Clark, Foster and York, 2007, p538). 
Some of the implications of dialectical biology for political ecology have been suggested by 
Brett Clark and Richard York (2005a and 2005b), two colleagues of John Bellamy Foster. 
They propose using the concept of a dialectics of nature rooted in Levins and Lewontin’s work 
to argue against two (common sense) understandings of environmental issues—economism 
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and deep green thinking. The authors equate economism with a mechanistic materialist 
philosophy—it supposes that society acts like a machine that can be made more 
environmentally friendly by including “nature” as an explicit input that merely needs to be 
correctly measured and accounted for, for example by valuing nature as a provider of 
ecosystem services. The faulty machine of capitalism can be fixed by making some slight 
adjustments such as by using greener technology. By contrast, deep green thinking (equated 
with philosophical idealism) sees nature as an autonomous sphere with its own needs that are 
fundamentally opposed to the demands of industrial, Western human societies. This way of 
thinking (ahistorically) assumes a natural state of balance or harmony which is upset by human 
action.  
Although these perspectives might seem to be polar opposites, both ways of thinking treat 
society and nature as separate and incompatible. Both tend towards seeing “nature” as external 
to human society, whether as a source of inputs or as a balanced and harmonious realm that 
humans disrupt (Clark and York, 2005a and 2005b; Castree, 2000, p11). Clark and York argue 
that, by contrast, the dialectical biology approach avoids both mechanical materialism and 
idealism, providing a distinctive approach whereby the society-nature relationship as a 
dynamic one involving society and nature mutually acting to transform each other.  
Norgaard and Kallis (2011) also refer to Levins and Lewontin’s work. Noting that “dynamic 
interactions between human and environmental systems are at the core of the discipline” of 
geography, they call for a greater recognition of what they call co-evolutionary dynamics, in 
other words situations where an evolving system transforms another but also reacts to this 
transformation. For Kallis, like Clark and York, such an approach avoids either social or 
environmental determinism, with the former represented by mainstream technocratic 
approaches to environmental problems where one input can simply be substituted for another 
and the latter by assertions of a “limits to growth”. Instead, coevolution involves recognising 
that cultural processes such as technologies, practices and knowledges transform environments 
but are also transformed by them. Additional complexity is added to this analysis by 
acknowledging, for example, the importance of power relations in “structuring environmental 
change” and the role of ideology in framing understandings of environmental problems 
(Norgaard and Kallis, 2011, p293). For these authors, this approach implies more than just a 
dyad where two things relate to each other. They refer to evolution in the biological sense in 
that they are interested in examples where there is some kind of selection mechanism at work. 
For example, if (hypothetically) a range of different pesticides are on offer to deal with an 
insect pest, the most effective might be selected for by the people using it but this might also 
influence the (biological) evolution of the pest species and in turn influence the pest control 





as Neil Smith’s production of nature thesis to emphasise the apparently changed role of 
humans as subjects that produce environments as well as objects of nature (Swyngedouw, 
2015, p132).    
Drawing in particular on Levins and Lewontin’s critique of assumptions about adaptation in 
evolution, political ecologist Michael Watts (2015) has also recently referred to their ideas. As 
Watts explains, the concept of adaptation has often framed work within cultural ecology on 
human societies and how they relate to their environments. For example, Roy Rappaport’s 
1960s work on ritual pig slaughter among Papua New Guinea’s Tsembaga Maring showed 
how rituals helped people adapt to environmental fluctuations by maintaining a certain pig 
population (see Watts, 2015, pp23-26). Cultural ecology treated human populations as 
analogous to the populations of other species referred to by ecologists. It borrowed some of its 
concepts from biology, including the term “niche”, the notion of a carrying capacity (which 
carries with it the assumption that environments have a fixed capacity to sustain a certain 
population) and the concept of homeostasis, in other words the idea that populations act in 
order to preserve or maintain an existing state. 
Adaptation, according to Watts’ analysis of cultural ecology, implied an end state, that of 
being adapted. It drew on Darwin’s ideas and on Darwin’s own Malthusian influence. But this 
work appeared increasingly problematic when political ecology started to focus on the 
transformations of global capital. For Watts, the “most troublesome” aspect of some of the 
early work was that it downplayed human agency and did not see it in social terms (2015, 
p22); in Watts’ words it saw regulation of responses to the environment as taking place 
“behind the backs of the actors” (p31). However, by referring to Levins and Lewontin’s work, 
Watts shows that adaptation-centred ideas are not the only ideas within biology. It is also 
possible to critique the mechanistic assumption of a fixed carrying capacity—as discussed 
above, niche construction biologist Kevin Laland has also done this—and to point out that 
organisms do not simply adapt to their environments. Work within radical biology also showed 
how evolution is not always adaptive, producing outcomes by chance, for example, as well as 
in response to selective pressure.  
Watts comments that the adaptation paradigm has re-emerged in political ecology with the 
concept of resilience. He says that as environmental research has increasingly focused on 
climate change as an imminent global threat, the language of adaptation has again become 
ubiquitous: adaptation “has emerged as the lodestar of public and developmental policy”. 
Furthermore, “the focus is on proximate rather than structural processes regarding adaptation 
in social systems, and on passive, reactive, or anticipatory adjustments” (Watts, 2015, p20). 
Watts argues that the hegemony that adaptation has gained in policy circles imposes limits to 
the range of responses to climate change on offer.  
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Biologists have drawn attention to the ways in which the activities of different organisms don’t 
just change the environment of the species in question but also change the conditions that other 
organisms are exposed to. In this way living things don’t just relate to each other directly—by 
predation or competing for food perhaps—but also indirectly exert an influence on other 
species by modifying the conditions in which those species live and sometimes creating new 
resources. As the human species constructs a particularly complex niche, then this is perhaps 
most clear in the case of humans. As Ian Rotherham points out, human environmental 
modification has created the conditions for some other species to flourish. For example, in 
Sheffield the warm waters of the River Don, once used for cooling in the city’s steel plants, 
has created the conditions in which forests of figs have grown along the river’s banks. The 
seeds of these Mediterranean plants would not have been able to germinate were it not for 
human activity in creating a particular niche (Bramwell, 2015).  
Building on this insight, Ellis (2015) uses the concept of niche construction in an extensive 
survey of the world’s anthropogenic biomes, thereby integrating ecological theory with ideas 
of anthropogenic change on a planetary scale. He argues that this project would not have been 
possible with a theory that assumed that humans simply adapt to their environment (Ellis, 
2015): “If you are trying to understand why humans alter the environment, if you don’t have a 
niche construction theory or something related to that, kind of explaining why an organism 
would alter its environment so much…it’s harder to place humans among other species” 
(interview, 23 August, 2016). For Ellis, humans are “champion niche constructors”. As 
explained in chapter three, Ellis has become associated with the idea that humans can direct 
nature according to their will. But adopting a theory of niche construction does not necessitate 
this kind of human exceptionalism. Humans may be able to produce environments with more 
forethought than other species; but constructing environments in general is something common 
to all living things. Furthermore, as the fig example also shows, the consequences for allowing 
other species to flourish can be uncontrollable and unpredictable. In what follows, the ability 
of humans to create novel ecosystems is addressed with reference to the political ecology of 
two biologists, Ivette Perfecto and John Vandermeer, who draw on Levins and Lewontin’s 
dialectical approach.  
  
6.4: Novel ecosystems: Perfecto and Vandermeer’s agro-ecology 
Biologists are increasingly arguing that the planet is dominated by what might be called novel 
ecosystems, characterised by new combinations of species and arising as a result of human 
action (Hobbs et al, 2006). And adopting a novel ecosystem approach has led some ecologists 
to rethink the assumptions of their discipline. Gardner and others (2009) argue that ecologists 





environments. They cannot treat areas of forest as undisturbed environments that act as a 
baseline against which they might compare the effects of agriculture; the species composition 
in the forests is also undergoing change due to human activity.  
The rewilding project at the Oostvaardersplassen (OVP) in the Netherlands has been discussed 
as an example of such a novel ecosystem (see Lorimer, 2015 and Marris, 2011). As explained 
in chapter three, the example of the OVP is often seen as signifying a shift on the part of 
conservation biologists from trying to monitor and manage populations—ie more or less keep 
things as they are—towards one of unleashing non-linear processes which are to some extent 
autonomous of humans, a shift from the “fixed” to the “untamed” and “spontaneous” (Lorimer 
and Driessen, 2014, p174). In rewilding there is an emphasis on the processes or services 
provided by non-human species rather than on the character or composition of these species 
and ecosystems (see also Lorimer, 2017). Discussing this project, Lorimer (2015) therefore 
shows that the Oostvaardersplassen defies simple binaries such as that between found and 
made spaces, secluded and wild, and phenomena of order and surprise. The OVP is “made” in 
the sense that it is a reclaimed piece of land and is continually modified by humans, but at the 
same time “organisms and landscapes are given scope to determine their own futures” 
(Lorimer, 2015, p107); “The wild cows of OVP are introduced to manage a dynamic 
landscape” (p186). Interestingly, then, for this discussion of non-human agency, these animals 
seem to have been introduced with the express purpose of letting them modify ecological 
processes. Although political ecologists might maintain that there is no ecosystem on the 
planet that exists in isolation from human activity—after all, anthropogenic climate change is 
modifying the very atmosphere—systems that have more directly combined human and non-
human processes have clearly interested geographers. As mentioned in chapter three, this work 
also has interesting connotations for science studies as it defies the stereotype of a scientist 
carrying out an experiment in the lab under conditions where they are in control of the object 
of their study (Lorimer and Driessen, 2014).  
Some of the dialectical biologists interviewed share similar interests to those above. Ivette 
Perfecto’s and John Vandermeer’s research on the ecology of tropical agricultural ecosystems 
(or agro-ecosystems) is particularly relevant and is referred to in Emma Marris’ 2011 book on 
novel ecosystems Rambunctious Garden. Perfecto and Vandermeer are scientists and political 
activists who have both worked with Richard Levins and were also members of Science for the 
People. Like Levins they have found it impossible to disentangle their scholarship from their 
activism and, as we shall see, have developed some of his ideas on the spatial distribution of 
living organisms. Both of them spoke at the 2014 SftP conference, with Perfecto describing 
how, as part of NWAG (New World Agriculture Group), she was involved in visiting 
Nicaragua to try to help develop an agriculture programme after the 1979 revolution. NWAG 
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also attended demonstrations in the US and tried to build solidarity for the leftist Sandinista 
government. Perfecto explained how she has known Richard Levins since the 1970s, 
describing how he “had a very big influence in my life because I saw for the first time how you 
can really combine your passion for science with your passion for social justice” (interview, 22 
September 2014).  
Like other members of SftP referred to in the previous chapter, Perfecto and Vandermeer 
recognise that they are far from “neutral” in their approach to the political aspects of research 
into agriculture. Perfecto is happy to accept that science is political: “I think the questions that 
I ask are influenced by my political views and my ideology and I think that’s true for 
everybody…but I think that the difference is that we tend to recognise that and embrace it as 
well and be more conscious about how…our view of the world influences the questions that 
we ask and how we ask those questions” (interview, 22 September 2014). Furthermore, for 
Vandermeer “the claim that you have no ideology is really quite an ideological claim in itself” 
(interview, 8 April, 2015). They have a “normative preference” for small-scale, organic 
agriculture that effectively uses ecological principles and local knowledge to maintain 
production rather than more industrial-scale approaches (Vandermeer and Perfecto, 2012). 
Perfecto has argued that synthetic pesticides and fertilisers could be avoided entirely; in a 2007 
feature in New Scientist she explained that in the developing world the tools needed to practise 
organic agriculture are more readily available to farmers than expensive artificial chemical 
products. Furthermore, a major study she was involved in found that organic farms could 
produce enough calories to more than satisfy the world’s food needs. Rather than people going 
hungry due to lack of technology, “we are producing enough food—it’s a question of the 
distribution of that food” (Ivette Perfecto, quoted in Brahic, 2007). The kind of agricultural 
systems Perfecto and Vandermeer advocate are, they argue “most likely to be constructed by 
small farmers with land titles, who, in turn, are normally the consequence of grassroots social 
movements” (Perfecto and Vandermeer, 2008). Therefore, they integrate their interest in 
collective struggle over environmental issues into their overall analysis, arguing that 
supporting the aims of farmers and their organisations should play a fundamental, rather than 
an incidental, role in biodiversity conservation in the tropics (Perfecto and Vandermeer, 2008). 
For Perfecto and Vandermeer (2008) conservation biology in tropical regions has prioritised 
“charismatic” rainforest environments at the expense of looking at what happens in 
agricultural systems, tending to reinforce the assumption that human activity is simply a threat 
to pristine environments that impacts upon those environments from the outside. These 
ecologists’ work on tropical agro-ecosystems therefore adopts many of the concerns that have 
animated environmental geography in recent years. In particular, they share Lorimer’s (2015) 





have been swayed by the appeal of charismatic species. They are broadly in agreement with 
some of the critiques of dualist approaches to environmental politics common to both Marxist 
geographers and new materialists.  
Although many animal species found in coffee plantations are considered pests of coffee, 
Perfecto and Vandermeer point out that some also provide autonomous pest control, reducing 
the need for farmers to apply synthetic pesticides (Vandermeer, Perfecto and Philpott, 2010). 
But the presence of these species is inextricable from the growing of coffee for humans. 
Coffee plants are not native to this part of the world (coffee cultivation is thought to have 
originated in Southern Arabia or east Africa), so like the Heck cattle in the 
Oostvaardersplassen, these species wouldn’t be where they are without human activity. Indeed, 
the inherently political implications of understanding ecosystems where human action plays 
such a prominent role is one of the reasons why these scientists became interested in 
agriculture. As Perfecto explains: “I like to look at this interaction between the humans and the 
natural system—the social system, the political system, and the natural system—and so if I 
work in a reserve, some place in the middle of nowhere, there is still some effect that the 
humans have on that area but it is not as evident…as it is in an agricultural system” (interview, 
22 September 2014).  
Agriculture (some types of agriculture more than others) is often understandably seen as 
having a negative effect on biodiversity. But Perfecto and Vandermeer point out that many 
species flourish in agricultural systems, often performing roles such as pollination or pest 
control. This implicitly poses a challenge to the assumption that biodiversity is something that 
happens where agriculture is absent. They also touch on the question of what might be 
described as the agency of non-humans in these systems, including the capacity of such 
systems to control pests (see following section). Although not adopting the term agency, 
Perfecto describes her research as “trying to understand what all this diversity is doing in the 
agro-ecosystem? What is the function of biodiversity?” (interview, 22 September 2014). The 
biologists avoid conflating wildlife with wild spaces or wilderness, a dualistic way of dividing 
up space that new materialist inspired geographers have also opposed (see Whatmore and 
Thorne, 1998).  
This thesis began with the case of the northern spotted owl, a classic example of how a debate 
over wildlife conservation became a heated conflict in the 1990s as the Wise Use movement 
mobilised local workers in defence of the logging industry and environmental groups took 
direct action to try to defend the forests. Given that it cannot be understood without reference 
to the wider context in which it took place, such a debate demonstrates the need for a political 
ecology. For Foster (2002), policies at the local and national level alongside economic trends 
such as mechanisation, which in this case made timber workers more fearful about their job 
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security, influenced ideas about what should happen to the forests. Perfecto and Vandermeer’s 
research on coffee ecosystems similarly integrates a diversity of human and non-human 
processes that influence such systems. These human processes occur at global scales: climatic 
change, geopolitical arrangements and trends in coffee consumption and at local scales: 
changes in individual farmer preference and national or regional agricultural policy.  
Neil Smith might further draw attention to the ways in which the profit motive shapes what 
happens in a forest or a coffee plantation by arguing that such environments are “produced”. 
As discussed in chapter two, this way of thinking involves a sharp break with the assumption 
that areas of ancient forest are wilderness spaces existing prior to human influence; such an 
assertion is an ideological commitment, kept in place by scientific and literary traditions and 
adopted by some environmental activists. As Smith argues, capitalism tends to turn the use 
values provided by, in the forest example, a forest into exchange values—by applying 
labour—as from the point of view of a capitalist drive to realise a profit, the trees in the forest 
are valued only as a source of timber (Smith, 2008, p79).  
Harvey and Ollman’s relational dialectical approach, with its focus on processes over things, is 
useful here. According to this approach, a place such as a forest or a coffee plantation should 
be seen as constituted by relations rather than treated as a “thing” with definite boundaries. 
These diverse processes stretch beyond a specific locality to produce a particular type of 
ecosystem (see Braun, 1998). This emphasis has the advantage that it shows how processes 
that might operate at a global scale interrelate with those at a local level. As interpreted in this 
thesis, Ollman’s approach does not simply mean that the context influences what happens in a 
locality from the outside. Instead, it means that the locality is itself constituted by diverse 
processes: specific ecosystems are dynamic as they express the contradictions and tensions that 
result from the multiple interacting processes that constitute them. Such a way of thinking 
avoids making a sharp distinction between the global and local.  
Furthermore, following Swyngedouw’s example of the socio-natural processes that produce a 
city’s water supply (Swyngedouw, 1996; 2006), it is useful to understand novel ecosystems, 
like those that Perfecto and Vandermeer focus on, as constituted out of both human and non-
human processes. Viewing human and non-human influences in these ecosystems as 
fundamentally entwined already presents a challenge to the idea that scientists are disinterested 
observers of the natural world. On one level anyone who drinks coffee is themselves a part of 
the global networks of coffee production that influences what happens on a plantation in 
Brazil. And scientists studying agricultural systems will almost inevitably have some interest 
in social justice and some opinion on how food and other agricultural commodities should be 





6.4.1: Socio-natural complexity 
Much of Perfecto and Vandermeer’s work involves ascertaining the interactions between 
different biological elements in an ecosystem, where different species can often interact in 
complex ways and ecological processes such as mutualism, parasitism, predation and 
competition are all evident (Vandermeer, Perfecto and Philpott, 2010). For example, they 
explain that the ant Azteca instabilis nests in trees on coffee plantations and that it has a 
mutualistic interaction with another small insect called the green coffee scale (Coccus viridis). 
Each species benefits from the other’s presence: the ants scare off predators of the scale and in 
turn the scale provides honeydew for the ant. This allows the scale population to grow. But 
once its population density reaches a particular threshold this can provoke an attack by a 
fungus called Cephalosporium lecanii or white halo fungus which can be seen coating the 
bodies of the insects. The white halo fungus in turn attacks the fungus that causes coffee rust 
disease, Hemileia vastatrix. Coffee rust disease is a devastating pest of coffee and, at the time 
of writing, a major epidemic was “destroying the livelihood of millions of small farmers” 
(John Vandermeer, interview, 8 April 2015). The halo fungus and scale insects, although also 
both pests, are much less destructive. Therefore, the ant-scale mutualism is essential in 
allowing the scale population to reach the levels whereby it can provoke periodic outbreaks of 
white halo fungus, an occurrence thought to be, on balance, useful for farmers in keeping rust 
disease in check (Vandermeer, Perfecto and Philpott, 2010).  
Focusing on just these four species provides only a snapshot of a system that is actually much 
more complex—where coffee berry borers, leaf mining moths, phorid flies and numerous 
species of ant are also involved. But Vandermeer and Perfecto argue that it is, nevertheless, 
still possible to gain useful insights by focusing on one aspect of a wider system (Vandermeer, 
Jackson and Perfecto, 2014), a procedure that Ollman would recognise as abstraction (see 
chapter two). Other empirical evidence appears to back up their hypothesis, where ant nests are 
more common there indeed appears to be a reduction in damage from rust disease. As 
Vandermeer has pointed out, using insecticides might kill off the insect pest species but this 
might result in unforeseen problems for farmers if applying them unleashes an outbreak of 
coffee rust disease (interviewed in Bryce, 2013). This seems to confirm Lorimer and 
Driessen’s (2014) view that ecosystems are often characterised by “surprise” and that 
biodiversity conservation has struggled to take account of such surprising events. Perfecto and 
Vandermeer’s method can therefore start to account for situations where the actions of one 
species can facilitate the flourishing of another, even leading to sudden increases in population, 
an example of a non-linear process at work.  
Furthermore, recognising that complexity exists in an ecosystem also requires a method of 
study that takes into account the degree of complexity. In a statement that demonstrates her 
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knowledge of ecology, animal behaviour and the use of ant species in pest control, Perfecto 
explains that organisms should not be seen as “separate from the environment” illustrating how 
the environment of an ant includes other species:  
This one particular ant could be a very effective predator of the coffee 
berry borer but the ant has a parasite and the parasite, when the parasite is 
present, the ant cannot go out, will stop foraging because it is protecting 
itself from the parasite…  So, when the fly is present the ant is not 
effective at all. And because the ant is not present other ant species start 
preying on the coffee berry borer. So, if you just study the ant in the 
laboratory and look at the different species as separate from their 
environment you might conclude that having just this one species is the 
best thing you can do to control this pest but the reality is that that species 
doesn’t exist in isolation, it exists interacting with a whole bunch of other 
things—other species (interview, 22 September 2014). 
This passage is about understanding a (fairly) complex system where three insect species 
interact and these interactions influence the damage the coffee berry borer pest does to coffee 
plants from the point of view of a farmer. But, as mentioned previously, complexity isn’t just 
something existing “out there” to be observed; it also refers to a predisposition on the part of 
the scientist to understand the objects of study in a particular way. For Perfecto, what she 
refers to as a holistic approach and sometimes as a “dialectical/complexity” approach involves 
understanding what happens to species in situ where possible rather than “just” in the 
laboratory. Dialectics is simultaneously a method of thinking about the world and, for many, a 
statement about how the things of the world actually are (Ollman, 2014, p574). 
Dialectical biologist Rob Wallace, commenting on Perfecto and Vandermeer’s work, further 
adds that “self-organised pest control emerges here out of ecological interactions” (Wallace, 
2016b, p293). As coffee is not native to this part of the world, Wallace sees these complexes of 
species and processes as having arisen contingently—they are in a constant process of being 
formed and reformed—but when such autonomous pest control does emerge it can prove 
useful to the humans that rely on small-scale farming.  
Chapter five referred to an insight into ecosystem dynamics from dialectical biology, the 
recognition that systems exhibit dynamism as a result of the transformative actions of the 
organisms that constitute them. Observed ecosystems therefore cannot be seen as in a final 
state or as stable unless encountered by an external force such as a fire or a flood (Preston, 
2003, p54). In a co-authored article, Perfecto and Vandermeer build on this insight by showing 





is “more technified, more mechanised, more chemicalised, more corporate-like” and might be 
termed industrial agriculture. The second tends to employ more traditional methods, involves 
smaller farms and, importantly, employs the capacities of organisms themselves, for example 
by encouraging the types of autonomous pest control referred to above. This second type of 
farming is described by these authors as doing things the “ecological way” (Vandermeer and 
Perfecto, 2012).  
Although it is possible to imagine a whole spectrum of different ways of farming, Perfecto and 
Vandermeer argue that in reality any one farm will tend towards one or other of the two 
extremes. For example, coffee can be grown in monocultures (ie with no other plant species 
present) where the coffee plants are exposed to full sunlight or the plants can be interspersed 
with shade-providing trees, a more traditional technique (Vandermeer and Perfecto, 2012).50 
Most of the coffee grown in the world today is the former (“sun coffee”) with Brazil being the 
main producer, while in parts of Central America and particularly Mexico, shade coffee is the 
norm. As the authors describe based on their own observations, it can be difficult for 
individual farmers to switch from one syndrome of production to another. For example, a 
farmer they know of who decided to cut down the shade trees on his farm soon found problems 
with weed growth which couldn’t be controlled without herbicides that the farmer struggled to 
afford. Similarly, there are barriers to going from a sun coffee system to a shade-based system 
including lack of knowledge of the most appropriate types of trees to grow.  
The authors conclude that the socio-ecological system has generated its own dynamics. In 
other words, rather than a smooth linear progression from one type of production to another 
being the norm, there are in reality two possible syndromes of production, either one of which 
is stable but where it takes great effort to move from one to the other. Engels might have 
referred to this as a shift from quantitative change to qualitative. Perfecto and Vandermeer 
reflect that external influence, perhaps a change in political policy or climate change, might 
force agricultural systems to reach a tipping point where they switch from one regime to 
another. But they expect that change would be sudden rather than gradual. This suggests that 
the switch from one form of agriculture to another arises as a result of the interaction between 
the properties of the system and the external influence. Although it is a very different example 
of these dynamics, the phenomenon is reminiscent of the way the evolutionary biologists 
discussed in the previous chapter have treated the evolution of species as analogous to trying to 
push a polyhedron with flat sides as opposed to a spherical object. System dynamics involving 
two or more alternative stable states, with a tipping point at which one switches to another are 
already known to ecologists (see Huggett, 2005). What is significant here is that in 
                                                          
50 The trees provide a habitat for the ants that can help control rust disease outbreaks, hence Perfecto and 
Vandermeer tend to favour growing coffee alongside trees.  
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Vandermeer and Perfecto’s study they consider a socio-ecological system, incorporating often 
ignored factors in ecology such as the actions of farmers and economic considerations as well 
as biological processes such as autonomous pest control. 
 
6.4.2: Population and metapopulation 
Perfecto and Vandermeer’s work on metapopulations of species provides another example of 
how they have integrated social and biological considerations into their outlook. This work 
expands on the theory of metapopulations associated with Richard Levins (see Levins, 1976 
and Begon, Townsend and Harper, 2006, pp180-185). In ecology, a metapopulation is a 
network of spatially separated populations of a particular species. For example, a species of ant 
might live in a network of patches of forest separated by areas of agricultural land. 
Metapopulations are dynamic systems; in each patch the population can fluctuate as 
individuals are born or die but individuals can also migrate from one patch to another. Species 
living in the patches of an ecosystem will almost inevitably go extinct locally given a long 
enough time frame. Leave a population of ants in an isolated patch of forest for 100 years and 
by chance it is highly likely to become extinct in that patch at some point before the 100 years 
is over: “local extinctions are common and natural” (Perfecto and Vandermeer, 2008, p177). 
The only way for that population to be replenished and the species as a whole to survive in 
such an environment is to allow the insects to migrate from other patches of forest where there 
are viable populations. So, there are two opposing forces at work—extinction and 
colonisation—meaning that the population of a species in each patch of a metapopulation is 
often far from stable (Begon, Townsend and Harper, 2006). 
Many populations of different species have always existed in these types of dynamic networks, 
but the theory of metapopulations becomes particularly important for understanding 
biodiversity in tropical environments where it is indeed the case that areas of forest are often 
separated by a “matrix” of agricultural land. Perfecto and Vandermeer argue that 
conservationists should, even if they wish to preserve unbroken tracts of unspoiled tropical 
forest, accept the reality of the situation as it is—in tropical regions the forest is often already 
fragmented (Perfecto and Vandermeer, 2008; Perfecto, Vandermeer, and Wright, 2009). 
Therefore, what happens in the agricultural matrix matters; if agriculture provides a hostile 
environment and prevents the migration of animals this will put the whole metapopulation at 
risk in the long term (Perfecto and Vandermeer, 2002). This is not an argument that more 
tropical forest should be cut down for agriculture, Perfecto and Vandermeer are clear that this 
is not necessary. However “given the fragmented nature of most tropical ecosystems, 
agricultural landscapes should be an essential component of any conservation strategy” 





The metapopulation approach has led Perfecto and Vandermeer to be somewhat critical of the 
“land sparing” hypothesis. This supposes that intensifying agricultural production will mean 
that agriculture takes up less space. Producing the same yields on a smaller area will 
supposedly leave more space for nature. Some popular accounts of land sparing suggest that 
stretches of land will return to a “wilderness” state if left free from human influence (eg Acton, 
2014). In contrast, the land sharing approach of Perfecto and Vandermeer would be more 
focused on sustainable agriculture that allows agricultural uses and biodiversity to coexist on 
the same area of land but would leave less space for “wilderness”. By employing their 
understanding of metapopulation theory, Perfecto and Vandermeer have introduced an 
argument that is not often considered in this long running debate. Advocates of land sparing or 
land sharing often implicitly treat the situation as if areas of land with different uses can be 
hermetically sealed. However, this ignores the issue of the ways in which many living things 
migrate from one area to another (Phalan et al, 2011). However, leaving patches of “natural” 
habitat surrounded by intensive agriculture might cause problems for biodiversity, although 
species might be able to survive in the patches, they will still go extinct if they cannot migrate 
between them.  
As well as identifying weaknesses in the biological theory underlying the land sparing 
approach, Perfecto and Vandermeer also criticise it for its political blindness: “intensification 
does not take place in a social/political vacuum”. For example, they point to various studies 
that suggest that increasing yields by increasing the use of technology on farms can give 
farmers an incentive to increase production and therefore increase the area of land under 
cultivation rather than decrease it. Farmers generally act to increase their return on investment 
rather than aiming to produce a target amount of food (or other produce) as assumed by the 
land sparing hypothesis (Perfecto and Vandermeer, 2008, p181).  
 
6.5: Conclusion 
The opening chapters of this thesis demonstrated that geographers are already considering 
what it is that non-humans can do. Discussions of non-human agency are ongoing in areas 
such as animal geography and among those influenced by new materialist thought. It is now 
not unusual to find discussions among geographers of ecosystems, biodiversity conservation, 
relationships with animals and even genetics and microbiology. Therefore, there are 
compelling reasons for geographers to take note of the findings of biologists as they attempt to 
make sense of today’s environmental problems. But social scientists ought also to recognise 
that biology itself is changing and is far from unified (Meloni, 2014).  
172 Chapter 6: Constructed niches and novel ecosystems 
 
As discussed above, niche construction theory is described as a “neglected process in 
evolution”. It suggests that organisms might have more “agency” in directing their own 
evolution than had previously been supposed. The theory is just one of several challenges to 
old certainties within biology. It is an example of relational, dialectical thinking that also has 
theoretical and methodological applications for geography. Engaging with such novel ideas 
within biology could add theoretical clarity to (more than) human geographical notions of 
agency and open avenues for interdisciplinary work. Indeed, NCT advocates themselves have 
called for a rapprochement between disciplines, arguing that their theory provides links 
between evolutionary biology, ecology and the human sciences and undermines some of the 
ways in which these had previously been separated (Laland et al, 2014; Pigliucci, 2007).  
It could be argued that geography and evolutionary biology consider such different timescales 
that the concerns of the two disciplines are irreconcilable. Evolution operates over timescales 
of tens of thousands of years whereas geographical studies (in both human and physical 
geography) tend to concern processes happening over years or decades. If this is so then niche 
construction is only really useful for its insights in ecology, and geographers ought to ignore 
applications in evolutionary theory. There are several counters to this argument. Firstly, 
evolution does often occur on shorter timescales than we might suppose; insects have started to 
become resistant to the most common insecticides over decades rather than millennia (Russell, 
2003). Furthermore, these instances of rapid species evolution are often themselves caused by 
the actions of humans, as well as having consequences for human societies. Therefore, 
Edmund Russell uses this fact to make a compelling case that biological evolution ought not to 
be ignored by social scientists, including in his own discipline, history (Russell, 2003). 
As explained in this chapter, niche construction is associated with dialectical biology and with 
Richard Lewontin’s work in particular. It builds on the dialectical biologists’ inclination to 
treat the socio-natural world as fundamentally dynamic, to see change as the default state of 
things and stasis as what requires explanation. The theory is influenced by Marxist 
understandings of the agency of humans in changing the world around them. But the theory of 
niche construction remains controversial; hence its followers are “causing a commotion” 
within biology (Laland, Odling-Smee and Feldman, 2004). Although niche construction theory 
should not be seen as a “theory of everything” that simply has to be applied to any situation, it 
has already started to influence thinking in the social sciences including the work of Clark and 
York, Ellis, Kallis, Stallins and Swyngedouw.  
Mainstream thinking in biology has relied on externalist assumptions about the relationship 
between organism and environment. But these are being challenged by theories such as niche 
construction, where externalism is no longer seen as adequate to understand fully how species 





environment as two elements that mutually construct each other to such an extent that it does 
not make sense to talk about an “environment” without the associated organism. A radical 
interpretation of the theory denies entirely that “the environment” exists, or at least that the 
environment is something stable and coherent that needs “saving”. Instead, organism and 
environment can be seen as abstractions from a totality. Bringing work in biology into 
conversation with the dialectical philosophy of Ollman and Harvey, with its insistence that the 
world is made of relations rather than things, can illuminate this possibility.  
The various contributions of Ivette Perfecto and John Vandermeer discussed here demonstrate 
how two dialectical thinkers have thought about wildlife in coffee plantations. Although these 
are clearly environments where human agency has played a major role, a host of other 
organisms also act in these systems, often in unpredictable ways, whether by causing other 
species to proliferate or by migrating from one part of the system to another. The work of these 
two scientists shows how social concerns such as the needs and actions of farmers can be 
integrated into an overall picture of what happens in these agro-ecosystems along with 
knowledge of ecology and animal behaviour. The ecosystems they study can, again drawing on 
the dialectical approach outlined in chapter two, be seen as constituted by multiple social and 
natural processes. The work of these scientists defies dualist understandings whereby human 
action is treated merely as a threat to wildlife. The following chapter will show how these 
theories can contribute to recent debates in geography around the need to develop a more 
overtly historical approach to socio-natural relations.  
 
  






Chapter 7: Historicising political ecologies 
Chapter six explained how dialectical biologists have developed accounts of evolution centred 
on the active role of organisms (both human and non-human) in shaping environments and 
how these ideas have been taken up by niche construction theorists. One area where this 
thinking might be taken forward is in creating an approach to geographies of non-humans that 
takes seriously the proposal that non-humans are historical agents. Such an approach, it is 
argued, would integrate insights from political ecology, evolutionary biology and more-than-
human geographies.  
Political ecology, with its overt references to the wider political forces structuring human-
environment relations and its roots in political economy, has already been somewhat 
influenced by historical approaches. There is already a wide literature on “historical political 
ecologies” that seeks to understand the temporal processes driving environmental change and 
that makes use of the theoretical and methodological contributions of historians (see Offen, 
2004). However, as explained in chapter one, political ecology has tended, at times, to focus 
on questions of discourse and representation and the influence these have on how humans 
manipulate the physical environment rather than on the actions of non-human species. 
Therefore, the subdiscipline has been criticised for the relative lack of attention given to 
ecological research in general (Walker, 2005) and to ecological engagements with non-human 
subjectivity in particular (Zimmerer, 1994). Hobson (2007) suggests that a failure to engage 
with the subjectivity of non-humans such as animals can lead to them being treated as passive 
bystanders in political ecologists’ analysis or even that they come to be viewed as “co-
oppressors of the world’s marginalised and poor” (p253). 
Animal geography, as developed in the past two decades, aims to address some of these 
omissions in political ecology. These more-than-human geographies have addressed, among 
other things, issues of animal subjectivity, the constitutive roles of animals in human societies, 
the role of scientific and other practices in representing animals and the political implications 
of such practices. Animal geography originated within cultural geography, so it is perhaps 





represented and how social institutions such as zoos shape popular understandings of animals 
(Anderson, 1998).  
However, little of this work is overtly historical. Many of the richly depicted examples of non-
human agency within geography consider individual animals (or sometimes plants or 
microbes) and their effects over short time-scales rather than accounting for the accumulated 
and directed effects of interactions between species and environments over time. For example, 
Lorimer’s work on non-human charisma considers the fleeting effects of individual 
representatives of particular animal species on the humans with which they come into contact 
(Lorimer, 2007).  
However, this is a problem that animal geographers recognise and are seeking to change. 
Wilcox and Rutherford, in their recent edited collection (Wilcox and Rutherford, 2018) refer to 
the need for a more historical animal geography, whereby animals (and other non-human 
species) are perceived as having a history and where “human and non-human agencies have 
shaped each other through time” (Wilcox and Rutherford, 2018, p3). They also address the 
political consequences of not seeing animals in this way. The contributors to this collection 
have pointed to several ways in which a more historical approach can extend the insights of 
animal geography. For example, work on pet ownership has engaged with spatial questions as 
it concerns animals in the home but this work could also be built upon by asking questions 
about the point in history at which animals first became pets. Answering this question involves 
charting the development of a particular type of culture that values relationships with certain 
types of animals rather than seeing that culture as universal (Howell, 2018).  
This chapter, based on my own contribution to that collection (Royle, 2018), will address the 
reasons why geographers might want to integrate the historical approach of some 
interpretations of political ecology with more-than-human thinking in order to counter some of 
the human exceptionalist narratives of the Anthropocene. The chapter will use the example of 
the ways in which animals are represented in natural history museums to show how ahistorical 
accounts of animals are maintained by cultural practices and will offer a way forward based on 
Charles Darwin’s historical and materialist writings on earthworms and the more recent 
contributions of niche construction biologists around earthworm evolution. It will conclude 
with some comments on what a niche construction approach means for debates around human 
nature, also of course highly relevant to discussions of the Anthropocene, by showing how 
evolutionary biology has suggested a non-reductionist route through which humans might have 
developed differentiated abilities to modify the biosphere that does not rely on exceptionalism.  
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7.1: Human exceptionalism 
Wilcox and Rutherford frame their work in opposition to “human exceptionalism” (2018, p1). 
This leads us back to discussions of the Anthropocene. As demonstrated in chapter three, 
discussions of the proposed epoch have involved a paradox: while renewed concerns over 
environmental threats have brought home how dependent humans are on the rest of nature, 
“this threat also appears to be prompting a renewed commitment to the idea that humans 
possess a unique capacity to control our environment” (Anderson, 2014, p13). So, humans are 
seen as uniquely able to modify the biosphere, even to the extent of being able to push the 
globe into a new epoch. But, while there is an emphasis in some of these accounts in humans’ 
ability consciously to manipulate the biosphere, humans are also seen as the object of natural 
forces over which they have little control. This has implications for environmental theory and 
politics as it brings with it the related notion that the non-human world can be freely 
manipulated in line with human wishes and desires (Anderson, 2014). This view of 
unprecedented human capacity to direct what happens to the rest of the biosphere is indeed 
evident in some discussions of the Anthropocene, for example in Ellis’ assertion that the 
“environment will be what we make it” (quoted in Collard, Dempsey and Sundberg, 2015, 
p324). For Anderson, the Anthropocene paradox is itself rooted in human exceptionalism, “the 
positing of a separation between active human subjects and passive non-human objects” 
(Anderson, 2014, p5). One particular way in which this exceptionalism manifests itself is in 
perpetuating the view that animals do not change through time as human societies do. The 
status of a historical subject with the capacity to shape history is reserved for humans whereas 
non-humans are assumed not to be historical actors. 
Criticising human exceptionalism and its role in discussions of the Anthropocene, Rutherford 
(2018, p202) uses recent work in historical geographies to critique attempts at “resurrection 
ecology”. Such projects are referred to as “resurrection” as they aim to restore extinct species 
to life by human endeavour, for example by editing DNA from museum specimens into the 
genomes of closely related extant species. For Rutherford, these projects offer “human mastery 
over nature”, suggesting that the non-human world can be manipulated at will with the right 
technology and enough money. As well as attempts to bring back extinct species by cloning or 
gene editing, Rutherford gives the example of selective breeding of Heck cattle (Rutherford, 
2018, pp201-205). Lorimer might disagree that Heck cattle breeding is an example of human 
mastery, given that attempts to reintroduce this species have been characterised by surprise as 
well as order and control (Lorimer, 2015). Nevertheless, for Rutherford, such projects are 
problematic as they do little to address the human-animal relations that are driving species 





As she is writing in a book about historical animal geographies, Rutherford is almost 
apologetic for raising the subject of the Anthropocene. A proposed epoch that is often 
discussed with reference to the future of the planet, may “seem quite distant from the subject 
of this book” (Rutherford, 2018, p201). However, the Anthropocene is indeed a matter for 
historians. What is needed is an analysis of how the proposed Anthropocene epoch began, 
when it began and what processes led to this situation—as it becomes more and more 
commonplace to argue that the Anthropocene has already started—rather than treating the 
epoch as either an imminent crisis or a hopeful scenario of future human domination over 
nature. 
Human exceptionalism is reinforced by cultural representations of animals. As Moore (2015, 
chapter 8) argues, rather than simply being expressions of ideas distinct from material reality, 
these practices of representation both emerge from and reinforce certain ways of treating non-
humans. Ideas about animals have real consequences for how humans understand and relate to 
the rest of nature. In what follows this chapter therefore addresses the way in which animals 
are presented in museums such as London’s Natural History Museum. If scientific norms have 
served to establish a proper place for animals, the presentation of animal specimens in a 
museum can similarly be thought of as a form of cultural practice.  
 
7.2: Museums and animal representation 
London’s Natural History Museum owns more than 20 million animal specimens. Many of 
them are preserved in ethanol and therefore known as the spirit collection. The collection 
includes rodents, reptiles, fish, amphibians, octopuses and larger animals such as a 3m long 
Greenland shark and an 8m long giant squid called Archie. Although part of the spirit 
collection is open to the public, most of it is kept behind the scenes on over 27km of shelving. 
Items are sometimes lent out for scientific research, or, preferably from the point of view of 
the museum as some of the specimens are rare or delicate, researchers visit the museum in 
order to make use of the collection. Some items in the museum’s possession were collected by 
Darwin, including fish specimens brought back from his five-year long voyage on The Beagle.  
The ways in which animals feature in natural history museums can influence the way people 
think about them (Kalof, Zammit-Lucia and Kelly, 2011). For example, museums such as this 
also play a role in what Philo and Wilbert (2000) might refer to as the spatial ordering of 
animals. The jars in the spirit collection as well as the exhibits in the public galleries are 
arranged according to the taxonomic system established in the 18th century by Carl Linnaeus. 
Exhibits about mammals are found in one part of the museum and those about insects in 
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another. The animals are therefore represented as distinct both from their own habitats and 
from other organisms with which they would interact in the wild. 
The museum and the collection featured in the novel Kraken, by the weird fiction author China 
Miéville. Miéville imagines the giant squid mysteriously going missing and the museum’s 
curator Billy being troubled by the sounds of grinding glass on distant corridors as the 
specimens appear to come to life:  
The corridor opened out, not a room but a sudden large hallway. It was 
stacked quite full of taxidermy, charnel Victoriana. Mammal heads 
watched from walls, like a hundred Faladas; bison stiff as ageing soldiers 
by a plaster iguanodon and a tatty emu… A clink, a clank. Under the 
striplights the stuffed bodies shed hard shadows. Billy heard another tiny 
noise. It came from the dark by the wall, deep in the specimen 
undergrowth (Miéville, 2010, p30).  
Indeed, as Miéville expresses, seeing so many dead animals curled up in an odd assortment of 
glass jars, with yellowing handwritten labels giving the Latin species names can be an eerie 
experience. Furthermore, by being invited to view dead animal specimens, viewers are 
encouraged to see animals as objects for our observation. One consequence of the practice of 
displaying animals as museum exhibits lends itself to an understanding of animal life as 
ahistorical. Human society might have changed since 19th century explorers like Darwin 
travelled the world searching for specimens, but, due to the emphasis on preservation in 
museums, we are led to believe that the animals remain the same. Such ahistorical conceptions 
of animals are not only blind to the ways in which animals have changed over time but would 
also seem to foreclose any discussion of how humans and animals have influenced each other 
throughout history. 
In fairness, museums are often aware of the importance of how they represent animals. 
Although they need to preserve animal specimens, the London Natural History Museum also 
has a mandate to facilitate scientific research. This tension between the museum’s desires to 
represent the animals of the past and to foster an understanding of living, breathing animal life 
was highlighted by the recent redevelopment of the museum’s central Hintze Hall. The project 
involved removing “Dippy”, the famous cast of a Diplodocus skeleton and replacing it with a 
real blue whale skeleton suspended from the ceiling (“a perfect symbol of…hope”) along with 
other new exhibits that tell “the dramatic story of evolution, diversity in the world today and 
our urgent role in the planet’s future” (Natural History Museum, 2016).  
Nevertheless, exhibits like the spirit collection demonstrate the resilience of the notion of 





in cultural practices. If humans are seen as dynamic while other animals are static this runs the 
risk of enforcing a form of human exceptionalism whereby the agency of other animals is not 
fully accounted for. As animal geographers have long recognised, these ways of representing 
and of understanding animals can also feed into ideas about “nature” generally, reinforcing the 
binary separation of nature and human society. As we will see, in the case of Darwin’s 
specimens, this is ironic indeed. It was Darwin who gave us the idea that life forms have a 
history.  
 
7.3: Darwin’s small agencies of earthworms 
Before Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection, life had been assumed to be typified 
by invariance and stability. However, according to biologist Ernst Mayr, Darwin “introduced 
historicity into science” by showing how species, rather than being fixed and static, could 
evolve into radically new forms (Mayr, 2000). As discussed in chapter two with reference to 
the scientific influences on Engels’ Dialectics of Nature, evolution involves irreversible 
change and development. Darwin’s theories were part of a shift in emphasis towards 
understanding such phenomena that also took place within other scientific disciplines in the 
19th century. 
Darwin recognised that in a population of organisms of a particular species there is often 
variation in the characteristics (phenotype) of individuals. Those individuals whose 
characteristics are best suited to their environment are more likely to survive and to produce 
offspring.51 But for evolution to occur, characteristics also need to be heritable (capable of 
being passed from a parent to its offspring). Over time certain phenotypes will become 
dominant in the population by this method. Although natural selection is sometimes termed 
“survival of the fittest” (a term coined not by Darwin but by Herbert Spencer), “fitness” in 
biology is understood relationally, it refers to how suited an organism is to its environment 
rather than being an inherent property (Mayr, 2000).52  
Darwin was not the first to argue that change could occur within a species. There were pre-
Darwinian evolutionists, notably Lamarck (Angus, 2017, pp33-35). And the fact that certain 
characteristics of animals could be artificially selected for was well known by lay people such 
as fancy pigeon breeders, who Darwin associated with (see Desmond and Moore, 1991, 
pp425-430). However, Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection provided answers to 
two questions: why do organisms seem well suited to their environment? And how can we 
                                                          
51 In sexually reproducing species an individual might also increase its chances of reproducing by being 
more able to attract a mate than their peers. 
52 Fitness is defined as how successful an organism is at reproducing. 
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account for the diversity of living things? Answers were provided respectively by the theory of 
natural selection and by the realisation that one species could evolve into another over time 
(see Pigliucci, 2007).  
At the time when Darwin was writing, the foundations of biology were being shaken. In the 
18th century, human exceptionalism had taken the form of Cartesian dualism, the idea, 
associated with Descartes, that humans—uniquely among animals—possess a soul and/or the 
capacity for rational action. However, by the beginning of the 19th century “the idea of an 
immaterial soul or mind was actively rejected” (Anderson, 2014, p6). Cartesianism had given 
way to a more materialist approach rooted in the scientific practices of the day. This is not to 
say that human exceptionalism was dispensed with; rather, it persisted in a different form with 
human distinctiveness thought of as having emerged from the physical differences between 
humans and other animals (Anderson, 2014, pp9-13). Therefore, Anderson argues, those who 
attack “Cartesian” dualism ought to note that they are dealing with a doctrine that has itself 
gone through historical changes. Furthermore, as Juanita Sundberg (2014) reminds us, the 
modern separation of nature and culture often referred to as “Cartesian”, far from being a 
universal foundation of thought, was specific to Western societies.  
Darwin himself returned throughout his life to debates about whether living things are 
animated by a vital force that is instilled in them from without or whether they contain an 
inherent vitality. As a young man observing pollen grains bursting under a microscope he 
noted: “the matter inside seemed to have a self-activating power” (Desmond and Moore, 1991, 
p82). Indeed, this was a key question for 19th century thinkers. Many of Darwin’s 
contemporaries maintained that matter was essentially inert, with the vital force in living 
things given by God. However, some radicals, including Darwin’s mentor Robert Grant, 
sought to explain liveliness in matter according to naturalistic principles without the need for 
celestial intervention.53 This materialist and historical approach would be evident in Darwin’s 
own writings for the rest of his career.  
Continuing this interest in the liveliness of non-human organisms, towards the end of his life, 
Darwin published an investigation into the lives of earthworms: The Formation of Vegetable 
Mould through the Action of Worms with Observations on their Habits (Darwin, 1881, p2). 
The book was a bestseller, with sales at the time actually rivalling those of his better known 
On the Origin of Species (Feller et al, 2003). Devoted almost entirely to earthworms, the book 
                                                          
53 As Darwin’s biographers point out, Grant’s view fitted well with the political views of the liberal 
intellectual circles with which both Darwin and Grant associated. It suggested that people were capable 
of self-improvement, providing an analogy that suited the emerging industrial class when old institutions 






includes the results of experiments on live worms performed by Darwin in his home, 
observations of worms in the garden and notes on their historical activities. Darwin’s writings 
are discussed here as they offer an alternative, more historical, way of describing the actions of 
non-human animals that recognises the role worm action plays in human societies. The 
earthworm example is, as discussed in the previous chapter, also popular among niche 
construction biologists. Furthermore, the historical approach expressed in Darwin’s writings 
was influential to Marx and Engels’ outlook. 
Darwin was interested in whether worms display evidence of “intelligence”. He described how 
the animals responded to vibrations, appearing to feel “aroused”, “surprised” or “distressed” 
by the presence of bright light and how they reacted to being played music (1881, p21). 
Darwin even explicitly compared the worms’ actions to those of humans. He described how, 
when a worm pulls a leaf into its burrow, it acts “in nearly the same manner as would a man” 
in solving this problem (1881, p312). The possibility of worm intelligence was a key reason 
for the book’s surprising popularity with the Victorian public. Worms had been considered 
ugly and useless, especially given their limited sensory abilities and the benefits of earthworms 
to gardeners were not well known even into the 20th century (Feller et al, 2003, p40). It should 
be cautioned, though, that Darwin hastily attributed intelligence to worms and today his 
writings would be seen as needlessly anthropomorphic (Feller et al, 2003, p43). However, it is 
interesting that, given the modern association of “work” with human enterprise, the naturalist 
refers repeatedly to the “work” carried out by the worms. For example, they are described as 
performing the work of drawing leaves into their burrows during the night (1881, p61).  
As Darwin also described, stones left on the surface of soil would, over decades, sink into the 
ground due to the actions of digging worms, bringing fresh soil to the surface and creating 
tunnels underneath objects that occasionally collapsed. For Darwin the whole of the topsoil is 
in “constant, though slow movement” due to the actions of worms (1881, p305).54 
Archaeologists ought to be thankful to the animals, he wrote. They have preserved Roman 
ruins by covering them with earth. However, their activities are also destructive. Their steady 
burrowing had affected the Neolithic earthworks at Stonehenge, causing some of the outer 
stones to collapse and become partially buried (1881, pp154-158).  
The lives of worms are also entwined with those of humans in other ways. Darwin described 
how worms tunnel into the soil and produce casts on the surface by ingesting a mixture of soil 
and vegetable matter and excreting it. For him it was fascinating to think that “the vegetable 
                                                          
54 Darwin tested this by setting out a “worm stone”: a flat round stone on the top of the soil with a 
hollow centre containing an instrument for measuring how far the stone had sunk into the ground. A 
reconstruction of the experiment can be seen in the grounds of the family home at Down House in Kent 
so the continued digging activities of the descendants of Darwin’s worms can still be observed. 
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mould [topsoil] over the whole country has passed many times through, and will again pass 
many times through, the intestinal canals of worms” (1881, p4). As Darwin convincingly 
demonstrated, worms play a role in constructing human societies. They produce “wonderful” 
transformations in farmers’ fields, turning rocky ground into fertile farmland. Strikingly, in his 
concluding remarks he states that the earth has been “ploughed” by worms since long before 
humans invented the plough (p313). This suggests a perspective quite different to what 
Haraway criticises as productivist logic, whereby non-human nature is the raw material on 
which human enterprise acts (Haraway, 1989, p13). 
In the introduction to their edited collection, Wilcox and Rutherford (2018, p2) write that 
animals leave little physical trace of their activities for historians to learn from, and they 
complain that animals don’t produce their own archives or pass down memories from one 
generation to the next. However, Darwin’s account provides a counter-argument to this 
unevidenced claim. It shows how the activities of other species have actually, in many cases, 
had a significant effect on their environment that can indeed still be detected by historians, 
even that their influence can be seen on the Roman ruins that conventional historians might 
take an interest in. Darwin’s views on worms suggest that, far from being hidden from 
contemporary observers, the activities of animals in the past are very much still observable 
today due to the effect creatures have on the landscape.  
As the Marxist biologist Stephen Jay Gould (2007) points out, Darwin’s work demonstrates a 
concern with the way in which small actions by worms can produce large-scale directed 
change when aggregated over time. Small quantitative changes could trigger qualitative shifts, 
as evidenced by the collapsing stones at Stonehenge. Although a book of observations of 
worms in the garden might be seen as a departure from work that had addressed grand 
questions—the origin of species, the evolution of humans—and a turn towards the mundane, 
Gould says that Darwin was actually pointing out something key to his whole way of thinking. 
In evolutionary theory species might only change very slightly with each generation, but over 
millennia, evolution can have a spectacularly transformative effect. Failure to appreciate this 
led to misunderstandings and even hostility towards evolution in Darwin’s own time: 
“an…inability to sum up the effects of a continually recurrent cause, which has often retarded 
the progress of science” (Darwin, 1881, p6).  
More recent investigators have described earthworms and other soil-dwelling invertebrates as 
ecosystem engineers—species that modify the resources available to other organisms by 
changing the physical, chemical or biological environment. As Lavelle et al (2006) confirm, 
earthworms break up soil particles into smaller pieces making the soil more amenable for crop 
plants to establish roots. They “dramatically change the structure and chemistry of the soils in 





Smee, Laland and Feldman, 2003, p11). The physical effects of worms can also be seen at 
much larger scales, for example when their actions lead to soil erosion and soil creep on 
sloping land (Lavelle et al, 2006, p8). However, Feller and others (2003) suggest that Darwin’s 
own work on worms remains overlooked as agricultural scientists have become preoccupied 
with chemical inputs rather than soil composition or soil dwelling organisms (2003, pp29 and 
44). For these authors there is likely to be a revival of awareness and interest in the book in 
line with an increased interest in organic farming.  
However, as discussed earlier with reference to the limitations of new materialist accounts, 
emphasising the active role played by non-humans in providing a “service” can have 
problematic implications. Where the input of non-humans into, for example, agriculture, has 
been recognised, various governments have been quick to attempt to incorporate their activities 
into a capitalist framework in the form of “natural capital”, where putting a price on 
“ecosystem services” is suggested as a solution to biodiversity loss (Monbiot, 2014; Lorimer, 
2012, p603).  
Drawing on Darwin’s references to the “small agencies” of the worms, Jane Bennett (2010) 
and Elizabeth Grosz (2011), two writers in the new materialist tradition, have both referred to 
Darwin’s work, particularly his comments about the self-activating power of matter. As 
explained in chapter three, the work of both, although sometimes described as neo-vitalist, has 
diverged from traditional vitalism. Both, like Darwin, tend to see the vitality of things as 
arising from the properties of matter rather than viewing the former as bestowed on matter 
from the outside. In her book Vibrant Matter (2010, chapter 7), Bennett makes use of Darwin’s 
writing on the “small agencies” of earthworms, addressing the role of worms in human 
societies as well as his comments on worm intelligence. Bennett asks whether the ability of 
worms to act makes them like humans or whether the observers’ ability to engage with the 
agency of worms is clouded by an anthropomorphism that obscures types of agency that do not 
operate in the same way as human action. Agency, for Bennett is, rather than being a 
possession of humans, distributed across a network. Human agency must work in concert with 
a host of other agencies at work in the world. Bennett notes how the way in which worms 
allow plants (including crops) to grow makes human action reliant on them. The animals 
should therefore be seen as members of a “public” in an interpretation of the political that is 
expanded beyond humans (Bennett, 2010, pp103-104).  
The emphasis on materiality and non-human agency within new materialist work is to be 
welcomed. However, this work has done relatively little to address the directedness of social 
relations and the historical processes that have allowed relationships to develop. Rather than 
discussing how worm agency has been utilised by different human societies throughout 
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history, Bennett is more focused on the way in which networks of worms, humans and other 
agents hang together in the present moment (see also chapter three).  
By contrast, evolutionary biology offers a more historical approach. As described in chapter 
six, earthworm evolution is one of the key examples used by niche construction biologists to 
demonstrate how their theory challenges existing thinking—although Bennett does not 
mention these contemporary debates among biologists. When niche construction biologists 
refer to the actions of earthworms, in contrast to much contemporary animal geography, they 
consider earthworms as a species rather than as individual animals. The earthworm example is 
one of change occurring over the long term. The effect the worms have on the soil takes 
decades and the evolution of the worm’s physiology has taken millions of years. For niche 
construction theorists the actions of worms have not only undermined buildings but have also 
played a role in their own evolution. They point out that earthworm evolution cannot be 
understood without taking into account the way worms have modified their immediate 
environment and treating this as itself an evolutionary process (Odling-Smee, Laland and 
Feldman, 2003, pp374-376).  
Niche construction theory has already been outlined in the previous chapter. However, it is 
important to emphasise here that it is inherently a theory of how organisms change over time 
and the theory does not make sense without considering a temporal dimension. As Brandon 
and Antonovics (1996, p174) explain, from an atemporal point of view, aspects of the 
environment can be measured independently of the organism that inhabits it. For example, one 
might measure the temperature, moisture content of pH of soil and treat these properties as 
independent of the living organisms that dwell there. However, when considering evolution 
over time, the “environment” becomes both cause and effect of evolutionary processes so 
cannot be seen as simply independent. A temporal dimension, as well as geographical space 
and scale, needs to be taken into account in order to understand how organism and 
environment mutually construct each other. This seems analogous to Jason Moore’s point 
about society and nature, that they cease to be simply a relation and become a dialectic when 
they are treated in a way that addresses their dynamism, ascertaining the “laws of motion” of 
socio-natures (Moore, 2017b, p295). 
Darwin’s materialist outlook has influenced new materialists. However, as the following 
section explains, Darwin is also a point of reference for Marxist, dialectical thinkers. This 
shared intellectual heritage suggests that there may be fewer differences between the two 
theories that is often supposed. It might provide the basis for developing a Marxism that 






7.4: Marxism and Darwin 
Both Marx and Engels were familiar with Darwin’s work and, despite his liberal politics and 
enthusiasm for Malthus, they were enthusiastic about its implications. Indeed, both read On the 
Origin of Species (published in 1859) and described it as “the basis for our views” (Foster, 
2000, p197, Angus, 2017; Royle, 2014). The relationship between the two thinkers is now 
fairly well-known (although much has been made of the myth that Marx wanted to dedicate 
Capital to Darwin—now conclusively disproved, see Blackledge, 2002, p11). The intention 
here is not to rehearse these arguments at length. Rather it is to remind readers that Darwinism 
is an influence on Marxism as well as for the new/vital materialists, although this Darwinian 
influence has been downplayed in Western Marxism following Lukács’ apparent reject of the 
dialectics of nature. As Clark, Foster and York (2007) argue, Marx’s debt to Darwin is 
evidence of their shared turn towards materialism. Both developed a philosophical approach 
that did not require the introduction of a spirit to animate matter as in the religious and 
idealistic ideas of their time. Both rejected crude teleological accounts of evolution progressing 
towards a predefined end point.   
The materialism of both Marx and Darwin was a historical materialism. If the historical role of 
animals has been somewhat overlooked within animal geography, a historical approach has 
been absolutely central to ecological Marxist thinking on ecological questions, for example 
Loftus describes historicising nature-society relations as the first step in Smith’s project of 
developing the production of nature approach (Loftus, 2017, p2). As shown in chapter three of 
this thesis, ecological Marxism is founded on a discussion of how different societies 
throughout history have produced different types of environments. It treats these relations as 
always transitory. Marx and Engels, then, apparently saw an analogy between Darwin’s 
account of species changing through time and their own approach to human history. For 
Engels in particular, the engagement of the natural sciences—especially Darwin—with notions 
of historical and unidirectional change was a major influence on his unfinished attempt at a 
dialectics of nature. Engels points out that Linnaeus divided up the living world into 
“unalterable organic species”. In contrast, Darwin demonstrated that: 
Nature works dialectically and not metaphysically… [nature] does not 
move in the eternal oneness of a perpetually recurring circle but goes 
through a real historical evolution. In this connection, Darwin must be 
named before all others. He dealt the metaphysical conception of nature 
the heaviest blow by his proof that all organic beings, plants, animals, and 
man himself, are the products of a process of evolution going on through 
millions of years (Engels, 1970 [1880], emphasis added).  
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Furthermore, an assertion that “history matters” has, as described in chapter five here, also 
been one of the key contributions of the dialectical biologists and their adherents. Levins and 
Lewontin (2006) have made their historical approach one of the tenets of their programme for 
biology. However, as Gould also recognised, there are different interpretations of Darwinism: 
there is a gradualist Darwinism that emphasises slow change and one that takes into account 
abrupt shifts in evolution (Blackledge and Kirkpatrick, 2002).  
This chapter has so far emphasised the commonalities between human and animal agency. It 
has shown how efforts to historicise animals, with the example of Darwin’s writings on 
worms, can offer an antidote to the kind of exceptionalist thinking that treats only humans as 
historical subjects. However, while opposing the view that humans are able to manipulate the 
rest of the biosphere at will, there are reasons why social scientists might want to distinguish 
the human capacity to transform the environment from that of other species. It is undoubtedly 
the activities of humans (or rather, the human-initiated capitalist system) that are at the root 
cause of climate change, plastic in the oceans and biodiversity loss, although other species play 
a role in these phenomena. John Bellamy Foster and others may be correct to see the ability to 
create a rift in the socio-natural metabolism as a uniquely human trait. Therefore, there is a 
need to address—with some comments on human “nature”—this apparently differentiated 
capacity to disrupt socio-natural relations.  
As described in chapter three, some commentators on the Anthropocene have argued that there 
is something innate in “human nature” that compels the burning of fossil fuels (see the critique 
in Malm and Hornborg, 2014, p63). They have adopted a determinist view that puts humanity 
on a pathway towards an inevitable Anthropocene catastrophe. However, this is a long way 
from the sophisticated discussion of human nature to be found in the work of Marx and Engels. 
As we shall see, the work of the dialectical biologists, some of whom have attempted to 
integrate their understandings of evolution with thinking on human culture and social relations 
is also informative in addressing these debates. 
 
7.5: Human nature in the Anthropocene 
Political ecologists have already done much to refute apolitical viewpoints by addressing the 
social roots of ecological degradation rather than seeing it as the outcome of, for example, 
human overpopulation (Robbins, 2012, pp14-18). Indeed, political ecology itself originated out 
of a response to “alarmist and universalist approaches to human behaviour” that, in essence, 
often blamed environmental problems on human nature, particularly the behaviour of people in 





This is a subject that has been discussed and debated at length by Marxists. But, in essence, for 
Marx, human nature, rather than being fixed, remains malleable and develops partially as a 
result of the way in which humans manipulate the environment which influences human 
development (Sayers, 2005; see also the discussion of human nature in Molyneux, 2012). 
However, Marx does not simply reduce human nature to social relations or say that there is “no 
such thing as human nature”. Norman Geras convincingly refutes this assumption, stating that 
Marx’s sixth thesis on Feuerbach, where the latter states that “the essence of man…is the 
ensemble of social relations”, “does not show Marx rejected the idea of a human nature” and 
that Marx “was right not to do so” (Geras, 2016 [1983], pp29 and 116).55 As Geras clarifies, it 
is possible to assert the existence of a human nature while also refusing to abstract this nature 
from historical processes. Marx also refers, in Capital, to the “species being” of a human and 
discusses the differences between humans and other animals, pointing out that humans are 
unlike bees and spiders in that humans consciously and intentionally modify their 
environments (see chapter two).  
In the essay “The Part Played by Labour in the Transition from Ape to Man”, Engels further 
argues that the use of tools played a role in human evolution by allowing for the development 
of larger brains, therefore effectively saying that humans have driven our own evolution in a 
particular direction by manipulation of the external environment mediated by labour. As 
discussed in chapter two, this is one of the more useful insights arising from his study of the 
dialectics of nature (Engels, 1939). For Engels, in this text, the distinction between humans 
and other animals lies in the ability to modify the biosphere (Sayers, 2005) but this is also the 
source of human differentiation. The transition “from ape to man” therefore represented a 
qualitative shift in the ways in which humans relate to and modify the rest of nature. So, Marx 
and Engels already laid the basis for an understanding of the ways in which a further shift 
might have taken place as planetary conditions tipped over from Holocene to Anthropocene. 
Elsewhere in his notes for Dialectics of Nature, Engels criticises those who refer only to the 
determining influence of “nature” on humanity and neglect the human modification of nature, 
writing:  
It is precisely the alteration of nature by men, not solely nature as such, 
which is [the] most essential and immediate basis of human thought, and it 
is in the measure that man has learned to change nature that his intelligence 
has increased. The naturalistic conception of history, as found, for instance 
to a greater or lesser extent in Draper and other scientists, as if nature 
                                                          
55 This is in response to Althusser, who argued that in Marx’s later writings he changed his outlook, 
abandoning his interest in the human essence and coming to see humans as nothing more than the 
outcome of the social relations in which they exist (Geras, 2016 [1983], p52).  
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exclusively reacts on man, and natural conditions everywhere exclusively 
determined his historical development, is therefore one-sided and forgets 
that man also reacts on nature, changing it and creating new conditions of 
existence for himself. There is devilishly little left of “nature” as it was in 
Germany at the time when the Germanic peoples immigrated into it. The 
earth’s surface, climate, vegetation, fauna and the human beings themselves 
have infinitely changed, and all this owing to human activity, while the 
changes of nature in Germany which have occurred in this period of time 
without human interference are incalculably small (“Notes and Fragments” 
to Engels, 1939 [1883], emphasis in original). 
As discussed in chapter three, Erle Ellis has more recently also referred to the need to 
understand the differentiated capacity of humans to “change to earth” as a key question for 
ecologists. Ellis also recognises the need to provide an explanation that is not reductionist, in 
other words that doesn’t reduce the question to one of differences in the genome or other 
biological differences between humans and other species (interview, 23 August 2016). For 
Ellis, niche construction is a key element of his understanding of how humans have modified 
biomes rather than simply adapting to their immediate environments (the original concept was 
meant to apply to all living things but Ellis is particularly interested in human environmental 
modification).  
However, a major limitation of Ellis’s work is that, in contrast to historical materialist 
approaches to this question, he has had very little to say about social structures among humans 
and the role these might play in enabling or driving modification of the biosphere. His work is 
in contrast with Malm, for example (2016), who sees climate change as rooted in (fairly 
recent) class struggle over the adoption of steam power in industry. Consequently, Ellis’s work 
can be criticised for its tendency to naturalise climate change, emphasising long-term changes 
to the biosphere over more recent phenomena, although in fairness he does note that recent 
climate change is quantitatively greater than in the past: “Really the amount of change going 
on now is orders of magnitude more than before… But the idea that humans are just recently 
becoming this transformative force in their environment is not true. Humans have always 
altered their environments—a lot” (interview, 23 August 2016).  
Some of the biologists mentioned in the previous chapter, by extending the insights of the 
niche construction approach, have come to similar conclusions about the importance of the 
human relationship with the environment in the evolution of the species. Humans, like all 
living things, construct a niche. But the human niche can encompass languages, cultural 
practices and the environments humans create including buildings, cities and institutions. 





for Chris Sinha: “humans are just niche constructors, that’s what humans are” (interview, 19 
August 2014). As with other species, niche construction can, in turn, influence the way in 
which the species has developed.  
To use an example related to Sinha’s work in linguistics, not all human cultures share the same 
metaphors for understanding how time passes. All, it seems, have some notion (expressed in 
language) that a human life involves a succession of events such as birth, adolescence, ageing, 
etc. However, the notion that time is cyclical, and associated cyclical expressions such as “all 
year round” and “round the clock” may be specific to cultures that use clocks and calendars 
rather than universal (Sinha and Gärdenfors, 2014). Sinha argues that cultures that have 
surrounded themselves with clocks have developed a cyclical understanding of time, making 
itself felt in the language used to refer to the passage of time. For Sinha, this conclusion is in 
line with Marxist ideas about alienation; the objects that humans produce through the labour 
process come to confront them as alien forces. It also chimes with the view of human nature 
outlined above, that human “nature”, rather than being something fixed, is able to adapt to 
changing external environments and that humans construct their nature by modifying the 
externalised world. If we follow Sinha’s way of thinking, it is not simply the case that human 
nature has initiated the Anthropocene, Anthropocene conditions might also be driving changes 
in the human species.  
Furthermore, this type of dialectical thinking offers an interpretation of how humans have 
evolved to be different from non-human ancestors that does not reduce this question to one of 
differences in the genome. The differentiated human ability to adapt an environment: 
Is the thing that makes human beings interesting and unique, it’s not the 
genome. The genome is, of course, unique in the sense that only one 
species has this particular genome. But that’s not it. It’s what the genome 
has adapted to as well as potentiated that makes us interesting” (interview, 
19 August 14).   
Although this work is somewhat speculative, Kevin Laland intriguingly argues that niche 
construction is one force that has allowed for humans to differentiate themselves from other 
animals. He notes that, although many animals display an impressive level of intelligence, 
humans have developed technological abilities not present in other species and have been able 
to produce a diversity of things not known in other species. In other words, humans have a 
unique capacity for culture that the standard evolutionary theory on its own falls short in 
explaining. Laland supposes, like Sinha, that the ability to modify the environment has created 
a positive feedback loop whereby the modified environments humans produce has also played 
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a role in driving human development (Laland, 2017).56 Niche construction therefore 
(controversially) includes cultural factors (defined as shared “ideas, beliefs, values, 
knowledge”) as forces in evolution—as these factors will, no doubt, influence the type of 
niches humans might construct and therefore direct the development of the human species. 
Laland gives some specific examples of “culture” leading to the selection of particular genes in 
humans, for example selection for lactose tolerance in groups of humans that farm cattle, 
suggesting that the everyday labour of these humans is making itself felt in their genes 
(Feldman and Laland, 1996, p453) although this work is controversial.  
This particular example might also prove uncomfortable for some of those radical biologists 
referred to in this thesis who have questioned the notion of genetic race. If “culture” can play a 
role in evolution, this suggests that cultural difference might lead to genetic differences 
between different human groups such as variations in their ability to tolerate lactose. But, as 
many have pointed out, there are in reality very few genetic differences between supposed 
human “races” (see El-Haj, 2007, pp283-286). Here Sinha’s clock example is interesting in 
that it does not require the selection of genes for clock use among people who have been 
influenced by the presence of clocks—clock use might influence behaviour and language in a 
group of individuals without the need for a gene “for” clock use that is inherited and selected 
for. Sinha’s example also of course does not require the separation of humans into the same 
traditional racial groups established by colonial powers from the 16th century onwards. He 
refers to the circumstances in which people live—in societies that use clocks versus those that 
don’t—rather than to putatively innate racial differences such as being black, white or Asian.  
In February 2018, studies of the full genomes of several Neolithic farmers (including one 
referred to as “Cheddar man”) appeared to confirm Laland’s hypothesis by showing that 
people living 6,000 years ago in what is now the British Isles were indeed lactose intolerant as 
well as having relatively dark coloured skin, the latter fact being more widely circulated in 
media reports (Brace et al, 2018). This suggests that lactose tolerance developed as humans 
started to farm animals. Provided with relatively tolerable Holocene conditions, these early 
farmers were able actively to drive their own evolution and develop lactose tolerance by 
constructing a pastoral niche. Although these processes are common to non-human species, the 
Holocene seems to have marked a qualitative shift in the capacity for humans to create such 
niches and simultaneously to evolve as a species in this account.  
Work such as this in niche construction therefore links the actions of humans at a local scale 
with the consequences of those actions, which manifest at a global scale in discussions of the 
Anthropocene. It is interesting to note then that two science writers, Margaret Lock and Gisli 
                                                          





Palsson perform a similar manoeuvre when describing how the Anthropocene changes 
common assumptions about biology. In Can Science Resolve the Nature/Nurture Debate? 
(2016) they explain how, having sequenced the human genome (in a project completed in 
2003), scientists are discovering that the genome is more complex than just a code that gets 
“read off” to produce proteins. There are also a host of other “epigenetic” processes at work. 
For example, the expression of genes can be turned on or off by processes such as DNA 
methylation, and that this may, it is suggested, be influenced by a person’s lifestyle or 
environment (Lock and Palsson, 2016, pp41-45; Parrington, 2015, chapter 9). Lock and 
Palsson argue, with reference to Richard Lewontin’s work, that new insights into epigenetics 
are challenging the determinist view that the sequence of genes in the genome alone can tell us 
what makes us human. Rather than “causing” development, genes are “activated by other parts 
of the genome responding to signals external and internal to the organism and its cells. 
Networks of interacting proteins are widely understood as self-organised and not as part of a 
pre-coded programme” (Lock and Palsson, 2016, p36). Epigenetics therefore suggests that the 
“environment” in which organisms live can modify their gene expression in heritable ways.  
All of this might seem far-removed from the concerns of environmental geography. However, 
for these authors, when discussing the “environment” in which a person lives and the possible 
influence this might have on how their genes are expressed, it is not sufficient to treat the 
“environment” as merely a person’s immediate surroundings. Lock and Palsson have therefore 
questioned dualist approaches to spatial scale, pointing to the mutual influence of processes at 
a global scale, those at the scale of the human body and those at intercellular level. The 
Anthropocene figures in this narrative as it “signals the collapse of this distinction between 
natural history and human history” such that human-initiated processes can no longer be easily 
differentiated from “natural” ones. Lock and Palsson might add that, in the Anthropocene, the 
environment that modifies gene expression is one that is itself modified by human activity. The 
socially produced environment that humans are exposed to is what Odling-Smee, Laland and 
Feldman (2003) might refer to as humans’ ecological inheritance. Lock and Palsson are 
consequently strongly opposed to the dualism inherent in trying to separate the biological body 
from the social body (2016, p55). 
By contrast, refusing to acknowledge global-scale environmental change has resulted in a kind 
of miniaturisation of “the environment” for biologists. In discussions of epigenetics, this has 
contributed to an understanding that the environment of a foetus is only their most immediate 
surroundings, leading to an overemphasis on lifestyle (particularly the lifestyle choices of 
pregnant mothers and its effects on foetal health) at the expense of social justice concerns 
related to phenomena operating at wider scales such as, perhaps, toxins in drinking water and 
the social relations that give rise to them.  
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Several of the scientists discussed in this thesis similarly draw on themes of the manipulability 
of the biological or natural world. For example, John Parrington’s popular genetics books draw 
attention to the ways in which genomes, often treated as essential and fixed are also potentially 
modified, by the environment in the case of epigenetics (Parrington, 2015) and by human 
action in the case of genome editing (Parrington, 2016).  
 
7.6: Conclusion 
When applied to human evolution, niche construction intriguingly suggests that human action, 
including in this case conscious action in producing a particular environment, might influence 
evolution. Although processes of niche construction are common to all living things—the 
ability of earthworms to modify the composition of soil is significant—Laland and Sinha 
would argue that the feedback loops created by the specific ways in which humans have 
changed the environment have allowed for humans to differentiate themselves from other 
living things. Rather than treating the ability to modify the environment as innate to humans, 
the niche construction perspective suggests a more contingent process whereby human nature 
has developed in a relation with the environment in which humans and human societies have 
evolved and where humans are also part of their environments. It sees this capacity as itself 
arising through an evolutionary process. From an ecological Marxist point of view it is also the 
specific social form in which humans are organised—ie capitalism—that has created a 
qualitative shift in the relationship with the rest of the biosphere rather than this process being 
linear or gradual.  
However, as Wilcox and Rutherford point out, despite humans’ differentiated ability to 
become historical actors, it is often forgotten that other animals also have a history. These 
authors would remind us that not only is historical analysis “important to animal geographies”, 
but that human subjects “are not the only beings capable of shaping the world” (Wilcox and 
Rutherford, 2018, pp2-3). It is further argued that perceiving animals as objects rather than 
subjects is related to their treatment as static or unchanging; to be considered active subjects it 
would also need to be recognised that animals shape the world in historically relevant ways 
such as, in the case of earthworms, by making changes to soil over time. The perception of 
animals as static is reinforced by cultural practices such as the ways in which animals are 
presented in natural history museums. Neglecting to historicise animals is one aspect of a 
human exceptionalism that treats them as part of a passive “nature” that serves as a 
background to human activity.  
However, since Darwin established the theory of evolution by natural selection, biology has 





sensibility evident in his final book on earthworms. As Darwin argues, the activity of worms 
may be slow but over time it can have dramatic effects including contributing to soils that 
human society relies on for agriculture. For niche construction biologists, animals do not 
merely have histories, they also play a role in shaping history to the extent that they alter their 
surroundings including modifying selection pressures that drive their own evolution. Taking a 
historical approach to animal geography reminds us that humans do not manipulate a passive 
and malleable earth, we act on an earth that is already being continually churned by worms. 
Recognising the difference in capacity to modify the environment between humans and other 
animals goes against the new materialist tendency to flatten agency such that human and non-
human agencies are all the same. However, it does not follow that other species are not 
“historical” or that they have not played a constitutive role in the development of human 
societies. An approach that recognises the differentiated capacities of humans as opposed to 
other animals need not mean that humans are able to freely manipulate the rest of the 
biosphere according to their will.  
  






Conclusion: Towards a dialectical political ecology 
This thesis has argued throughout that the proposed designation of an Anthropocene epoch 
(see Bonneuil and Fressoz, 2017, pp3-4) will have transformative consequences for 
environmental theory. It looks increasingly likely that scientists will locate the start date of the 
epoch in the middle of the 20th century (Anthropocene Working Group, 2016). Such a recent 
start for the Anthropocene would make it unfeasible that the situation was caused by human 
activity per se; the new epoch must have arisen as a result of the influence of capitalism 
throughout the world. Therefore, the critiques of specifically capitalist socio-ecological 
relations outlined in chapter two of this thesis, although in many cases they predate discussions 
of the Anthropocene, are indispensable when it comes to making sense of it. Marx’s own 
work, although his writings on nature were incomplete, offer the basis on which to do this. In 
particular, as demonstrated in chapter two, the value theory developed in Capital and his 
writings on the metabolic relationship with nature have both been used productively by 
subsequent generations of ecological Marxists to develop an understanding of capitalist socio-
natures today (see Burkett, 2014 and Huber, 2017 on value theory, Foster, 1999 on metabolism 
and Saito, 2017 on alienation). 
Following Lorimer’s work (2012; 2015), it is further argued that the idea of the Anthropocene 
can be mobilised in order to build a more progressive political ecology. But, rather than 
naturalising the existing state of things, there is a widely recognised need to discuss how the 
Anthropocene came about. The new epoch calls for an approach to socio-natural relations that 
emphasises how these relations have changed through time; as biologists Levins and Lewontin 
have long argued (2006), there is a need to discuss what processes led to things becoming the 
way they are and how these processes might play out in the future. A theory adequate to the 
Anthropocene must therefore be both historical and political. It must be capable of capturing 
process, complexity and internal relations.  
Such an approach should avoid reducing questions of human behaviour to issues of biology. 
As ecologist Ian Rappel, with reference to Richard Lewontin, points out, those thinkers who 





taken such a reductionist approach, positing an external relationship between humans and 
nature rather than a dialectical one (Rappel, 2015, pp107-108). Murray Smith similarly guards 
against the dualism that sees human conscious activity as reducible either to the material or 
natural or to “ideas” distinct from concrete activity (Smith, 2009, pp376-378). This thesis has 
demonstrated how dialectical biologists including Levins and Lewontin and their peers have 
developed the type of non-reductionist methodology that is needed and how their work might 
inform a more ecologically engaged Marxism. 
 
8.1: What kind of science for the Anthropocene? 
The contributions of dialectical biologists are varied. Indeed, as Levins and Lewontin are 
understandably keen to point out, their dialectics is more a “habit of thought” (Levins and 
Lewontin, 1985, p267) than a list of rules to follow. Dialectics, for them, is a predilection 
towards looking for complexity, dynamism and agency in the biological world rather than a 
rigid series of laws that a biologist comes ready equipped with when they carry out their 
research. As Levins argues, part of Lysenko’s mistake was to try to work from philosophical 
principles to reach biological conclusions (Levins, 2007). Such an approach is dualist in itself 
as it suggests that scientists are detached from their object of study and simply approach it 
from the outside. If such a view of scientific practice was ever tenable, it is harder to justify if 
we fully accept the implications of the Anthropocene, whereby humans are transforming the 
biosphere in intensive as well as extensive ways.  
However, despite the dialectical biologists’ reluctance to put forward a list of laws, some 
themes can be discerned from their work that are relevant to the debates outlined in the first 
half of this thesis. Firstly, understanding systems as existing in a state of flux has been central 
to the project of dialectical biology, as has accounting for processes that, rather than being 
“social” or “natural” are irrevocably socio-natural. Instead of assuming systems to be static 
unless an external force encounters them, dialectical thinkers assume systems to be dynamic 
and treat stasis as an aberration to be explained (Levins and Lewontin, 1985, p277). As well as 
Engels’ hints about “matter in motion”, such thinking echoes Bertell Ollman’s point that 
dialectics is a method for grasping the inherent dynamism of the world. Ollman even 
introduces his study of dialectics by comparing it to attempting to jump onto a moving car as 
opposed to one that is stationary; one needs a method of understanding how fast the car is 
moving and in what direction (Ollman, 2003, p11).  
This is also one of the most expressly political aspects of dialectical thought as it recognises 
that the potential for change is always inherent in the conditions of the present. It is analogous 
to the way in which Marx analysed the dynamics of capitalism and the prospects for its future 
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development. With regards to environmental issues specifically, Neil Smith also criticises the 
persistent assumption that nature is external to human history, and consequently that the latter 
is universal and does not go through changes of its own (2008, pp11-12). As demonstrated in 
this thesis, this idea of an unchanging nature runs counter to much of thinking in biology, 
which has recognised the dynamism of ecosystems and where the creation of novel ecosystems 
by human activity is increasingly a focus of interest (Hobbs et al, 2006).  
Secondly, dialectical biology is informed by materialism. In fact, many of the biologists 
referred to here are engaged in a critique of the type of idealistic thinking that sees the 
information contained in genes as the sole or primary causal factor in evolution. They have 
seen this tendency to explain complex systems by reference to their smallest and most stable 
units as symptomatic of the reductionism and genetic determinism common in biology and 
even suggested that reductionism is due to the influence of bourgeois individualism (Levins, 
1981). Like the new materialists, some biologists have developed an approach that engages 
with the physical properties of material things such as those attributes that enable animal 
bodies to maintain their stability. For example, Stuart Newman has highlighted the way in 
which the properties of animal tissues impose constraints on the direction in which natural 
selection can drive the evolution of animal forms (Newman, 2007). Organisms cannot freely 
evolve in any direction in response to pressures from the environment like a ball rolled across 
a table; instead, trying to roll a polyhedron on a flat surface would be a more apt analogy 
(Clark and York, 2005a).   
The insight that organisms do not passively respond to environmental influence is related to a 
more general turn towards recognising the active role of living things in evolution that has 
been promoted by Lewontin in particular (Lewontin, 2007, Levins and Lewontin, 1985). This 
emphasis on what might be described as a type of “agency” extended to non-human living 
things deserves to be seen as the foremost contribution of dialectical biology. The theory of 
niche construction, influenced by Lewontin, is changing how biologists think about evolution 
with its striking conclusion that organisms drive their own evolution by exposing themselves 
to different selection pressures. The theory has also been taken up by ecologists who have 
questioned the assumption that ecosystems have a fixed carrying capacity—with its 
implications for human population—given that organisms construct their niche rather than 
simply adapting to fit a pre-existing mould (Vandermeer, 2008). Niche construction has also 
been utilised by political ecologists to challenge adaptationist thinking, for example the 
assumption that populations (of humans) act in order to adapt to fluctuations in their 
environments (Watts, 2015).  
Theories that take account of niche construction introduce some complexity into how theorists 





that organism influences environment and vice versa in an external relation. It also requires an 
acknowledgement that the environment effectively does not exist prior to the organism that 
inhabits it (Levins and Lewontin, 2007, p34). However, its advocates do not say that the 
distinction between organism and environment is dissolved completely in favour of seeing 
them together as an “organism-environment complex”. John Vandermeer (quoted in chapter 
five) refers instead to a dynamic and mutually creative relationship.  
Brandon and Antonovics (1996, p174) concur that the theory cannot be understood 
atemporally. In other words, if organism and environment are assumed to both be static it is 
possible to consider them as separate entities, but when the way each transforms the other 
through time is taken into account, organism and environment come to be seen as cause and 
effect of each other. This seems to accord with the point Braun makes in his critique of new 
materialism’s engagement with biology. Braun argues that the organism cannot simply be seen 
as the outcome of a complex of relations; it must also itself maintain some kind of stability and 
efficacy in order to have a constructive effect on the environment (Braun, 2006, pp209-210). 
This view also forms the basis of a Marxist interpretation of human nature, as it is strikingly 
similar to Marx’s complex and contradictory view of human nature as having an “essence” 
which, at the same time, is also the ensemble of social relations (see chapter seven).  
Thirdly, dialectical biologists have integrated understandings from the social and natural 
sciences to develop an approach that, drawing on the previous points, assumes that socio-
natural systems are dynamic rather than static and accounts for the agency of living things 
within those systems. Ivette Perfecto and John Vandermeer have done much to develop this 
approach and apply it to real-world agricultural contexts. The contributions of these ecologists 
to this field are multiple and are only briefly summarised here. They have highlighted the way 
in which the human creation of new ecosystems can, rather than simply being a threat to 
nature, actually in some cases enable other species to flourish. They have referred to the 
functional capacities of various species living in coffee plantations, particularly as sources of 
autonomous pest control in agriculture (Vandermeer, Perfecto and Philpott, 2010). In this they 
have come to conclusions similar to those reached by Lorimer in his (2015) study of the way 
rewilding makes use of the activities of animals like the Heck cattle introduced to the 
Oostvaardersplassen to recreate the grazing processes of their extinct relatives. And these 
dialectical biologists have extended Levins’ work on metapopulations to show how species of 
organism often exist in patches within a matrix and argued that conservationists ought to take 
account of the ways in which organisms migrate between patches of suitable habitat rather 
than treating each patch as separate (Perfecto and Vandermeer, 2002; 2008).  
Perfecto and Vandermeer have also shown how socio-natural systems often display a 
distinctive temporal dynamic; they might exist in one state for some time until some influence 
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forces them to switch to a qualitatively different state rather than there being a smooth and 
gradual transition, with intermediate stages, from one syndrome of production to another. 
Drawing on their expertise in coffee agriculture, with the case of transitions between sun 
coffee and shade coffee regimes, these biologists have illustrated mathematically how systems 
can shift from one state to another (Vandermeer and Perfecto, 2012).  
The final point here about coffee regimes being characterised by abrupt shifts between states is 
particularly relevant to discussions of the Anthropocene as human action is one such influence 
that could lead socio-natural systems to reach tipping points and suddenly and unexpectedly 
shift from one state to another. Indeed, the Anthropocene itself could be seen as an example of 
a rapid shift in socio-natural relations on a global scale taking place (perhaps) in the middle of 
the 20th century. Discussions of the Anthropocene have demonstrated the need for a theory 
that not only historicises socio-natural relations but also recognises that quantitative change 
can become qualitative. As Clark, Foster and York point out with regards to the relationship 
between Marxism and evolutionary theory: “A key feature of the Marxist view of history is 
that change is not typically smooth and continuous, but rather, often occurs very rapidly 
following periods of stasis” (Clark, Foster and York, 2007, p538). In an example that Perfecto 
and Vandermeer are familiar with, pest outbreaks are often characterised by the pest 
population remaining low for some time interspersed with periods of rapid population growth, 
often as a result of the interactions between the species of interest and its predators or 
symbionts. This emphasis is exemplified by the dialectical approach expressed in Gould and 
Eldredge’s theory of punctuated equilibria in palaeontology as well as Perfecto and 
Vandermeer’s work. The following points therefore summarise the key ways in which the 
dialectical approach outlined in this thesis differs from what might be called “mainstream 
biology”:  
 Dynamism is assumed, it is stasis that requires explanation. 
 Historical understanding of time that emphasises development rather than reversible 
change. 
 Change is often understood as rapid, interspersed with periods of stasis, rather than 
gradual. 
 Parts cannot be understood without reference to the whole, abstraction needed as a 
method in order to focus on some elements of a totality at any one point.  
 Genes are important but there is a need to understand their operation in the context of 
the organism as a totality. 
 Focus on the material properties of DNA and other aspects of biological systems. 
 Ecosystems are constantly changing, never in their final state.  





 Organisms play an active role in seeking, defining and modifying their environment. 
 Processes of niche construction or environmental modification influence evolution as 
an organism’s offspring (as well as other organisms in an ecosystem) are exposed to 
the effects of this process.  
 Carrying capacities of ecosystems are not fixed and do not simply apply an external 
pressure to organisms.  
As this thesis has dealt with the contributions of a group of biologists who are influenced by 
Marxism, it has inevitably addressed the issue of the way in which scientists carry out their 
work and the attitude social scientists might take to ideas from biology. Science is often 
assumed to involve neutral practitioners observing processes within a system of which they are 
not part. As explained in chapter two, this seems to have been the assumption of Georg 
Lukács, for whom there can be no dialectics of nature as this would simply involve witnessing 
the unfolding of a series of laws in an external nature. Lukács’ view has now been refuted by 
many (Burkett, 2013) and the dialectical biologists have demonstrated through their practice 
that it is possible for scientists to be engaged in their subject of study while also recognising 
the role of human influence in apparently “natural” environments. For example, Perfecto and 
Vandermeer are both political in the sense of openly expressing an opinion about the 
phenomena they are studying, driven by their preference for organic agriculture managed by 
small farmers, and they have also sought out examples of agro-ecosystems where they can 
study the interrelated influence of human actions and those of other species. The 
Anthropocene, as mentioned above, also emphasises the impossibility of treating nature as 
distinct from society. Furthermore, the theory of niche construction has demonstrated that, 
contra Lukács, the subject-object dialectic is indeed present in “nature”; it is not unique to 
humans but might actually play a role in the evolution of species in general.  
Levins, Lewontin and other dialectical thinkers have developed a distinctive approach to the 
philosophy of science. Key to this has been a critique, developed by activists, of the notion that 
science is neutral. But these thinkers also differentiate themselves from those social scientists 
who reduce science to ideology, unrelated to any truth about the real world. As discussed in 
chapter five, by stating that science is “class science”, that nevertheless tells us “real truths 
about the world” (Levins, 1981, Sur, 2008), Levins in particular has emphasised the 
irresolvable internal contradictions driving science. These contradictions mean that science can 
progress as new knowledge is added but can also be held back as determinist and reductionist 
assumptions limit scientists’ ability to make sense of the new information generated.  
The view of science as contradictory has meant that discussions of science for these thinkers 
can involve debates about its content—which scientific findings are right or wrong—as well as 
addressing matters of ideology such as the ways in which science under capitalism serves a 
200 Conclusion: Towards a dialectical political ecology 
 
particular purpose (although of course as activists they have done much to address the latter). 
Without recognising this contradictory dynamic, it would be impossible for dialectical 
biologists to carry out their work. If they saw statements about the content of science as simply 
expressing the class position of the scientist they would presumably be able to deduce 
scientific knowledge from their own philosophical principles, imposing a proletarian science in 
place of bourgeois science (as was attempted so disastrously in the Soviet Union). Therefore it 
is possible to discern an approach to scientific practice based on that developed by Richard 
Levins and Science for the People and on critical approaches to the Anthropocene. Such an 
agenda might be summarised as follows:  
 Subject and object are internally related. 
 Scientists are part of and also modifiers of nature.  
 Science is a social activity that produces a profit like other forms of work.  
 Scientists should be open about their political views. Knowledge, including scientific 
knowledge, is unavoidably biased.  
 Science finds out truths about the world. 
 The class basis and truth of science present an unresolvable contradiction. 
 
It should, of course, not be surprising that the ideas of Levins and Lewontin and other 
dialectical biologists support a Marxist view of society, nature and human nature. They have 
read Marx and Engels’ work themselves and are influenced by it. For example it is no 
coincidence that Sinha’s work on human evolution and language bears some resemblance to 
Engels’ comments on human evolution in Dialectics of Nature (see chapter seven). 
Admittedly, this runs the risk of creating a circular argument, where Marxist ideas influence 
biology which in turn provides a basis for confirming the validity of the Marxist view. Indeed, 
once it is recognised that science is not neutral, it is no longer feasible to use ideas from 
science as a basis on which to justify one way of thinking or another.  
However, although many of the biologists interviewed here would argue that their mind was 
prepared to see things in a particular way due to their philosophical background, having a 
philosophical outlook is no substitute for doing the painstaking work of collecting data and 
carrying out experiments in the lab or field that they have built their careers on. They might 
also point out that all scientists have a philosophy; not just Marxists. Darwin was influenced 
by liberal, Malthusian ideas in developing his theory of natural selection and his work was 
later used to justify these same ideas. This does not mean that Darwin’s ideas are false, merely 
that we ought to recognise that he was influenced by the prevailing ideas of his day. Therefore, 





debates about biology, it would only leave the field dominated by conservative or bourgeois 
interpretations. 
 
8.2: What kind of politics? 
The contribution of dialectical thinkers to debates among biologists and sociologists of science 
is interesting in its own right. However, this thesis has aimed to use their ideas to engage 
productively with two debates; that between ecological Marxists and theorists in the new/vital 
materialist tradition and another debate among Marxists about the nature of a dialectics of 
nature. For example, there have been arguments between metabolic rift theorists and advocates 
of a world-ecology approach with the latter accusing the former of soft dualism and the former 
responding by defending an account of society and nature as a differentiated unity.  
Perhaps the key contribution of ecological Marxism has been in politicising the Anthropocene 
and uncovering the capitalist social relations at the root of many of the environmental 
problems associated with it. In some ways therefore it is understandable that Marxists would 
want to centre their analysis on human activity in developing a critique of the specifically 
capitalist production of nature. As Smith argues: “There can be no apology for the 
anthropomorphism of this perspective: with the development of capitalism, human society has 
put itself at the centre of nature, and we shall be able to deal with the problems this has created 
only if we first recognise the reality” (Smith, 2008, p8).  
However, some have been dissatisfied with Marxist accounts that seem to foreground human 
agency while paying little attention to the actions of non-human species. Marxists have 
therefore been accused of anthropocentrism (see for example, Bennett, 2010, p.xvi). 
Anthropocentrism can end up treating the non-human world as freely manipulable by human 
action. If nature is treated as merely “brute matter” it is cautioned that it may become seen as 
the backdrop against which politics plays out (Hinchliffe, 2008) or, worse, as simply a 
resource there to be appropriated for human use (Braun, 2011). 
Somewhat counterintuitively then, in discussions of the Anthropocene epoch where it might be 
expected that narratives that centre on human activity would predominate, new or vital 
materialist approaches have become common within geography and cognate disciplines. These 
theoretical trends are characterised by their tendency to expand the notion of agency well 
beyond seeing it as a possession of the human subject (see Braun, 2009; 2015). As well as their 
engagement with non-human agency, new/vital materialists are interested in the properties of 
things and the processes that crystallise into things at particular moments. By refusing to 
divide the world into lively humans and inert matter they have developed an approach that, 
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from the outset, resists dualist interpretations that start from society and nature as two separate 
poles.  
As explained in chapter three, new materialist accounts have been met with their own 
criticisms. These theories have been described as “politically inert”, with their advocates 
reluctant to make normative judgements (Kirsch and Mitchell, 2004, pp694-695). Indeed, in 
these narratives there is often a lack of attention to the directedness of social relations—and the 
processes by which humans might gain power over each other or over non-humans. Some have 
drawn fairly conservative conclusions about the political action needed to approach some of 
the environmental problems they highlight, in some cases offering little other than an 
inducement to be more open to the capacities and performances of the things of the world.  
However, despite their limitations, these theories do offer a genuine challenge for Marxists. 
Some have responded to this challenge with calls to develop a “dialectical naturalism” (see 
Brincat and Gerber, 2015, p887) that denies the separation between humanity and nature. As 
explained in chapter two, misgivings about the tendency in some accounts to ignore non-
human agency have also been raised by those sympathetic to Marxism. For example, Jason 
Moore, although critical of new materialist flat ontologies, has identified a need for a political 
approach that attends to the specifics of non-human processes rather than just seeing non-
human nature as wholly absorbed into capitalism (Moore, 2017b, p299).  
Contra the accusations of some of the new materialists, there have always been interpretations 
of Marx’s ecology that have always avoided crudely establishing society and nature as two 
separate poles that come to relate. For example, Smith is less interested in understanding how 
society and nature relate and more concerned with a dialectical interpretation of the processes 
that have led to them becoming separated. For Smith, such a method “begins with the relation 
with nature as a unity and derives as a simultaneously historical and logical result whatever 
separation between them exists” (Smith, 2008, p48). In pursuing this approach, Smith follows 
Marx and Engels, whose starting point in their early work is that humans are part of nature, 
and who therefore develop a complex understanding of how humans oppose themselves to 
nature through the labour process (see Murray Smith’s 2009 article “Against Dualism” and 
also chapter two).  
As Burkett adds, Marx himself also refers to the ways in which processes outside of the direct 
control of humans contribute to wealth or use value (if not the specific form of value that is 
produced solely by exploited workers in a capitalist system). For example, Marx explains how 
in wine production the wine needs to be left alone for the yeast to produce alcohol: this process 
is, to some extent, outside of human control (the capitalist may wish to speed this up in order 





Here the need to leave the wine for a period of time causes an interruption in the labour 
process; although the activities of the yeast are part of production, these activities are not 
themselves understood as labour (Burkett, 2014, pp43-44). However, the intention of this 
thesis is not to recount the references to non-human activity in Marx’s own writings. Instead, 
following Harvey’s maxim that “the only way to understand [Marx’s] method is by following 
his practice” (Harvey, 1996, p48), it has pursued the project of understanding how a group of 
Marxists have utilised his dialectical methods in practice in their own discipline of biology.  
Some Marxist theorists, notably Andreas Malm, have responded to the challenge posed by new 
materialisms by retreating into a defence of dualism. Contra not just the new materialists but 
much of contemporary environmental geography, Malm sees an issue like air pollution as best 
understood by treating society as expelling its waste into an external nature (Malm, 2018, 
p178): nature really is something that develops separately from human activity. Tellingly, he 
repeatedly uses the example of British imperialists coming across a coal seam on the island of 
Labuan near Borneo to illustrate his understanding of nature as something that predominantly 
exists prior to human action and is “encountered” by humans rather than produced or 
constructed (Malm, 2018, p42).   
Far from defending this distinction between society and nature, this thesis has demonstrated, 
with the work of the dialectical biologists, that it is possible to develop a Marxist approach that 
takes seriously the material properties of the non-human world and the agential capacities of 
non-humans. Indeed, this project is central to the approach to biology developed by Levins and 
Lewontin and other dialectical thinkers. However, such a project is also compatible with one 
that acknowledges the role of humans in producing socio-natures in historically and 
geographically specific ways.  
The dialectical biologists are often mentioned approvingly by social scientists. As chapter two 
has shown, debates over the dialectics of nature have re-emerged among Marxists in recent 
years. And theorists on all sides are keen to claim Levins and Lewontin as their own (see, for 
example, the references to their work in that of the metabolic rift theorists Clark and York, 
2005a and 2005b and in Moore’s book, 2015, p46). Malm refers to Levins and Lewontin 
briefly to assert that conscious planning is unique to humans and to argue against a holism that 
simply states that everything is connected (2018, pp87 and 182). Here, this thesis is in 
agreement with Malm on both these specific points. However, Levins and Lewontin’s 
contributions in general do not support his views.  
The work of dialectical biologists, instead of emphasising disunity between social and natural 
processes, has drawn attention to the impossibility of separating the two. Levins and Lewontin 
refer to Ollman in their work (Levins and Lewontin, 2007, p186) and are evidently influenced 
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by his philosophy of internal relations in several aspects of their thinking, including, for 
example, their understanding of dynamism as inherent to socio-natural processes rather than 
such systems being animated by an external force. The striking statement “the environment 
does not exist” is not the hubristic assertion of an idealist thinker but is, of course, a quote 
from Richard Lewontin that appears in several of his works (Levins and Lewontin, 2007, p34; 
Lewontin, 2001) and that, it can only be assumed, he stands by. Therefore, if ecological 
Marxists are consistent in calling for a dialectics of nature—and Levins and Lewontin are the 
closest that can be found to a real-world example of a dialectics of nature—this is an aspect of 
their thought that ought not to be overlooked. And, as evidenced at some length in this thesis, 
it would be remiss to ignore or discount theories of the agency of non-humans. Although 
humans have a differentiated capacity to modify the environment compared to other species, 
the actions of ants, earthworms, beavers, cattle, bacteria and multiple other species produce 
their own spectacular transformations and relate in complex ways to the niches created by 
humans.    
In conclusion, it is an interesting time to be discussing Marx and nature. The multiple and 
emerging environmental problems highlighted daily in the media make this an urgent task. It is 
argued here that theorists ought to engage with debates about the Anthropocene despite the 
fact that there are many interpretations of the Anthropocene that critical geographers will find 
problematic. For one thing, for the scientists currently considering the Anthropocene there is 
substantial evidence for the epochal shift it signifies. This thesis has developed a critical 
approach to scientific knowledge and has questioned the assumption that scientists have 
unmediated access to a singular and stable nature. Nevertheless, the intention here is not to 
deny the reality of the rising global temperatures, increasing amounts of plastic in the oceans, 
declines in biodiversity and a whole range of other alarming signals of global biospheric 
instability. But the lively discussions among Marxists show that the environment and wildlife 
are no longer seen as outside of the concerns of socialists. These altercations will no doubt 
continue and the input of biologists will not settle them conclusively. However, it is hoped that 
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